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Abstract 
Drawing from many disciplines, the report adopts a behavioural psychology perspective to argue that “social media changes people’s 
political behaviour”. Four pressure points are identified and analysed in detail: the attention economy; choice architectures; algorithmic 
content curation; and mis/disinformation. Policy implications are outlined in detail. 
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Preface 
This report is the second output from the Joint Research Centre’s (JRC) Enlightenment 2.0 multi-annual 
research programme. The work started with the classical Enlightenment premise that reason is the primary 
source of political authority and legitimacy. Recognising that advances in behavioural, decision and social 
sciences demonstrate that we are not purely rational beings, we sought to understand the other drivers 
that influence political decision-making. The first output “Understanding our political nature: how to put 
knowledge and reason at the heart of policymaking” published in 20191, addressed some of the most 
pressing political issues of our age. However, some areas that we consider crucial to providing an updated 
scientific model of the drivers of political decision-making were not fully addressed. One of them is the 
impact of our contemporary digital information space on the socio-psychological mechanisms of opinion 
formation, decision-making and political behaviour. 
The JRC, together with a team of renowned experts addresses this knowledge deficit in a report that 
synthesises the knowledge about digital technology, democracy and human behaviour to enable 
policymakers to safeguard a participatory and democratic European future through legislation that aligns 
with human thinking and behaviour in a digital context. It is hoped that this report will prove useful as 
policymakers reflect upon the forthcoming European Democracy Action Plan, the Digital Services Act, the 
EU Citizenship Report 2020, as well as on how to legislate against disinformation. 
The report has been written in spring/summer of 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic took hold of Europe 
and the world. During this time, our democracies suffered while technology played a crucial role in keeping 
societies functioning in times of lockdown. From remote distance education to teleworking, religious 
services to staying in touch with family and friends, for many but not all, everyday activities moved online. 
Additionally, technological applications and initiatives multiplied in an attempt to limit the spread of the 
disease, treat patients and facilitate the tasks of overworked essential personnel. 
Conversely, however, significant fundamental rights questions have been raised as unprecedented 
initiatives to track, trace and contain the pandemic using digital technologies have proven controversial. 
Governments invoking emergency measures in support of public health decision-making, used advanced 
analytics to collect, process and share data for effective front-line responses that lacked transparency and 
public consultation. 
When used as an information source, social media have been found to present a health risk that is partly 
due to their role as disseminators of health-related conspiracies, with non-English language speakers 
being at greater risk of exposure to misinformation during the crisis. It is likely that these technologies will 
have a long-lasting impact beyond COVID-19. Yet despite the immediacy of the crisis, the authors invite 
the reader to take a longer perspective on technology and democracy to get a deeper understanding of 
the interrelated nuances. In dark times, we seek to bring light to the importance of understanding the 
influence of online technologies on political behaviour and decision-making. 
 
  
                                                 
1 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/facts4eufuture/understanding-our-political-nature  
 
 
P
a
g
e 
4
 
Executive summary 
The historical foundation of the European Union lies in the ideal of democracy as a mode of governing 
social, political and economic relations across European states with the objective of ensuring peace. This 
has led to an unprecedented period of peace across the Union. 
Yet today some of the institutions, norms and rules that underpin this structure are experiencing major 
pressure. A functioning democracy depends on the ability of its citizens to make informed 
decisions. Open discussions based on a plurality of opinions are crucial; however, the digital information 
sphere, which is controlled by few actors without much oversight, is bringing new information challenges 
that silently shape and restrict debate. 
In terms of understanding the online environment, there are three key vectors that deserve 
consideration by policymakers: actors, content and behaviours. For the most part, ongoing policy 
reflections have concentrated on understanding the actors and the nature of content. In the absence of 
behavioural reflections, policymakers may feel that they are constantly playing catch-up with 
technological advances. Taking a behavioural approach, this report seeks to help policymakers regain 
agency. Essential components of human behaviour are governed by relatively stable principles 
that remain largely static even as the technological environment changes rapidly. 
Before getting into the details, we provide an answer to the basic question “Do we behave differently 
online? If so, why?” The web is cognitively unique, resulting in specific psychological responses to its 
structure and functionality and differences in perception and behaviour. Structural factors in the design of 
online environments can affect how individuals process information and communicate with one another. 
Importantly, there is scientific evidence that social media changes people’s political behaviour 
offline; this includes the incitement of dangerous behaviours such as hate crimes. 
Based upon an in-depth scientific analysis, four pressure points are identified that emerge when people 
and the online environment are brought into contact without much public oversight or democratic 
governance: i) Attention economy; ii) Choice Architectures; iii) Algorithmic content curation; iv) 
Misinformation and disinformation. Each pressure point is tackled in terms of its specific characteristics 
and how it affects behaviour. A dedicated chapter looks at the implications for policy. 
Attention economy — human behaviour unfolds online in an economy in which human attention is the 
predominant commodity. The digital sphere is designed so that people give their valuable resources of 
time, attention and data without considering the costs — for themselves and others. This exploits certain 
features of human behaviour, which makes it hard to address at the individual level. On a societal level, 
coordination is needed to assure privacy and autonomy as a public good, otherwise there are deep conflicts 
with the principles of democracy, freedom and equality. 
Social media poses a risk for the fundamental rights to data protection and privacy of users, and even for 
non-users that extends far beyond what individuals explicitly share with social media sites, because of 
how much can be inferred from users’ activity. Ensuring online privacy preserves three core 
components of democratically empowered voters: freedom of association, truth-finding and 
opportunities to discover new perspectives. Effective privacy online means a strengthened 
democracy offline. 
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The effects of highly personalised advertisements directed at users based on personal behavioural 
characteristics — the practice referred to as microtargeting — are nuanced and difficult to assess. 
However, there is enough evidence of (at least potential) harm to concern policymakers. The 
microtargeting of political messages has considerable potential to undermine democratic 
discourse — a foundation of democratic choice. Furthermore, research shows that the public are 
opposed to microtargeting about certain content (including political advertising) or based on certain 
sensitive attributes (including political affiliation). 
Despite ongoing discussions about further online regulation, the web experience is uniquely subjective and 
largely influenced by the algorithms of private actors designed to maximise profits by capturing our 
attention without any public accountability. Consequently, business models prevalent in today’s online 
economy constrain the solutions that are achievable without regulatory intervention. 
Choice architectures — are an important determinant of online behaviour. Companies use defaults, 
framing and dark patterns to shape user behaviour. These prompt lenient privacy settings to 
increase user engagement. These design features limit freedom of association, truth-finding, 
opportunities to discover new perspectives, creating challenges for democratic discourse and 
the autonomous formation of political preferences. 
Importantly, users are generally unfamiliar with what data they produce, provide to others and how that 
data is collected and stored when they perform basic tasks on social media platforms. 
Algorithmic content curation — algorithms are an indispensable aspect of digital technologies which 
can be used or abused to impact user satisfaction, engagement, political views and awareness. Curated 
newsfeeds and automated recommender systems are designed to maximize user attention by 
satisfying their presumed preferences, which can mean highlighting polarising, misleading, 
extremist or otherwise problematic content to maximize user engagement. The ranking of content 
— including political messages — in newsfeeds, search engine ordering and recommender systems can 
causally influence our preferences and perceptions. 
While the evidence on filter bubbles is ambiguous, there is legitimacy to the societal concerns raised about 
echo chambers. Scientific findings suggest that there is an ideological asymmetry in the prevalence of 
echo chambers, with people on the populist right being more likely to consume and share untrustworthy 
information. 
Misinformation and disinformation — misinformation generally makes up a small fraction of the 
average person’s “media diet”, but some demographics are disproportionately susceptible (advanced age, 
some cognitive attributes). The problem of misleading online content extends far beyond strict “fake news” 
and when misleading content is considered in its entirety, the problem is extensive and concerning. 
Two core attributes from the attention economy and human psychology create the perfect conditions for 
the spread of misinformation: algorithms that promote attractive, engaging content and people’s 
strong predisposition to orient towards negative news, as most “fake news” tends to evoke 
negative emotions such as fear, anger and outrage. 
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The shape and spread of misinformation is governed by social media network structures; they 
can give rise to significant distortions in perceived social signals that in turn can affect the entrenchment 
of attitudes. 
There are asymmetries in how false or misleading content and genuine content spread online, with 
misinformation arguably spreading faster and further than true information. Some of this asymmetry is 
driven by emotional content and differing levels of novelty. 
Related to this, the interpretation and classification of misleading content often turns on subtle issues of 
intent and context that are difficult for third parties — especially algorithms — to ascertain, making it 
difficult to distinguish legitimate political speech from illegitimate content. 
Taking democracy online — this chapter looks at the pros and cons of encouraging democracy online. 
Some self-governed online fora have been identified as contributing to radicalisation and toxic extremism. 
Secluded online spaces can function as laboratories that develop extremist talking points that 
then find entry into the mainstream. Importantly, however, online spaces can also provide voices 
to marginalised and disadvantaged communities. 
Current social media platform architectures are not primarily designed for democratic discourse, yet they 
are heavily used for political purposes and debates. The platforms may, for example, provide social signals 
that can lead to misperceptions about relative group sizes. This has consequences for social movements 
who can come to believe that their ideas have broader penetration than they actually do. 
Importantly, government-supported platforms have been shown to allow large-scale public consultation 
with existing research in online deliberative spaces suggesting that when properly designed and 
managed well, online deliberation may match the success of offline deliberative processes. 
What does this mean for policy? — this chapter translates the impact of the four pressure points into 
implications for policymakers. Given the integrated nature of these pressure points, it is not meaningful 
to recommend individual policy actions. Instead, the three fundamental democratic principles of equality, 
representation and participation are used as a framework to shape the proposals formulated in this 
chapter. 
Future Research Agenda — of all current and future human behaviours, online political behaviours are 
perhaps the most important ones for our collective future. However, a mix of platform reticence and a lack 
of regulatory clarity have hampered a full scientific understanding of these behaviours. This chapter 
proposes a collectively operated, publicly funded European alternative to commercial platforms that would 
see the research community and citizens jointly pursue a research agenda to understand the influence of 
digital technology on democracy. 
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In the 5 minutes it took you to get to this page... There have been 
20 million Google searches, 6.5 million Facebook logins, 95 
million WhatsApp messages sent, 12.5 million Snaps created on 
Snapchat, 23.5 million videos viewed on YouTube, 8 million Tinder 
swipes, 1 million Tweets tweeted, 7,000 TikTok downloads and 
3.5 million Instagrams scrolled. That’s a lot of posting, swiping, 
tweeting, scrolling, liking, sharing, downloading, viewing and 
snapping but what does it all mean? Who controls that data, 
what are they doing with it, and by what authority? 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The historical foundation of the European Union lies in ensuring peace in Europe by means of democracy 
as the ideal way of governing social, political and economic relations across the Union. This ideal has been 
put into practice within and across Member States through a set of institutions, norms, rights and rules 
that have regulated the relationship of trust and legitimacy between governments and citizens, giving rise 
to democracy as arguably one of the most stable forms of political system and collective living. 
Yet today some of these institutions, norms and rules are witnessing major pressure to keep apace with 
the evolving character of societies as well as with their ways of constituting themselves as a political 
community. A functioning democracy empowered by fundamental rights depends on the ability of its 
citizens to make informed decisions. Open discussions based on a plurality of opinions are crucial to 
identify the best arguments, exchange diverse viewpoints and build consensus. Therefore, freedom of 
discussing and exchanging ideas is of essential importance. 
However, the digital information space is bringing new challenges on a different level. In an online 
“marketplace of ideas” [1], where attention is limited and information is sorted by algorithms developed 
by powerful platforms, there is a deeper power structure shaping and restricting debate. Online platforms 
allow and enable the marketplace of ideas to fail, for example through interference in democratic 
processes and elections or other votes. This threatens to manipulate the opinion formation upon which 
democracy depends and exerts undue influence on democratic decision-making. Of course, biased forces 
have always tried to influence political decision-making in pursuit of their own interests. But today, the 
affordability of online communication, its lack of transparency as well as the scope and gravity of influence 
take a much more threatening form. In particular, the digital sphere offers tools that make targeted 
manipulation on a global scale very easy, without offering any transparency, meaningful regulation of the 
actors in the advertising ecosystem or insights into the underlying proprietary processes. 
In terms of understanding the online environment, 
there are three key vectors that deserve regulatory 
consideration; actors, content and behaviours. For 
the most part, ongoing policy reflections have 
concentrated on understanding the actors and the 
nature of content. In the absence of behavioural 
reflections, policymakers may feel that they are 
constantly playing catch-up with technological 
advances. Taking a behavioural approach, this 
report seeks to reduce such uncertainties as — 
notwithstanding its variability and diversity — 
human behaviour is governed by stable principles 
that remain relatively unchanged even as the 
actors, contents and environments may change 
rapidly. Even though people adapt easily to new 
contexts and environments, that adaptation 
involves relatively stable cognitive processes that 
scientists are beginning to understand well. 
“This is a coalition of 
democracies founded 
on the principle of 
freedom. That is our 
bastion, that is our 
platform, that is our 
struggle.” 
— Alcide de Gasperi, 
1952 
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So can ever-evolving digital technologies be regulated? If so how and why? Is there proof that we behave 
differently online from offline? While mindful of the rights-based society in which we live, how can the 
regulatory toolbox be strengthened to reduce the chance of minor technical tweaks (e.g. Facebook adding 
different reaction emojis other than the ‘like’ function) having large unanticipated consequences at a 
societal level? 
These are just some of the questions EU policymakers wanted answers to when they were approached to 
discuss the scope of this report that subsequently determined the parameters of the scientific literature 
review. This report is therefore not a “systematic review”, but it responds systematically to the scoping 
questions put to the authors by the European Commission. 
The influence of the digital world can only be understood by joint consideration of behaviour and cognition 
on the one hand and the full range of socio-political, philosophical, economic, regulatory and design 
contexts in which it unfolds on the other. This interdisciplinary report recognises and explores this tension 
at all levels of analysis; from the macro level of the “attention economy” and how it shapes global streams 
of human behaviour, to the micro level of the design of newsfeeds and defaults and how they affect 
cognition in the moment. 
The solutions offered in this report will draw on the recognition that human cognition while inextricably 
tied to context, is also governed by stable principles that remain largely unchanged even as the 
technological environment changes rapidly. Understanding those principles and how they are leveraged by 
context will enable policymakers to strengthen the regulatory toolbox with instruments that can transcend 
changes in technology. 
Despite substantial legislation already applying to the online world and several regulatory initiatives 
currently taking shape at the European level, this report is intended to help policymakers identify 
frameworks and policies that can remain meaningful in a rapidly changing world. 
In this context, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) also recognised the importance of 
incorporating a strategic foresight element into this work to enable policymakers to “see” and consider 
alternative possible futures. The annex of the report presents different scenarios for the “European 
information space in 2035”, created in collaboration with a broad range of stakeholders, from industry to 
civil rights groups, from academia to media regulators and policymakers. 
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Methodology 
This report is a state-of-the-science review based upon a solid interdisciplinary critical analysis and a 
synthesis of the relevant peer-reviewed scientific literature. 
As the European Commission’s knowledge and science service, the JRC used innovative knowledge 
brokerage techniques to produce this report; embedding European Commission staff in a team of 
international scientific experts spanning different disciplines. Renowned cognitive psychologists and 
philosophers who contributed to the first study under the Enlightenment 2.0 multi-annual research 
programme were joined by specialists from the fields of Complexity Science, Computational Social Science, 
Constitutional Law, Fundamental Rights, Mathematics and Network Science as well as specialists in the 
ethical and societal implications of Artificial Intelligence. 
The report is firmly embedded in two principles of enquiry:  
 First, the authors are committed 
to the idea that truth is not just a 
construct in the eye of the 
beholder but something that 
exists independently and that 
should, in democratic societies, be 
a common goal of political 
debate2; and  
 Second, the report is based on the 
balance of evidence rather than 
the balance of opinions and the 
report foregrounds evidence 
irrespective of whether it aligns 
with a preferred balance of 
opinions. 
Where normative judgements were 
required, the experts used the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities, 
as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union, to guide all 
recommendations. 
Despite the thoroughness of the scientific 
review herein, the authors acknowledge 
three important methodological considerations: 
                                                 
2 United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and Australia; https://www.scimagojr.com/ 
countryrank.php?category=3201 
“If you want to have the 
right balance of governance 
measures, you need to have 
very clear and strong values 
and in Europe we have these 
values. If you understand 
how we are building our 
continent on these values, 
you understand how you 
need to behave.” 
— Thierry Breton, European 
Commissioner for the Internal 
Market in a live-streamed 
debate with Mark Zuckerberg, 
Facebook CEO 
18 May 2020 
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1. Although human cognition is studied the world over, the fields of behavioural science and 
psychology are disproportionately Anglophone. Of the top five countries in psychological 
research, four are either exclusively or predominantly Anglophone and none of those four are 
members of the EU. This imbalance is necessarily reflected in this report and it must be 
acknowledged. Fortunately, although cognition is remarkably flexible and adapts to the 
prevailing context, within western industrialized nations its basic principles have been found to 
be largely invariant. People’s basic cognitive apparatus in Canada or the US does not differ 
qualitatively from that of people in Finland or Italy. Moreover, although a large share of new 
technology emerges from Silicon Valley, those new modes of interacting and communicating 
almost invariably find global penetration [3]. From July 2019 to July 2020, 98.5% of social 
media use in the EU was on 5 platforms, all of which are American (Facebook: 75.66%; Pinterest: 
8.78%; Twitter: 7.61%; Instagram: 4.47%; YouTube: 1.14%).3  
The reliance on non-European sources therefore does not undermine the significance of the 
findings outlined in this report. However, in light of the possibility that European and American 
cultures may continue to drift further apart, this reliance on non-European research in a 
culturally-sensitive arena is not sustainable. The report therefore concludes with a strong call 
for further European research into cognition within its cultural setting (Chapter 9). 
2. The report does not address the wider context of the contemporary European political landscape 
but instead distils — in as much as is it is meaningful and possible — the specific digital layer 
added by information technology to previously existing means of exerting political influence. 
This approach does not mean that we assume this digital layer to exist in isolation from offline 
communication, traditional media or larger societal trends. 
3. The report mainly focuses on human political behaviour online. Although we touch on automated 
processes, algorithmic decision-making and artificial intelligence, we mainly exclude from 
consideration non-authentic or non-human actors such as “bots”, “avatars” and “sock-puppets”, 
which are polluting the information landscape with manipulative messages on behalf of hidden 
political interests. Although these artificial entities play an influential role online [4, 5, 6], their 
control is a matter of cybersecurity rather than understanding human cognition online. The 
European Commission’s recent report on Cybersecurity4 addresses those threats. Additionally, 
the JRC’s report “Artificial Intelligence: A European perspective” provides many different 
perspectives of the developing technology and its possible impact in the future5. This report 
touches on artificial entities only when they have unique cognitive or behavioural implications. 
 
                                                 
3 https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/europe  
4 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/put-cybersecurity-at-centre-of-society  
5 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/artificial-intelligence-european-perspective  
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Understanding the basics: Cognition in context 
Human cognition is context dependent. No decision is ever made in an informational void. 
 When people make decisions about matters of money, health or entertainment, they are 
considerably more likely to accept preselected choice options, so-called “defaults” [7]. 
 When shopping online, we are more likely to click on items at the beginning of a list of options 
or at the very end, irrespective of other aspects of our preferences [8]. 
When the context changes, decisions change. For example, people’s support for climate mitigation policies 
increases considerably if identical economic consequences are presented as a foregone gain (reduction in 
future wealth increases) than a loss (reduction in wealth) [9]. 
Calls for greater “media literacy” or “critical thinking” are, by themselves, therefore likely to be insufficient 
to counteract any adverse effects on democracy from political online behaviour. Context matters and it 
can override people’s best intentions, in particular in a rapidly changing environment where existing skills 
may rapidly become obsolete. 
Nevertheless, humans are not absolute slaves to their environment. They can be “boosted” to exercise their 
own agency in specific contexts and they can become more skilled consumers of information [10]. However, 
even though people can be empowered to become better decision-makers, in many cases boosting cannot 
be achieved without relying on platforms to provide the (informational) basis and not to distract. 
To understand digital influence, we must explore the tension between context and cognition at all levels of 
analysis, from the macro level of the “attention economy” and how it shapes global streams of human 
behaviour, to the micro level of the design of newsfeeds and defaults and how they affect cognition in the 
moment. 
Levels of context: The macro context 
At the broadest level, we must recognize that we live in an attention economy [11] in which competition 
is becoming increasingly fierce. Whenever we venture online, our attention is a precious commodity that 
platforms vie for in pursuit of profit. We pay for a “free” service online by selling our attention and personal 
data to advertisers. At present, the attention economy is the inescapable driving-force of online behaviour 
and no understanding of the influence of online technologies on political decision-making is possible 
without appreciation of this context. 
We must also recognise that most of the information we consume is presented to us shaped and curated 
by algorithms whose design and operations are proprietary and not subject to public scrutiny. Every 
newsfeed and every search result represents output from algorithms that, ultimately, are designed to 
satisfy the demands of the attention economy. This creates an inherent asymmetry in the power of 
platforms and citizens: while the platforms know much about their users—and even people who are not 
on their platforms— and deploy that knowledge to shape our information diets, citizens know little about 
what data the platforms hold and how they are used to customise our online experience. 
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Levels of context: The micro context 
At the micro level, seemingly trivial platform features can have far-reaching consequences. To illustrate, 
in India in 2018, false rumours about child kidnappers shared via WhatsApp’s unlimited forward facility 
were implicated in at least 16 mob lynchings, leading to the deaths of 29 innocent people [12]. The power 
that digital architectures have to shape individual actions and to turn those actions into collective 
behaviours, has an important corollary: The converse also holds and minor technological revisions can 
result in significant collective behaviour changes. For instance, curtailing the number of times a message 
can be forwarded on WhatsApp (thereby slowing large cascades of messages) may have contributed to 
the absence of lynch killings in India since 2018 [13]. 
More than a decade into the online attention economy, it is difficult to imagine an online environment that 
is designed not to influence and manipulate, but to accurately inform citizens in the interest of civil 
democratic discussion. The first challenge for the future, therefore, is to imagine what a better online 
environment would look like. The annex to this report contains the results of a foresight exercise that 
describes possible alternative futures for the European Information Space in 2035. It is intended to help 
readers reflect in more depth about what they would consider a better future online environment. 
The next six chapters of this report summarise the current state of the science of how online technologies 
interact with human political behaviour and decision-making. 
 
 
P
a
g
e 
1
7
 
 
Chapter 2 
Why do we behave differently online? 
How social media can stir up hate crimes  
The distinct cognitive attributes of the web  
Differences in Structure and Functionality  
Differences in Perception and Behaviour 
 
 
 
P
a
g
e 
1
8
 
Chapter 2: Why do we behave differently online? 
Technological innovations have a long history of evoking a mixture of Utopian euphoria and Dystopian 
fears. Socrates, for example, was deeply troubled by the detrimental consequences of writing (Plato, ca. 
370 B.C.E/1997, pp. 551–552). 
Some 2,000 years later, we accept that writing has redeemed itself. Heeding this lesson from history, we 
must not lose sight of the immense benefits of the digital revolution. Arguably, the COVID-19 pandemic 
did not wreak unmitigated havoc because digital technologies permitted the economy to continue to 
function during “lockdown.” 
Digital technologies, including social media, also made physical distancing more bearable because it 
enables friends and family to stay in touch in ways that would have been unthinkable without the web 
and its multitude of communication apps. 
Social media has also been heralded as “liberation technology” [14], owing to its role in the “Arab Spring”, 
the Iranian Green Wave movement of 2009 and other instances in which it mobilised the public against 
autocratic regimes. A review of protest movements in the United States, Spain, Turkey and Ukraine found 
that social media platforms (e.g. Twitter and Facebook) serve as vital tools for the coordination of 
collective action, mainly through spreading news about transportation, turnout, police presence, violence 
and so on [15]. Social media were also found to transmit emotional and motivational messages relating 
to protest activity [15]. 
However, at the same time, there is evidence that 
political behaviours — and consequently our 
democracies — may be adversely affected by 
events on the web. Some analysts have identified 
social media as a tool of autocrats [16], with 
empirical support provided by the finding that the 
more autocratic regimes aim to prevent an 
independent public sphere, the more likely they 
are to introduce the Internet [17]. In Western 
democracies, recent evidence suggests that 
social media can cause problematic political 
behaviours and developments [18, 19, 20, 21]. 
Establishing causality is crucial because it offers 
opportunity for intervention and control. If social 
media were found to cause social ills, then it 
would be legitimate to expect that a change in 
platform architecture might influence society’s 
well-being. In the absence of causality, this 
expectation does not hold: For example, if certain 
people were particularly prone to express their 
hostilities by anti-social behaviours and by 
hostile engagement on social media, then any 
intervention targeting social media would merely 
prevent one expression of an underlying problem 
“Your invention will 
enable them to hear 
many things without 
being properly taught, 
and they will imagine 
that they have come to 
know much while for 
the most part they will 
know nothing.” 
 
— Socrates on writing 
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while leaving the other unaffected. 
Establishing causality is, however, notoriously difficult, measurements can only establish an association 
or correlation but not causation. One approach to establishing causality that has gained popularity through 
the availability of “big data”, is known as instrumental variable analysis. The key idea of this technique is 
to find events in the world that are not associated with the outcome but are associated with the potential 
predictor variable. For example, it is unlikely that the availability of broadband internet, which is driven by 
considerations such as terrain and local regulations [22], would be directly associated with people’s voting 
behaviour. However, broadband availability would be expected to be associated with internet use. This 
identifies broadband availability as a good instrumental variable because it is expected to determine 
internet usage without affecting the outcome variable (voting behaviour in this case) directly. Thus, if the 
variation in internet usage that is due to broadband availability were found to predict voting behaviour, 
then this relationship would be identified as causal. A recent study conducted in Germany and Italy used 
broadband availability at the level of municipality as an instrumental variable. Reliance on the web for 
political information was found to predict the share of votes for populist parties [21]. In both countries, 
reliance on the web as a source of political information strongly predicted voting for populist but not for 
mainstream parties. Because this relationship was due to the variation in web use associated with 
broadband availability, a causal interpretation is possible. 
Several recent studies have established causality in this manner, including for the role of social media in 
triggering ethnic hate crimes [19, 20] and the role of misinformation in voting for populist parties [23]. 
How social media can stir up hate crimes 
It is troubling that social media have been causally linked to hate crimes and ethnic violence by two studies 
that used the instrumental-variable approach. To illustrate, a recent study in Germany [20] examined the 
association between anti-refugee posts on the Facebook page of Germany’s far-right AfD party and hate 
crimes against refugees at the level of municipalities. The analysis revealed a strong relationship between 
the number of online posts and attacks on refugees. Municipalities with AfD Facebook users were three 
times as likely to experience refugee attacks than municipalities without. This association alone, however, 
would not warrant a causal interpretation for the reasons mentioned earlier. To isolate the causal effect 
of social media posts on hate crimes, local internet and Facebook outages were used as the instrumental 
variable. The association between Facebook posts and attacks was found to disappear in localities in which 
outages (e.g. internet services unavailable due to technical faults) prevented access to Facebook for limited 
time periods [20]. The study estimated that a 50% reduction in anti-refugee sentiment on social media 
would result in 421 fewer anti-refugee hate crimes (a reduction of 12.6%) [20]. 
Russian researchers have found similar results with the social-media platform VKontakte [19]. The fact 
that social media usage can have measurable causal effects on politically adverse behaviours such as 
hate crimes must give rise to concern. 
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The distinct cognitive attributes of the web 
The digital world differs from its offline counterpart in ways that have profound consequences for 
individuals as well as society. A more systematic and extensive review of the psychologically-unique 
properties of the internet was recently provided by Kozyreva and colleagues [24]. We leverage their analysis 
to provide a conceptual overview of the cognitive attributes of the web. Many of these are taken up at 
length in later chapters. The researchers identified two systematic differences between online and offline 
environments, one relating to structure and functionality and another relating to differences in perception 
and behaviour. 
Differences in Structure and Functionality. 
Network size. On the one hand, the structures of communities and the number of close friends people 
have online can resemble their offline counterparts [25]. It appears that the cognitive and temporal 
constraints that limit face-to-face networks, such as attention and information processing, also limit online 
social networks. On the other hand, social media permit messages to be broadcast to a potentially very 
large audience. The number of followers (as opposed to followees) on a platform with a directed network 
structure such as Twitter is not limited and can far exceed any offline social reach [26]. When viral content 
travels through these large networks, it can accumulate social reactions (likes, shares, comments, etc.) in 
huge numbers that have no offline equivalent. 
Permanence. On the one hand, the web does not forget. Information can be stored more or less 
indefinitely. This situation prompted the European Union to codify in Article 17 of the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) what is commonly referred to as the “right to be forgotten” which provided 
European citizens with a legal mechanism for requesting, under certain conditions, the removal of their 
personal data from online databases. On the other hand, platform outputs like Google Search rankings or 
Facebook newsfeeds are ephemeral. It is currently impossible to reproduce what a search for “Brexit” 
looked like during the UK referendum in June 2016. 
Personalisation. Search engines and recommender systems collect and infer users’ preferences to deliver 
personalised results or recommendations. This technology has led to a gradual relinquishing of public 
control. Algorithms are both complex and non-transparent — sometimes for designers and users alike [27]. 
Power of design. The web cannot be accessed without interacting with choice architectures that constrain, 
enable and steer user behaviour. While physical environments such as cities or supermarkets can also be 
engineered, interventions are limited by physical factors and the original purpose of the infrastructure (e.g. 
streets for transport or supermarket shelves for storage). Online, by contrast, these constraints largely 
disappear. This has allowed platforms to evolve into sophisticated choice architectures whose main 
purpose is to engage user attention and persuade users to take certain actions. Moreover, while it might 
take several years to make a city bike-friendly (e.g. by building new bike lanes), adjusting powerful default 
settings of online choice architectures can occur almost instantly and at low costs. 
Differences in Perception and Behaviour. 
Social cues and communication. On the one hand, compared to face-to-face interactions, online 
communication provides several additional opportunities, such as: (a) the potential for anonymity; (b) the 
ability to broadcast to multiple audiences; and (c) availability of extensive audience feedback. On the other 
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hand, online communication eliminates many non-verbal or physical cues (e.g. body language or facial 
expressions). This elimination originally elicited much concern that computer-mediated communication 
might lead to impoverished social interaction [28]. However, it has now been recognised that users can 
replace non-verbal cues in digital communication with verbal expressions and graphical elements such as 
emoticons and “likes” [29]. Nonetheless, there is a large literature arguing that the distinctive features of 
online interactions — such as anonymity, invisibility and lack of eye contact — can reduce inhibitions, 
possibly increasing people’s tendency to express aggression in online fora [30, 31, 32, 33]. The lack of eye 
contact has been identified as having the greatest disinhibiting effect, being more important than 
anonymity [32]. 
Cues for epistemic quality. Much web content now bypasses traditional gatekeepers such as 
professional editors. Content can nonetheless look professional and authoritative. Traditional cues for 
epistemic quality — e.g. quality of branding or typesetting — have therefore become less useful. New 
markers are emerging, such as crowd-sourcing (e.g. Wikipedia), but social-media feeds are largely curated 
without regard to epistemic quality [34]. 
Social calibration. The internet has radically changed social calibration — that is, people’s perceptions 
about the prevalence of opinions in their social environment or the population. Offline, people gather 
information about how others think based on the limited number of people they interact with, most of 
whom live nearby. In the online world, physical boundaries cease to matter; people can connect with others 
around the world. One consequence of this global connectivity — which is usually heralded as a positive 
feature — is that small minorities can form a seemingly large, if dispersed, community online. This in turn 
can create the illusion that even extreme opinions are widespread, a phenomenon known as the false-
consensus effect [35]. It is difficult to meet people in real life who believe the Earth is flat, whereas online, 
among the billions of those active on social-media, there are some who do share this belief and they can 
now easily find and connect with each other. The existence of an epistemic community provides perceived 
legitimacy for a person’s belief and renders them more resistant to changing their mind [35]. 
Social media has created a further source of miscalibration when multiple people are sharing information 
that is partially based on the same source. For example, if a single news article is retweeted by different 
individuals each of whom adds a comment in the tweet, a common recipient would receive messages that 
are correlated (because they rely on one article) but appear to be independent (because different 
individuals retweet). In those circumstances, people discount the correlation between messages, thus 
“double-counting” the underlying common source and being more sensitive to the information than is 
advisable [36]. 
Self-disclosure and privacy behaviour. People’s attitudes and behaviours relating to privacy online are 
characterised by several paradoxical aspects. There is some evidence that people tend to be more willing to 
disclose sensitive information in online communications [37] and in online — as opposed to face-to-face — 
surveys [38, 39]. People are typically also highly permissive in their privacy settings when using the web. 
However, when their attitudes are probed, people profess to put a lot of weight on privacy [40]. This 
divergence between the importance people place on privacy in surveys and their actual behaviour when it 
comes to acting on those opinions has been identified as the “privacy paradox” [41]. 
Norms of civility. Behavioural disinhibition is observed in many contexts online. Disinhibition can express 
itself in a behaviour known as “trolling”, a practice defined as “behaving in a deceptive, destructive, or 
disruptive manner in a social setting on the Internet with no apparent instrumental purpose” [42, p. 97]. 
Trolling can be used strategically to disrupt the possibility of constructive conversation. Trolling and other 
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forms of incivility and harassment are pervasive: For example, among young Finnish people, approximately 
47% reported encountering online hate in 2013 and this proportion had risen to 74% at the end of 2015 
[43]. Women and minorities are disproportionately subject to online incivility and hostility [44]. An 
important dimension of the discussion about online incivility involves the distinction between incivility per 
se (i.e., rudeness) and anti-democratic intolerance [45]. The latter should be of far greater concern — even 
if expressed in seemingly civil language — than mere lack of politeness. The problem of online incivility 
and anti-democratic intolerance may be compounded by the recent finding that online moral outrage is 
experienced as being greater than in conventional media or in person [46]. 
Dissolution of shared perceptions. The web offers nearly unlimited choice. A result of this abundance 
of choice is that audiences are increasingly segmented. The segmentation of audiences has two related 
consequences for democracy: First, it creates an incentive for extremism because a politician may gain 
more voters on the extreme margins of their “base” than they repel in the moderate middle if they can 
selectively target extreme messages to their followers [47]. Second, when segmentation is accompanied 
by public polarisation, it becomes possible for politicians to create their own “alternative facts” [48] that 
they present as an ontological counter-measure to accountability [49]. 
Pressure points: citizens vs. the internet. Based on this analysis of the unique cognitive attributes of 
the web [24], four pressure points were identified that emerge when people and the online environment 
are brought into contact without much public oversight and democratic governance. Figure 1 summarises 
these four challenges. Each challenge is taken up in a chapter in this report. 
 
Figure 1 - Map of challenges in the digital world. Adapted from [24].  
Chapter number refers to chapters in this report that take up each challenge. 
The attention economy. We can only consume a finite amount of information. We must therefore spread 
our attention between the multitude of competing sources offered by the web [50]. This has created an 
entire economy and its supporting technological apparatus to compete for our attention. As we will show 
in Chapter 3, the attention economy has several consequences for understanding how political behaviour 
unfolds online. For example, it has been argued that the zero-sum race for finite human attention explains 
why Internet technologies are designed to be appealing, addictive and distractive [51]. 
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Perpetual information overload results from the attention race. Information overload has been associated 
with impoverished decisions about what to look at, spend time on, believe and share [52]. For example, 
longer-term offline decisions such as choosing a newspaper subscription (that then constrains one’s 
information diet) have evolved into a multitude of online micro-decisions about which individual articles 
to read from a scattered array of sources. The more sources crowd the market, the less attention can be 
allocated to each piece of content and the more difficult it becomes to assess their trustworthiness — 
even more so given the demise and erosion of classic indicators of epistemic quality (e.g. name recognition, 
reputation, print quality, price). When quality ceases to be accessible for the end user, it disappears as a 
focal point of competition in the attention economy. The explicit goal is quantity, screen time and clicks, 
independent of the content itself. We take up the challenges arising from the attention economy in Chapter 
3. 
Choice architectures. Supermarkets are carefully designed to maximize shoppers’ spending. In-store 
marketing can draw attention to products that shoppers had no intention of purchasing before they 
entered the store [53]. Conversely, stores can be redesigned to facilitate purchases of items recommended 
by nutritionists over other foods [54, 53]. Are those design decisions acceptable? Do they represent 
legitimate influence or persuasion or are they manipulative or even coercive? 
Online architectures are behaviourally far more powerful than the physical options available to 
supermarket designers. Accordingly, some online choice architectures are ethically problematic because 
they stray into coercion or manipulation. Coercion is a type of influence that does not convince its targets, 
but rather compels them by eliminating all options except for one (e.g. take-it-or-leave-it choices). 
Manipulation is a hidden influence that attempts to interfere with people’s decision-making processes in 
order to steer them toward the manipulator’s ends. Manipulation does not persuade people and it may not 
technically deprive them of their options; instead, it exploits their vulnerabilities and cognitive 
shortcomings [55]. Not all choice architectures are manipulative [56] — only those that exploit people’s 
vulnerabilities (e.g. hidden fears) in a covert manner. There are at least two cases where persuasive online 
design borders on manipulation: dark patterns and hidden privacy defaults. We devote Chapter 4 to an 
exploration of choice architectures, with a particular emphasis on instances of manipulation and coercion. 
Algorithmic content curation. Without algorithms the utility of the web would be severely curtailed. 
Information is useful only to the extent that we can access it — and any search of the web inevitably 
involves algorithms that curate and personalise information.6 Algorithmic filtering and personalisation are 
not inherently malign technologies — on the contrary, instead of showing countless random results for 
search queries, personalisation aims to offer the most relevant results. Googling “Newcastle” in Sydney, 
Australia, should prioritise information about the city that is 200 km to the north, not its distant British 
namesake. 
In a similar vein, newsfeeds on social media strive to show information that is expected to be interesting to 
users. Recommender systems offer content suggestions based on our past preferences and the 
preferences of users with similar tastes (e.g. video suggestions on Netflix and YouTube). Algorithms can 
also filter out information that is harmful or unwanted, for example by filtering spam or flagging hate 
speech and disturbing videos. There are countless examples of why algorithms are indispensable and can 
be useful for human decision-making [58]. 
                                                 
6 We restrict consideration here to algorithms that members of the public are likely to encounter on the web. This excludes a 
class of important and powerful algorithms that serve as decision aids for experts, for example when predicting recidivism [57]. 
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However, algorithms, like any other technology, come with their own set of problems. Those problems 
range from lack of oversight and transparency and consequent loss of autonomy, to computational 
violations of privacy and targeted political manipulation. Such problems can then be compounded by the 
use of biased data, which reproduce inequalities reflected in historical data. We explore these issues mainly 
in Chapter 5. 
Misinformation and disinformation. Disinformation and conspiracy theories have been implicated in a 
number of recent political tragedies around the world. In Myanmar, the military orchestrated a propaganda 
campaign on Facebook that targeted the country’s Muslim Rohingya minority group. The ensuing violence 
forced 700,000 people to flee the country [59].7 
Most recently, the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic gave rise to multiple conspiracy theories and misleading 
news stories that have found considerable traction. For example, 29% of Americans believe that COVID-
19 was created in a laboratory [60]. In the UK, the belief that 5G mobile technology is associated with 
COVID-19 has led to vandalism of infrastructure, with numerous cell phone masts being set alight by 
arsonists [61]. About one quarter of the British public consistently endorses some form of conspiracy 
related to COVID-19 [62] and endorsement of conspiracies has been found to be negatively associated 
with health-protective behaviours [63]. These developments are considered in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
  
                                                 
7 At the time of this writing Facebook rejected requests to release Myanmar officials’ data to the World Court 
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-facebook/facebook-rejects-request-%20to-release-myanmar-
officials-data-for-genocide-case-idUSKCN2521PI ). 
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Key scientific findings 
 Social media can have a causal effect on people’s political 
behaviours, including inciting dangerous behaviour such as 
hate crimes. 
 The web is cognitively unique, resulting in specific psychological 
responses to its structure and functionality as well as 
differences in perception and behaviour compared to the 
offline world. 
 There are 4 pressure points when people and online systems 
interact: the attention economy; choice architectures; 
algorithmic content curation; and misinformation and 
disinformation. 
 Structural factors in the design of online environments can 
affect how individuals process information and communicate 
with one another. 
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Chapter 3: The attention economy 
The philosophy of the internet has always been one of empowerment [16, 64] and this is echoed in EU 
policy. A recent example is the European Commission’s Communication on Shaping Europe’s digital future8 
that underscores citizens’ empowerment as a goal of European digital policy. 
These ambitions stand in contrast to the stark reality that the overabundance of available information has 
rendered people cognitively more impoverished than ever before [50]. As the informational capacity of the 
web increases, more issues can be considered, but the public’s available attention span for each issue 
decreases. This is not mere speculation. Analysis reveals that whereas in 2013 a hashtag on Twitter was 
popular on average for 17.5 hours, by 2016 this time span had decreased to 11.9 hours [65]. The same 
declining half-life has been observed for Google queries [65]. The limitations of human attention and its 
exploitation by the attention economy have given rise to several interlinked consequences. 
Specific characteristics 
Human attention has become the most precious resource in the online marketplace [11] and one that 
online platforms can steer by organising and curating content [66]. The business model of all leading 
platforms is to capture user attention for the benefit of advertisers. This commercial imperative may risk 
users’ autonomy and the public good. For example, YouTube’s recommender algorithm has the primary 
purpose to increase viewing time [67] and YouTube itself has claimed that 70% of viewing time on YouTube 
results from recommendations of its AI system, rather than purposeful consumer choice.9 This raises 
questions about how much personal autonomy has been supplanted by recommender systems. Moreover, 
there is evidence that YouTube’s 
recommendations are drawing viewers into 
increasingly extremist content [68, 69]. This 
raises questions about whether algorithms 
foster or undermine the public good. Crucially, 
users’ attention and their behaviour are products 
being sold even when they are unaware that a 
commercial transaction is taking place — our 
time and attention are products while we watch 
videos on YouTube. 
The limitations of attention resources and the 
resulting demand for algorithmic curation of 
information has created a relationship between 
platforms and their users that is profoundly 
asymmetric: Platforms have deep knowledge of 
users’ behaviour and even intimate aspects of 
their lives [70]. Whereas, users know little about 
how their data are collected, how it is exploited 
for commercial or political purposes and how it 
                                                 
8 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/shaping-europe-digital-
future_en 
9 https://www.cnet.com/news/youtube-ces-2018-neal-mohan/ 
“Europe’s digital 
transition must protect 
and empower citizens, 
businesses and society 
as a whole.” 
— Ursula von der Leyen, 
President of the  
European Commission 
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and the data of others are used to shape their online experience. This asymmetry in knowledge also 
translates into an asymmetry of power: To keep others under surveillance while avoiding equal scrutiny 
oneself is the most important form of authoritarian political power [71, 72]. To know others while revealing 
little about oneself is the most important form of commercial power in an attention economy. 
Reinforcement architectures. It is a known fact in psychology that the strength of behaviour depends 
upon reinforcement and in particular on the intervals or schedules of reward delivery. If one’s goal is to 
maximise user attention, reinforcement schedules provide a powerful tool to pursue this goal. Scientists 
have identified two major classes of such schedules that are summarised in Figure 2 below: 
 Fixed schedules deliver rewards at predictable time intervals (fixed-interval) or after a predictable 
number of attempts (fixed-ratio schedules).  
 Variable schedules deliver reinforcement with less predictability. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Schedules of reinforcement: Social media or online gaming offer their users rewards (e.g. “likes” or reaching 
another level in a game) to reinforce and maintain the desired behaviour — namely, time on platform. See text for 
details about schedules. Equivalent schedules can also be found offline. 
Variable schedules are further differentiated into variable-interval and variable-ratio schedules. In a 
variable-interval schedule, reinforcements are delivered at time intervals that are independent of a person’s 
behaviour and unpredictable from their perspective, even though the underlying dynamics are known to 
the experimenter or designer. Variable-ratio schedules, by contrast, involve reinforcement after an average 
(but variable) number of responses (e.g. winning a prize after a variable number of attempts). 
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Both variable schedules are known to create a 
steady rate of responding, with variable-ratio 
schedules producing the highest rates of 
responding and variable-interval schedules 
producing moderate response rates. It seems 
that if rewards are difficult to predict, people 
— just like other organisms studied in the 
laboratory — tend to increase the rate of a 
particular behaviour, perhaps hoping to 
eventually attain the desired reward. 
Although people are indubitably capable of 
analytic thought, we do not always engage in 
careful deliberation. In those circumstances, 
people respond to social rewards online in much 
the same way as any other species responds to 
reinforcement in the laboratory. To illustrate, 
Facebook provides users with rewards in the 
form of “likes” and shares, social reinforcements in messages, comments and friend requests. A recent 
analysis of four large social media datasets (Instagram and three topic-specific discussion boards) 
revealed that reward learning theory, originally developed to explain the behaviour of non-human animals 
in conditioning environments, can also model human behaviour on social media [73]. People calibrate their 
social media posts in response to rewards (likes) as predicted by reward learning theory [73]. 
Jonathan Badeen, cofounder of the online dating app Tinder, recently acknowledged that its algorithms 
were inspired by this behaviourist approach [74]. Reinforcements constitute messages, likes, matches, 
comments or any desirable content that is delivered at irregular intervals and prompts users to constantly 
refresh their feeds and check their inboxes. 
Attracting attention is only a first step to successful advertising: a further necessary step is to persuade 
the recipient to engage with content. The success of persuasion can be enhanced by personalising message 
content. 
Personalisation and audience segmentation. The “Cambridge Analytica scandal” of 2017 created much 
public concern about “microtargeting” [75]. Microtargeting is an extreme form of personalisation that 
exploits intimate knowledge about a consumer to present them with maximally persuasive advertisements. 
Cambridge Analytica was implicated in using microtargeting during the Brexit referendum campaign.10 
Microtargeting is particularly problematic when it exploits people’s personal vulnerabilities. For example, 
according to a 2017 report, Facebook (in Australia) had the technology to allow advertisers to target 
vulnerable teenagers at moments when they feel “worthless” and “insecure.” Facebook did not dispute the 
existence of the technology although it claimed that it was never made available to advertisers and only 
used in an experimental context [76]. Facebook apologised at length and reassured the public that 
“Facebook does not offer tools to target people based on their emotional state.”.
11
 Facebook was, however, 
                                                 
10 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/07/the-great-british-brexit-robbery-hijacked-democracy  
11 https://about.fb.com/news/h/comments-on-research-and-ad-targeting/  
Once Big Data systems 
know me better than I 
know myself, authority 
will shift from humans 
to algorithms. Big Data 
could then empower Big 
Brother. 
— Yuval Noah Harari 
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awarded a patent
12
 based on technology that allowed one “to predict one or more personality 
characteristics for the user. The inferred personality characteristics are stored in connection with the user’s 
profile and may be used for targeting, ranking, selecting versions of products and various other purposes.” 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that data collected about people online can be used to make 
inferences about highly personal attributes. Kosinski and colleagues analysed how the Facebook user likes 
could be used to infer private attributes, including sensitive features such as religion and political affiliation 
[77]. 
The predictive power varied across attributes, from nearly perfect for race to slightly better than chance 
for “whether an individual’s parents stayed together until they were 21 years old” [77]. Algorithmic 
personality judgements based on information extracted from people’s digital fingerprints (specifically, 
Facebook likes) can be more accurate than those made by relatives and friends [70]. Knowledge of 300 
likes is sufficient for an algorithm to predict a user’s personality with greater accuracy than their own 
spouse [70]. 
A review of 327 studies revealed that numerous demographics could be reliably inferred from digital 
fingerprints, including for example sexual orientation [78]. Other research concluded that online 
architecture inferred personality (defined as the “Big 5” attributes) from digital fingerprints with greater 
accuracy than human judges [79]. Recent empirical research has shown that Facebook might be inferring 
sensitive attributes of European users, such as sexual orientation, even after the GDPR was implemented 
[80]. 
On balance, there is little doubt that access to people’s digital fingerprint permits inference of their 
personality. Inferences of other attributes, such as personal values and moral foundations, is also possible 
albeit at best with modest accuracy [81]. 
The power afforded by such inferences into intimate details of people’s lives is considerable. A recent 
analysis warned of the dangers that the “personality panorama” offered by big-data analysis could all too 
readily turn into a “personality panopticon”, a dystopia in which each person’s behaviours are “ceaselessly 
observed and regulated” [82, p. 6]. There is therefore a direct and strong link between the data that permit 
personalisation and the implications for people’s privacy. 
Privacy in the attention economy. Privacy as a public good. The conventional view of privacy is as a private 
good: My data are mine, your data are yours and each of us is entitled to choose whether or not to 
relinquish these data to government, corporations and other entities or persons. At its core, the individual 
can decide whether or not to grant access to and allow use of their data. In the realm of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (Article 7), the right to privacy protects “private” information from any unjustified 
state interference. Independently, the Charter contains a fundamental right to data protection (Article 8) 
that applies only to natural (not legal) persons, but covers all (not just private) personal data [83]. It 
demands that this data “must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.” The corresponding 
EU data protection regime imposes concrete obligations on private parties. It is prohibitive in nature as no-
one is allowed to process personal data unless one of several conditions is satisfied (pertaining to grounds of 
processing and data protection principles). 
                                                 
12 US Patent No 8,825,764, with Michael Nowak and Dean Eckles as inventors; see 
https://patents.google.com/patent/US8825764B2/en  
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The regime thus empowers data subjects with a set of rights they can exercise against data controllers. 
While the regime expressly permits the processing of personal data without consent (if certain conditions 
are met, i.e. a lawful basis exists, it serves legitimate interests and is necessary for the performance of a 
contract, etc.) and the GDPR’s objectives focus on the uninhibited transfer of personal data around the 
European Union, transfer is only permitted when processing adheres to the “fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons.” 
Thus, the role of the data protection regime is limited in both its personal (data controllers and processors) 
and material scope (personal data relating to an identifiable natural living person) and is insufficient in an 
attention economy in which personal data are used to infer intimate characteristics not just of the 
individual user but also of others [84]. Exercising one’s right to make personal data available or public 
therefore has negative externalities (i.e. negative side effects on innocent bystanders not involved in the 
decision): Individuals are vulnerable merely because others have been careless with their data. 
This turns privacy into a public good [85, 86], with far-reaching ramifications for democracy. One recent 
illustration involves the exercise app Strava, which published a “heat map” showing where its users were 
jogging or cycling. The map was found to inadvertently reveal the location of US military installations 
around the world, including some whose existence had not been made public [87]. It follows that 
empowerment of individual citizens, for example through the GDPR, may be insufficient—privacy also 
requires coordination between individuals [85]. 
Beyond the raw data. The power to exploit digital fingerprints [77, 70] implies that protecting users’ data 
has to go beyond considering the data that are collected from them — we must also take into account how 
that data is processed and what inferences are drawn. Users are unlikely to be fully aware of what data 
is being collected — few may realise that the text of Facebook comments is analysed even if the user 
decides not to post the comment [88]. People are also unlikely to recognise what is inferred from their 
data, as revealed by the anecdote of the department store Target inferring from purchasing behaviours 
that a teenager was pregnant before her parents knew [89]. 
Beyond individual inferences, the persistent and networked nature of online information systems creates 
further problems for individuals to control the use of their data [90]. Data are shared across systems and 
services, which curtails users’ ability to understand what can be inferred from their data and what they 
might be disclosing about others. One example of the complexity of digital privacy is the possibility to build 
shadow profiles with information on individuals who do not have an account on the platform [91]. 
Information on these individuals can be inferred from the data that users voluntarily provide, which can 
be combined with contact lists and other kinds of relational data to make inferences of personal attributes 
of people without an account. This inference builds on statistical patterns of social interaction e.g. the 
preferential congregation of people with shared political affiliation or sexual orientation [92]. 
Field research has shown how shadow profiles can be built. When empirical data on social networks are 
combined with simulations of the spreading of their adoption, it can be illustrated how a network can infer 
the friendship between two non-users [93]. This has far-reaching consequences, particularly for 
circumspect citizens who choose to stay away from social network platforms in the belief that this will 
help protect their privacy, as this is not the case. Using data from the now disbanded social network 
“Friendster”, research has shown that Friendster user data was predictive of people who did not have an 
account, with particular respect to marital status and sexual orientation [92]. Analysis of Twitter data 
shows that the location of a non-user can be predicted from their friends on Twitter, showing increasing 
accuracy with the number of friends who are on Twitter [94]. 
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This complexity of privacy also threatens the right to be forgotten that is enshrined in the GDPR. Even after 
deleting a user account, the traces remaining in the data of other users can be used to infer attributes of 
a person [95]. Several personal attributes, including religion and personality traits, can be estimated using 
only the tweets written by the friends of a Twitter user, without the need to use the text of the user itself 
[96]. If digital traces are left behind without a user’s awareness and ability to delete them, furtive political 
manipulation is facilitated. 
A recent scientific study compared the predictive ability of analysing a user’s past tweets to predict the 
text of their future tweets, to the ability of predicting that person’s future text from the text of their close 
contacts [97]. The analysis revealed that 95% of the potential predictive accuracy for an individual can be 
achieved without access to that person’s previous texts, by using their social ties only (with as few as 8 or 
9 contacts being sufficient) [97]. As user text is a powerful tool to infer behaviour and personality [82], 
this kind of social inference opens the door to potential manipulation, beyond the control or awareness of 
an individual. 
Manipulative targeting. Marketers have always segmented audiences. Motorcycle magazines are 
unlikely to contain advertisements for cosmetics. What, then, is the boundary between justifiable audience 
segmentation and manipulation? Philosopher Daniel Susser and colleagues published a significant analysis 
relevant to this report. They examined what it means to manipulate someone online and how manipulation 
can be systematically differentiated from other forms of influence that are seen to be more legitimate, 
such as persuasion, as well as forms that are clearly considered unacceptable, such as coercion [55]. The 
core concept in the analysis is that of users’ autonomy; that is, their ability to know what they desire and 
to act on reasons they think best [55, p. 36]. That autonomy is threatened by manipulators hiding their 
intentions and actions, this threat increases in proportion to the amount of knowledge held by the 
manipulator about their targets [55, 38]. A similar analysis was provided by B. J. Fogg [56]. 
A recent analysis by Lorenz-Spreen and colleagues derived three dimensions that together determine 
whether algorithmic targeting is ethically and politically problematic or acceptable [98]: 
 granularity of the target group (i.e., the fewer people are targeted, the more personal data of 
each individual are used to permit narrowing of the target); 
 domain (political vs. non-political, to the extent that a clear differentiation is possible); and 
 how personal data were obtained (provided by the user or, e.g. personality data inferred from 
digital fingerprints, such as Facebook “likes”). 
Information that microtargets just a few users for political purposes based on inferred personal 
information is maximally problematic: It is non-transparent and manipulative irrespective of content. In 
contrast, information targeting a broad audience based on user-provided data for commercial purposes is 
least problematic: It represents conventional market segmentation. Although these distinctions are 
relatively easy to make at a conceptual level, in practice the differentiation may be more difficult. To 
illustrate, whereas advertisements for facemasks would have attracted no political attention a year ago, 
the COVID-19 pandemic has rendered this product highly political in at least some societies. 
This analysis is echoed in public opinion data. In Germany, a recent representative survey probed the 
public’s attitudes towards artificial intelligence online, in particular the use of machine learning to exploit 
personal data for personalisation of services [40]. Attitudes towards personalisation were found to be 
domain-dependent: Most people find personalisation of political advertising and news sources 
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unacceptable. For instance, 61% oppose customised political campaigning and 57% object to personalised 
newsfeeds on social media. At the same time, a majority approves of personalised entertainment (77%), 
shopping (78%) and search results (63%). A majority of respondents objected to personalisation based on 
sensitive information (e.g. religious or political views, personal events, personal communications) [40]. 
Additionally, a 2018 Special Eurobarometer Report on democracy and elections13 found broad support 
amongst Internet-using respondents for applying the same pre-election rules for traditional media to 
social networks, Internet platforms and the actors that use them. More than six in ten Internet-using 
respondents in each Member State shared this opinion. At least eight in ten of these respondents were in 
favour of transparency about political advertised content including who is paying for it. 
The analysis in the study by Lorenz-Spreen and colleagues [98] also meshes well with other researchers’ 
conclusions that microtargeting carries considerable risks in the political domain. At least six harms can 
arise from microtargeted political advertising [75]: 
 Microtargeting is harmful because it exploits personal data without the user’s consent. 
 Microtargeting is harmful because it conceals its intent and true nature. 
 Microtargeting is harmful because claims made in targeted messages cannot be corrected or 
debated in the free marketplace of ideas. 
 Relatedly, microtargeting is harmful because it permits disinformation to spread without 
opportunity for correction. 
 Microtargeting is harmful because it potentially allows politicians to make mutually 
incompatible promises to different segments of the electorate. 
 Microtargeting is harmful because it permits foreign actors to influence domestic political 
campaigns. 
A further possible avenue to limit the harms associated with malicious advertising consists of content 
regulation. Facebook offers a “custom audiences” feature that allows the social media platform to match 
users to an email address provided to them by an advertiser. The provision of these addresses usually takes 
place through a consent mechanism, satisfying data protection obligations. The platforms undertake 
minimal content checking with much of the oversight executed by AI with limited human supervision. In 
consequence, “issue-based” advertising has thrived on platforms like Facebook. Actors interested in 
influencing democratic processes and elections purchase some of these advertisements, which could be 
designed to stoke civil unrest and spread hate speech. Yet, they might escape the remit of regulators 
concerned with safeguarding the integrity of electoral processes. At the same time, because these 
advertisements can amount to dark posts (only visible for individual targeted users and not accessible to 
a common audience), their content is not subjected to the corrective marketplace of ideas as is other (user-
generated) content. 
Similarly, platforms offer demographic marketing; for example, an ad can be delivered to all users living 
in Amsterdam over the age of 50 (or any multiple of variations). During the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
European Union’s Consumer Protection Authorities spent considerable time and resources tracking and 
                                                 
13 https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/%20DocumentKy/84538  
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ordering the removal of malicious advertisements; for example, selling high dose Vitamin C to combat 
COVID-19 “after scientific breakthroughs”. In the latter example, it is not a certainty that the advertiser 
ever comes into contact with personal data, but the advertisement’s harmful content could still be delivered 
to a considerable number of users with detrimental effects on society [99]. Other critical analyses of 
microtargeting have also been conducted [100][101]. 
With this in mind, it is noteworthy that a recent Eurobarometer study focusing on Artificial Intelligence,14 
found that 80% of the representative EU population sample think that they should be informed when a 
digital service or mobile application uses AI. 
Whatever the political, legal or ethical implications of microtargeting may be, the magnitude of the issue 
is tied to pragmatic considerations: Is it really possible to target people’s selective vulnerabilities and, if 
so, does this lead to successful—but illegitimate— manipulation? We explore these pragmatic questions 
next. 
How this affects our behaviour 
Microtargeting: Hype or dystopian manipulation? Microtargeting is technically legal. The direct 
effects of microtargeting on behaviour are nuanced and difficult to assess. There is evidence of (at least 
potential) harm, but benefits may also exist. 
The potential harms of targeting. Facebook claimed credit for their targeting abilities after the 
Conservative Party in the UK won the election of 2015, boasting that “the party was able to reach 80.65% 
of Facebook users in the key marginal seats. The party’s videos were viewed 3.5 million times, while 86.9% 
of all ads served had social context—the all-important endorsement by a friend.”15 
Based on the testimony of a former Cambridge Analytica employee, the firm used Facebook personality 
profiling to target fear-based messages (e.g. “Keep the terrorists out! Secure our Borders!”) to people high 
on neuroticism during Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign.16 Researchers have subsequently 
confirmed those claims by identifying, for example, three attack vectors that could be exploited to target 
specific individuals via Facebook [102]. Attributes such as income, net worth, relationship status, clothing 
size, housemates and many others could be obtained from a single person on Facebook, even if their 
privacy setting precluded sharing of that information with people who are not “friends” [102]: In response 
to the research Facebook closed this loophole. The same study also showed that single individuals and 
single households could be targeted with messages using Facebook’s ad delivery services. Facebook did 
not alter their policies in response to the research, suggesting that such targeting of specific individuals is 
still possible [102]. 
                                                 
14https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/%20instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/22
55  
15 https://www.facebook.com/business/success/conservative-party 
16 The Great Hack Documentary / Netflix 
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One concern about targeted political advertising is the fear that it may promote polarisation. There are 
multiple ways polarisation can emerge and is maintained [103]. One pathway to polarisation involves 
separate information streams for subgroups within a society. It seems possible, even likely, that targeted 
information campaigns can promote polarisation [104]. Showing ads across partisan lines on Facebook 
(i.e. liberal ads to conservatives or vice versa) can cost three times more than showing an “aligned” ad to 
the same audience [104]. Even when an advertiser is explicitly trying to reach a diverse audience, 
Facebook’s delivery system has been found to preferentially present the ad to users who Facebook predicts 
to be more interested and hence likely to be of the same political stripe [105]. Russian efforts to polarise 
members of the American public provide an example of this process.  
The campaigns have used online platforms to reach different groups of users with distinct messages 
intended to drive division and hatred between these groups. For instance, largely liberal groups (e.g. LGBTQ+ 
and Black Lives Matter groups) were presented with information vilifying conservatives, while conservative 
groups (e.g. gun rights advocates) were presented with the opposite sort of content [103]. 
There is debate, however, about the degree to which this sort of advertising actually drives polarisation. 
At least one analysis of large data sets found no evidence of a link between political advertising and 
increased polarisation [106]. However, other authors have argued that advertising can cause polarisation 
[107]. The latter position is supported by a recent report [108] that Facebook was aware of the polarising 
effects of its algorithms but shelved potential countermeasures. 
“The trick to a successful campaign lies less in a powerful 
overarching cause than in crafting different messages for 
different constituencies, focusing on the issues that matter to 
each of them. For example, the most successful message in 
getting people out to vote had been about animal rights. Vote 
leave argued that the EU was cruel to animals because, for 
example, it supported farmers in Spain who raise bulls for 
bullfighting. And within the “animal rights” messaging, Vote 
Leave could focus (sic) even tighter, sending graphic ads 
featuring mutilated animals to one type of voter and more 
gentle ads with pictures of cuddly sheep, to others. A country 
of 20 million people requires between 70 and 80 types of 
targeted message on social media” 
— Thomas Borwick, Chief technology officer for the UK’s Vote 
Leave campaign in an interview with Peter Pomerantsev 
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The impact of microtargeting is exacerbated by the lack of transparency in political campaigning online. 
Notwithstanding recent transparency measures by Facebook (e.g. the “ad library”), it is nearly impossible 
at present to trace how much has been spent on microtargeting and what content has been shown [109]. 
This difficulty is likely to persist because ads on Facebook are delivered by a continually-evolving 
algorithm, known as AdTech, that auctions off ads on a second-to-second basis based on live analysis of 
user data [104].17 A recent investigation of AdTech by the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office 
expressed a number of serious concerns, mainly relating to the non-consensual use of sensitive personal 
data and the complexity of the data supply chain.18 In 2018, the European Data Protection Supervisor 
concluded that AdTech is an ecosystem that “has now been weaponised by actors with political motivations, 
including those wishing to disrupt the democratic process and undermine social cohesion. Opaque 
algorithmic decision-making rewards content which provokes outrage, on the basis that greater 
engagement generates revenue for the platforms in question. This poses obvious risks to fundamental 
values and democracy.”19 
The psychology of targeting. Several laboratory experiments have shown targeting to be effective. An 
early study from 2012 showed that “adapting persuasive messages to the personality traits of the target 
audience can be an effective way of increasing the messages’ impact” [110]. Similar results were reported 
in a large-scale field study on Facebook [111]. The study used the platform to deliver cosmetic ads to 
subsets of (female) Facebook users that were identified as being either introverted or extraverted based 
on their “likes” [111]. Ads that were matched to people’s introvert/extrovert score “resulted in up to 40% 
more clicks and up to 50% more purchases than their mismatching or unpersonalised counterparts” [111, 
p. 12714].20 
Benefits of targeting. Social media can amplify the reach of public information campaigns and mass 
media communication, activating public discussion and setting up political agendas. Digital reach 
amplification has been used in several domains to inform citizens for their own good or to motivate 
behaviour change towards better well-being. The best documented examples of such digital campaigns 
are often related to health issues. For example, advocacy organisations on Facebook have raised 
awareness about autism spectrum issues by building “cultural bridges” between communities that can be 
empirically quantified [116]. 
Health promotion campaigns can combine the additional reach of social media with microtargeting 
techniques to increase their effectiveness. For example, cancer prevention messages are more effective 
when their text is personalised to match cognitive traits of the recipient [117]. However, campaigns for 
good can also meet resistance if they are considered invasive or patronising. A recent example is the EAT-
Lancet report [118], which proposed a healthy and sustainable diet. Despite being promoted by several 
organisations and news media, the EAT-Lancet social media campaign met a significant backlash on 
Twitter [119]. 
How do people understand and manage privacy. A recent Eurobarometer study21 on “Attitudes towards 
the impact of digitalisation on daily lives”, found that 59% of the representative EU population sample 
                                                 
17 See also https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/04/how-facebooks-ad- technology-helps-trump-
win/606403/ 
18 https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2615156/adtech-real-time-bidding- report-201906.pdf 
19 https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/ar2018_en.pdf 
20 The study by [111] has been subjected to critiques [112, 113] which were rebutted by the original authors [114, 115]. 
21https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/survey/getsurveydetail/%20instruments/special/surve
yky/2228 
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would be willing to share some of their personal information securely to improve public services. In 
particular, most respondents were willing to share their data to improve medical research and care (42%), 
to improve the response to crisis (31%) or to improve public transport and reduce air pollution (26%). 
However, importantly in 13 EU countries, more than one third of the respondents would not be willing to 
share any of their personal information for any purpose, with more than four in ten saying this in Bulgaria 
(43%), Poland (43%), France, Hungary and Latvia (41%). 
In general, however, people value their privacy, with 82% of respondents in a recent German survey 
claiming that they are very or somewhat concerned about their data privacy [40]. In line with the “privacy 
paradox”, in the same survey significantly fewer respondents reported taking steps to protect their privacy 
online: Just 37% adjust privacy and ad settings on online platforms and 20% do not use any privacy-
enhancing tools [40]. There are several potential reasons for this discrepancy between what people say 
about online privacy and what they actually do. One reason is the lack of transparency and understanding 
of how online platforms collect and use people’s data and what can be inferred from that data. For 
example, more than 60% of the participants of a Facebook user study in a US university were not aware 
that the Facebook newsfeed selects information to be displayed based on their personal data [120] (this 
study was conducted in 2015 and public perceptions of Facebook may have changed since then). 
The second reason is that platforms may use defaults that favour collection of data over users’ privacy, 
making it difficult to choose privacy-preserving options. With this in mind, people are not incoherent, but 
rather, their attitudes towards privacy are difficult to translate into behaviour because the platforms have 
made privacy unnecessarily complicated to achieve. 
A somewhat different view, proposed by some researchers, is that people engage in a privacy calculation, 
“which states that people will self-disclose personal information when perceived benefits exceed perceived 
negative consequences” [121, p. 369]. 
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Key scientific findings 
 The Internet is tightly controlled by private corporate 
algorithms designed to maximise profits by capturing our 
attention without public accountability. 
 Human attention is the main object of the online economy 
and is considered as a commercial “product” especially on 
social media. 
 The business model of the online economy constrains the 
space of possible solutions that are achievable without 
regulatory intervention. 
 Microtargeting of political messages has considerable 
potential to undermine democratic discourse, which is a 
foundation of democratic choice and is being used to this end. 
 Most people are opposed to microtargeting of certain content 
(e.g. political advertising) or based on certain sensitive 
attributes (e.g. political affiliation). 
 Corporate social media pose a privacy risk for users and non-
users alike, that extends far beyond what individuals explicitly 
share with social media sites, because of how much can be 
inferred from users’ activity. 
 The digital sphere is designed so that people give their 
valuable time, attention and data without considering the 
costs — for themselves and others. This exploits certain 
features of human behaviour, which makes it hard to address 
at the individual level. On a societal level, coordination is 
needed to assure privacy as a public good and to buttress 
democracy, freedom and equality. 
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Chapter 4: Choice architectures 
Choices almost always require an enabling architecture. When we order a beverage in a restaurant, we 
choose from a set of options (e.g. “small”, “medium” or “large”) rather than expressing our preference 
based on an assessment of our thirst (should this even be possible) and translating that into a desired 
quantity (“362 millilitres please”). Choice architectures are ubiquitous in digital settings. The necessity for 
a choice architecture creates a powerful opportunity for platforms to guide users’ choices — be they 
commercial or political — in the platform’s interests. 
As choice architectures are ubiquitous, our analysis is necessarily limited to a few key domains that are 
the most significant from a democracy perspective. Our selected domains focus on choices about privacy 
and associated issues, such as knowledge and management of data sharing. 
Specific characteristics 
Defaults. Default settings have a strong effect on the choices of users of online platforms. A simple 
change from an opt-out to an opt-in default has been found to raise participants’ consent to be informed 
about future health surveys from 48% to 96% [122]. Default settings can also lead users to unwittingly 
share sensitive data, such as location information that can be used to infer attributes like income or 
ethnicity. On Twitter, sharing the GPS location of a user was, at one point, activated by default (opt-out 
format) when posting a tweet that included a place tag, for example “New York City” [123]. In April 2015, 
the default was changed to opt-in, leading to a decrease in the number of geocoded tweets in the US from 
more than 2.5 million per day in 2014 to less than half a million per day in 2015 [124]. In 2019, the option 
to add precise GPS coordinates to tweets was removed [125]. 
The design of defaults can also allow platforms to get around regulations. For example, the GDPR stresses 
the importance of privacy-respecting defaults and insists on a high level of data protection that does not 
require users to actively opt out of the collection and processing of their personal data (GDPR Article 25). 
However, according to a report by the Norwegian Consumer Council [126], tech companies such as Google, 
Facebook and, to a lesser extent, Microsoft, use design choices in “arguably an unethical attempt to push 
consumers toward choices that benefit the service provider” [126, p. 4]. Thus, default settings, serving the 
interests of the service providers, tend to be privacy-intrusive (e.g. Google requires that the user actively 
go to the privacy dashboard in order to disable personalised advertising). 
Compliance issues are not limited to defaults. A quantitative study of privacy policies from 248 US 
companies in privacy-sensitive markets such as social networks and dating sites revealed multiple 
problems [127]. For example, online contracts often missed critical information on privacy-relevant issues, 
contained unclear language and frequently did not include the privacy standards the firms claimed to 
adhere to (such as the EU Safe Harbour Agreement; [127]). 
Framing and commercial nudging. Framing and wording may also be used to nudge users towards a 
choice by presenting the alternative as risky (e.g. on Facebook, users are encouraged to keep face 
recognition turned, because it ostensibly helps “protect you and others from impersonation and identity 
misuse, and improve platform reliability.”22). Choice architectures may also require a take-it-or-leave-it 
                                                 
22 https://www.facebook.com/help/122175507864081 
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decision (e.g. a choice between accepting the privacy terms or deleting an account) or they may be 
designed such that the privacy-friendly option requires more effort and knowledge from users. These 
design features may contribute to the privacy paradox previously discussed. 
Dark patterns. Dark patterns are particularly extreme forms of manipulation and are defined as design 
choices that “benefit an online service by coercing, steering, or deceiving users into making unintended and 
potentially harmful decisions” [128, p. 2].23 They are a coercive and manipulative design technique used 
by web designers when some sort of action is needed from a user — typically to begin the processing of 
personal data or indication of agreement to a contract [129]. One notorious example of dark patterns is 
the “roach motel” which makes it easy for users to get into a certain situation, but difficult to get out. For 
instance, creating an Amazon account requires just a few clicks, but deleting it involves 12 steps that are 
difficult to achieve without instructions.24 
Dark patterns are pervasive. A recent search for dark patterns on 11,000 shopping websites identified 
1,818 dark patterns [128]. The patterns relied on various techniques such as misdirection, applying social 
pressure, sneaking items into the user’s shopping basket and inciting a sense of urgency or scarcity (a 
strategy often used by hotel booking sites and airline companies) [128]. It is unknown how dark patterns 
are being used by political influencers, but the potential for users being involuntarily retained by political 
campaigns must give rise for concern. 
Yet, under Article 38 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, “public authorities shall guarantee the 
protection of consumers and users and shall, by means of effective measures, safeguard their safety, 
health and legitimate economic interests”. The EU consumer protection acquis provides for an extensive 
framework of consumer rights. The EU has recently initiated a “New Deal for Consumers” initiative, 
ultimately adopting the “Directive on better enforcement and modernisation of EU consumer protection” 
(Directive (EU) 2019/2161),25 which also adapts existing rules to the modern conditions of the online 
marketplace. Both the data and consumer protection regimes stand alone but can be used to supplement 
and complement each other. 
As noted recently by Leiser [129], “analysing the overall system architecture, user experience, and 
interfaces for fairness would permit consumer law to gauge whether the totality of the consent process 
was fair on consumers. This requires moving away from proposals for remedying the consent fallacy that 
focus on the panacea of consent simplification and reflects recent acknowledgements found in the 
European Union’s ‘New Deal for Consumers’ that personal data is increasingly seen as having economic 
value.” Therefore, the EU’s consumer protection regime could be used to determine whether the process 
that led to processing was fair on users [130]. 
  
                                                 
23 See also https://darkpatterns.org/  
24 https://www.wikihow.com/Delete-an-Amazon-Account 
25 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/2161/oj 
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How this affects our behaviour 
Defaults and information cost. Defaults clearly matter. It is also clear that defaults are exploited by 
platforms to elicit user behaviours that are in the platform’s interest. However, people’s interaction with 
defaults is more complex and nuanced than simple compliance. 
Much research has focused on the design of default rules, often focusing on the costs to declare an opt 
out. These costs include mechanical costs as well as information costs: That is, the user must manually 
opt out and acquire the necessary information in order to take this decision. One method to increase the 
“stickiness” of defaults is to increase the mechanical effort users have to invest in order to opt out. 
Understanding data. People are generally unaware of what personal data is being collected and potentially 
shared. A particularly pertinent example involves photos, which can be accompanied by a very large number 
of “tags”, including the date and time a photo was taken, the name of the camera owner, a camera’s unique 
ID, geolocation information and even uncropped preview images [131]. Because there is bewildering variety 
in how those tags are stored, how they are stripped (if at all) during upload, the privacy implications of photo 
metadata are difficult to discern, even for experts [131]. In a survey conducted among members of a 
university community in Germany, only 61% indicated familiarity with the concept of metadata 
accompanying photos [132]. Of that informed subset, over half (58%) did not know what happened to 
metadata upon uploading to their preferred platform [132]. 
Interacting with privacy choice architectures. A recent study examined the effects of different 
consent management “pop-up” windows, using a browser extension that displayed different privacy control 
pop-ups in real websites [133]. The designs were mimicking the consent management pop-ups that we 
commonly find in the EU following the introduction of the GDPR. The experiment was conducted with US 
participants (to avoid familiarity with current European consent practice) and measured the effect of pop-
up design on the final privacy decisions of participants. In the experiment, the basic layout of the consent 
notification had no effect on the final privacy decisions, but other components of the design mattered 
[133]. Removing the ‘reject all’ button from the first page of the consent form increased the probability of 
consent by 22%. The display of granular consent choices on the first page also had effects on consent: 
Showing a list of granular choices that spelled out the purposes of data use decreased consent by 8%. 
Showing a list of vendor companies that would access the data decreased consent by 20% and showing 
the list of both purposes and vendors decreased consent by 11% [133]. These results suggest that the 
lack of accessible granularity and the absence of simple opt-out buttons in consent forms leads users to 
share more data than they would when given accessible control over their privacy. 
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Key scientific findings 
 Online privacy preserves three core components of democratically 
empowered voters: freedom of association, truth-finding and 
opportunities to discover new perspectives. More privacy online means 
a strengthened democracy offline. 
 Users are generally unaware of what data they produce, provide to 
others and how that data is collected and stored when they perform 
basic tasks on social media platforms. 
 Choice architectures are an important determinant of online behaviour. 
 Defaults, framing of choices and dark patterns can substantially 
influence user choices, likely contributing to the privacy paradox and 
limiting opportunities to discover new perspectives. 
 Companies use defaults, framing and dark patterns to prompt the 
choice of lenient privacy settings and to increase user engagement. 
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Chapter 5: Algorithmic content curation 
Navigation of the web is nearly impossible without intelligent algorithms that curate content for us. 
Organising information and making it accessible is Google’s official mission statement.26 We benefit from 
those algorithms every time we search for information. However, algorithms frequently also act without 
our knowledge and involvement, to satisfy our “presumed” preferences. Preference satisfaction turns out 
to be a double-edged sword. On the positive side, intelligent recommender systems help us find movies 
or restaurants that we like [134]. YouTube by default continues to play videos automatically without our 
intervention, selecting one video after another based on what an algorithm deems to be of interest to us. 
On the more negative side, algorithms also open the door to manipulation and subterfuge. As we have 
seen in Chapter 3, “microtargeted” political messages that are based on extracting psychological 
characteristics from digital fingerprints can exploit people’s personal vulnerabilities without their 
knowledge and without public scrutiny or opportunity for rebuttal. The benefits and harms of algorithms 
thus deserve to be explored in depth. 
Specific characteristics: The dark side of algorithms 
Anne dislikes violent movies. Why shouldn’t her internet movie provider withhold Chainsaw Massacre from 
a list of offerings? Bob likes to share current-event stories with his friends. Should his social media 
newsfeed provide him with exciting stories that are untrue but that fit his political views? Where should 
one draw the line between helpful algorithmic customisation and manipulation or algorithmic selections 
that run counter to the common good? 
The responsibility gap. Algorithms make decisions without public oversight, regulation or a widespread 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying the resulting decisions. Most algorithms are considered 
proprietary trade secrets and therefore operate as black boxes where neither individual users nor society 
in general knows why information in search engines or social media feeds is ordered in a particular way 
[135]. The problem is compounded by the inherent opacity and complexity of machine-learning algorithms 
[136], such that even creators or owners of algorithms may not be aware of their functioning. 
The delegation of choice from humans to algorithms under conditions of opacity and complexity raises 
questions about responsibility and accountability [137]. Since artificial agents are capable of making their 
own decisions and since no one has strict control over their actions, it is difficult to assign responsibility for 
the outcomes. Because the manufacturer or designer of the algorithm cannot predict its future behaviour, 
it is easy to claim that they cannot be held morally or legally liable for its behaviour. Although designers 
must be held to account for flaws that could reasonably have been detected by careful testing; the 
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) has codified principles on fair use of personal data and fair 
use of algorithms [138]. This diffuse link between designers’ intention and the actual behaviour of an 
algorithm creates a “responsibility gap” that is difficult to bridge with traditional notions of responsibility 
[139] and is subject to ongoing debate (see, e.g. the EU’s recent statement on artificial intelligence by the 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies27). This gap must be of concern because some algorithms 
are known to exhibit systematic biases. 
                                                 
26 https://www.google.com/about/ 
27 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/dfebe62e-4ce9-11e8-be1d- 01aa75ed71a1 
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Algorithmic discrimination and biases. Notwithstanding their opacity and complexity, algorithms 
always have an input and an output. Those two openings can be leveraged into “reverse engineering” an 
algorithm’s functioning [137], that is, understanding its design based upon its observable behaviour. 
Reverse engineering can range from the relatively simple (e.g. examining which words are excluded from 
auto-correct on the iPhone [140]) to the highly complex (e.g. an analysis of how political ads are delivered 
on Facebook [104]). Reverse engineering therefore offers a tool to shine the daylight of transparency into 
what is otherwise an opaque but powerful ecosystem.28 
Reverse engineering of algorithms has consistently identified biases in algorithmic design based upon a 
number of socio-demographic variables. For example, an early analysis by the Wall Street Journal revealed 
price discrimination by online vendors based on user geography (i.e. distance to a rival’s store) and various 
other variables [141]. A more disturbing set of examples concerns deeply rooted gender or racial biases 
that are encapsulated into data-processing algorithms. One study of personalised Google advertisements 
demonstrated that setting the gender to female rather than male in simulated user accounts, resulted in 
fewer ads related to high-paying jobs [142]. This finding was confirmed by another field study using 
Facebook, which found that an ad promoting information about careers in science and engineering was 
seen by fewer women than men, even though the ad was explicitly intended to be gender neutral in its 
delivery [143]. This discriminatory delivery occurs because younger women are a prized demographic, which 
increases the price of ad delivery compared to their male counterparts. Hence, any algorithm that optimises 
the cost-effectiveness of an advertising campaign will deliver ads that were intended to target both men 
and women equally in an apparently discriminatory manner. No matter how unbiased the advertiser, the 
algorithm will introduce a bias through optimisation of a variable (cost of delivery) that happens to differ 
between genders [143]. This can happen “even when advertisers set their targeting parameters to be highly 
inclusive” [105, p. 1]. 
Another study in the US found that online searches for “black-identifying” names were more likely to be 
associated with advertisements suggestive of arrest records (e.g. “Looking for Latanya Sweeney? Check 
Latanya Sweeney’s arrests”). Names such as Jill or Kristen did not elicit similar ads even when persons by 
that name did have an arrest record [144]. Such algorithmic racial biases can have significant 
consequences in society, for example when they exacerbate inequalities in health care between White and 
Black Americans [145]. 
Racial discrimination is also well established for facial recognition algorithms. These algorithms have been 
found to exhibit low accuracy on non-white faces. For example, in a gender classification task, darker-
skinned females were misclassified by the algorithm up to 35% of the time, compared to a maximum 
error rate for lighter-skinned males of below 1% [146]. Similarly, a study by the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology29 found that current facial recognition systems misidentify Blacks and Asians 
at 10 to 100 times the rate of Whites. Given the increasing use of automated facial recognition in law 
enforcement, this is a significant cause for concern. 
Recent research from the US has revealed that even email is not immune to political fallout from 
algorithmic sorting. Google’s popular gmail facility automatically sorts incoming messages between 
different mailboxes. A primary inbox, which is the default focus, receives “the mail you really, really want”, 
                                                 
28 Although the GDPR has numerous provisions regarding the right to an explanation and right to meaningful information, 
independent, external audits are the only way to ensure compliance. 
29 https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software 
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whereas other messages are sent to a promotions folder (for “deals, offers and other marketing emails”) 
or to spam. 
A recent audit revealed that fundraising emails from politicians were frequently redirected from the 
primary inbox even if a user signed up to receive them. More troubling still, the redirection differed 
considerably between different political candidates, with 63% of one candidate’s email showing up in the 
primary inbox compared to 0% for many others (including Joe Biden and Elizabeth Warren).30 
Search engines. Web search engines have been the focus of studies on information coverage, diversity 
and bias since the late 1990s [147, 148, 149]. Early scholars recognised that search engines also raised 
important political questions regarding their control over the flow of information [150]. Indeed, search 
engine bias can have a substantial impact on important societal decision-making processes [66]. 
Early work suggested that diversity in user interests might mitigate any search engine biases [151]. More 
recent work, however, suggests that user interests can exacerbate search engine biases [152]. These 
problems are not easily rectified, even with training and the best intentions of the user. Pinning down a 
“correct” query is difficult because web content and search rankings change over time. A query that returns 
high quality results today might return low quality results next month. 
The rapid shift in meaning of search terms arises particularly in the context of gaps in search coverage 
(“data voids”) that can be exploited by malicious actors [153]. To illustrate, few people ever searched for 
“Sutherland Springs” before 4 November 2017, when a shooter walked into a Baptist church in the small 
Texas town and killed 26 people. Because there was little competition for online content about Sutherland 
Springs at the time (barring weather information, a map and a Wikipedia entry), malicious actors were 
able to influence search rankings by posting a torrent of material that (falsely) blamed the shooting on 
the “Antifa” movement. These malicious actors succeeded in shaping the front page of search queries and 
even injected “Antifa” into auto-suggest. The fictitious link to “Antifa” was picked up by Newsweek and took 
valuable time to debunk. There is evidence that this is no isolated incident and that white supremacists 
systematically seek to exploit data voids which can then be filled with extremist material against little 
competition [153]. 
Another cause for concern are allegations that Google hard-coded rules in its algorithm to put its own 
products at the top of the page [154]. For example, Google has been shown to push YouTube videos over 
those hosted by rivals31 and in an audit of autocompletions Google was found to add “YouTube” to queries 
of politicians’ names at twice the rate of Bing [155]. 
Independent efforts to audit search engines have examined them with respect to a wide range 
of topics, including personalisation, news, health and discrimination. Personalisation has been 
explored several times in recent studies, with researchers generally concluding that individual-
level personalisation is relatively low in search and that location-based personalisation is a 
bigger factor [156, 157, 158]. Researchers have examined search results for news content, 
finding that exposure is generally concentrated among a small number of highly popular outlets 
[159, 160]. 
                                                 
30 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/26/gmail-hiding-bernie-sanders-emails-google-inbox-sorting-consequences-
2020 
31 https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-steers-users-to-youtube-over-rivals-11594745232 
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While searching for the names of political candidates, researchers have also found that queries (i.e. user 
agency), can account for a large share of the variance in the partisanship of the results returned [161]. An 
additional finding is that Google’s web page preview snippets (the short paragraph of text that typically 
accompanies a link) often amplify the partisanship of the corresponding web page [162]. Further 
highlighting the importance of users’ queries, recent work has found that people formulate queries that 
contain partisan signals reflecting their ideology [163, 164]. 
Similar to most other online platforms, search engines can interact with inputs related to race and gender 
in ways that reflect a society’s existing stereotypes and power structures. For example, researchers have 
found discriminatory advertising practices and stereotypical representations of Black Americans in Google 
Search [144, 165]. Similar findings have arisen with respect to the autocomplete suggestions that Google 
provides [166] and auditing methods for interrogating such suggestions have been developed [155]. 
Even if a search engine can correct for these problems, they are still subject to ongoing attempts by 
external actors to manipulate their rankings. Such attempts can be seen in prior work on web spam in 
search, where third parties attempt to surface content for political motives or financial gain [167, 168]. 
One way to measure resilience to such manipulations is to measure the stability of results over time [169, 
170], but without collaboration with a search engine itself, detecting gaming attempts is not possible. 
Not all search engines are created equal. A 2019 study by the Stanford Internet Observatory 
compared the performance of Google to Microsoft’s Bing search engine.32 In general, Bing was found 
to return disinformation and misinformation at a significantly higher rate than Google; it directed 
users to conspiracy-related content without being prompted by specific search terms; and it returned 
white-supremacist content in response to unrelated queries. There are, however, methodological 
limitations (e.g. a limited number of search queries) that suggest caution in interpretation of these 
results. Nonetheless, they are consistent with earlier research which found that searches related to 
suicide themes on Google would yield the phone number for the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline 
as the top item, whereas Bing would return methods for committing suicide among the top search 
results.33 
Recommender systems and algorithmic rankings. YouTube boasts over 2 billion users34, making it the 
second most visited website worldwide. At the heart of YouTube’s architecture is a sophisticated 
recommender system that is designed to maximise viewing time on the platform [67]. The system learns 
approximately one billion parameters and is trained on hundreds of billions of cases. One consequence of 
the recommender system is that it tends to offer viewers more extreme content at every step. For example, 
users who viewed videos of Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign were subsequently 
presented with videos featuring white supremacists and Holocaust denialists. After playing videos of Bernie 
Sanders, YouTube suggested videos relating to left-wing conspiracies, such as the claim that the US 
government was behind the September 11 attacks [171]. A recent preregistered study of the YouTube 
recommender system confirmed that it was liable to promote and amplify conspiratorial content even in 
response to relatively innocuous search terms [172]. 
Problems with the YouTube recommender system also arise outside the political arena. Recent research 
has shown that young children are likely to encounter “disturbing” videos (i.e. clips containing 
                                                 
32 https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/bing-search-disinformation 
33 https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/nn97jk/how-google-searches-influence-suicides-511 
34 https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-GB/about/press/ 
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inappropriately violent or sexual content) on YouTube when they randomly browse YouTube, starting from a 
benign video [173]. 
A particularly problematic feature of these recommendations is the “autoplay” setting on YouTube, which 
automatically starts playing the next video in a recommended sequence without requiring user input 
(turning off the autoplay feature requires a relatively complicated sequence of steps35). 
There is now evidence suggesting that YouTube algorithms may have actively contributed to the rise and 
consolidation of right-wing extremists in the US [174] and Germany [175]. This concern about 
radicalisation was buttressed by a recent large-scale quantitative audit of the YouTube recommender 
system [176]. An alternative view on radicalisation argues that YouTube has other features besides the 
recommender system, such as monetisation of content, that facilitate content creation by fringe political 
actors [177] (see also, [178]). On balance, we are not aware of scientific dissent from the position that 
YouTube’s design—i.e. mainly but not exclusively its recommender system — facilitates radicalisation and 
exposure to extremist content. 
In response to mounting criticism, YouTube recently vowed to limit recommending conspiracy theories on 
its platform [179]. This move may be welcome in light of the demonstrably adverse effects of conspiracy 
theories on the public [180], but it also highlights industry’s unilateral power to shape information diets, 
which at present is only challenged by academic research and investigative journalism. In this context, it 
is noteworthy that a former software engineer at YouTube has accused the company of shutting down an 
algorithm that had been designed in 2010 to insert more diversity into the recommendations because it 
reduced viewer time.36 
Curated social media newsfeeds. Social media newsfeeds have become a ubiquitous feature of life. 
We inform ourselves about anything from family events and friends’ adventures to political developments 
by checking Facebook, Instagram or Twitter (to name but a few platforms). In 2019, active social media 
penetration across the EU ranged from 88% in Malta to 46% in Germany. Overall, 48% of EU citizens used 
online social media networks every day or almost every day. The average daily length of time of social 
media use (via any device) ranged from 129 minutes per day in Portugal to 64 minutes in Germany. In 
Germany, more than 15 million Instagram users follow influencers Lisa & Lena. 54% of Finns use Snapchat 
several times a day, while in France 61% of 8-14 year-olds have a Snapchat account. In the Netherlands, 
from January-February 2020, the TikTok app was downloaded more than 600,000 times.37 During the peak 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, a global survey found that 20% of respondents indicated that they would 
continue to spend more time on social media even after the pandemic [181]. Figure 3 (below) summarises 
internet penetration and associated social media use across all 27 EU Member States. 
 
                                                 
35 https://www.lifewire.com/turn-off-autoplay-on-youtube-4178239 
36 https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/algorithms-take-over-youtube-s-recommendations-highlight-human-
problem-n867596 
37 All data in this paragraph are from Statista’s report Social media usage in the European Union (EU); 
https://www.statista.com/study/32424/social-media-usage-in-the-european-union-eu-statista-dossier/ 
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Figure 3 - Internet and social media penetration across EU 27 (January 2020). Source: https://datareportal.com/ 
The public’s habitual interaction with social media has likely dulled us to the fact that newsfeeds have 
become one of the most sophisticated algorithmically driven features of online platforms [182]. Most 
platforms order pieces of content according to attributes that are branded as “trending,” “hot,” “popular,” 
or “new.” Behind those branding labels is an algorithmic score that integrates some measure of popularity 
of a post, together with other variables such as its age and the proximity in the social networks of its 
originator. The exact combinations and algorithms are generally not public, even though sorting can be 
crucial for popularity dynamics [183]. 
Many sites, including Twitter, Reddit and Facebook, preferentially show content that has seen more 
engagement from other users or which the algorithm expects to yield high engagement. It follows that 
the algorithm will favour extreme, emotional and humorous content because it is often more engaging 
than generic news or shared personal news. Similarly, engagement (e.g. through disagreement) may 
amplify more polarising content over less polarising, community-building content. Newsfeeds 
consequently, may expose users disproportionately to polarising content or content emphasising 
disagreement. 
In consequence, there has been much concern and public debate that social media platforms may be 
responsible for “echo chambers” [184] or “filter bubbles” [185]. Here, we use the term “echo chamber” to 
refer to environments in which people are only exposed to information from like-minded individuals 
(formed mainly by people’s purposeful avoidance of opposing views). We use the term “filter bubbles”, by 
contrast, to refer to algorithmic content selection according to a viewer’s preferences as revealed by prior 
behaviour [186]. 
The adverse consequences that are thought to arise from echo chambers and filter bubbles are increasing 
political polarisation and radicalisation [187]. The existence of filter bubbles and echo chambers is subject 
to considerable academic debate. To put this debate on a solid footing requires a careful disentangling of 
the roles of algorithms that automatically curate a newsfeed (filter bubble) and people’s choice to avoid 
(or denigrate; [188]) opposing views (echo chamber), as well as the interaction between human and 
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algorithmic biases. For example, in principle it is possible for there to be little evidence for the existence 
of filter bubbles (i.e. people’s news offerings may be less segregated than feared) even though evidence 
simultaneously reveals the existence of echo chambers (i.e. people may trust different content, sources or 
other users, so that even if people are exposed to a variety of content, uptake of that content may differ 
between people).38 In support of this possibility it has been shown that even in completely connected 
networks with no curated newsfeeds (i.e. no filter bubbles), polarisation may appear because people treat 
evidence shared by some of their connections as less trustworthy than evidence shared by others [189]. 
These dynamics can lead to factions of users who share otherwise-unrelated polarised beliefs [190]. In 
such cases, echo chambers may be effectively present because users ignore or distrust some content to 
which they are exposed. 
The entanglement of algorithm and user. Due to the complex interactions between algorithmic and 
human behaviour, a causal link to political preferences is difficult to establish [191, 192]. The complexity 
of interaction is best illustrated by considering a seemingly simple web search. When analysing potential 
search engine biases, it is difficult to tease apart confounding factors inherent to the scale and complexity 
of the web [193]. One factor involves the constantly evolving metrics “relevance” that search engines 
optimize for [194]: Google is known to change its algorithms hundreds of times each year.39 Another factor 
relates to efforts to counter and prevent gaming by vested parties [169]. This Search Engine Optimization 
(SEO) can take many forms, ranging from the legitimate (e.g. linking to high quality sites) to manipulative 
(e.g. hiding unrelated high-traffic terms in the webpage to maximise its reach). 
The problem is compounded by the observation that how users formulate and negotiate search queries 
can vary by political party [164, 152]. These behavioural differences, in turn, can have a large impact on 
the partisanship of the sources users encounter on the web. For example, query selection has been shown 
to substantially affect audience-based partisanship in both Google [161] and Twitter search results [195]. 
The process of generating queries — and the ensuing search results — thus involves not only the 
information retrieval algorithms at play, but also the cultural and political history of the human interacting 
with them [194, 152]. It appears that human biases are detected by algorithms and rewarded by a more 
biased offering of information. 
Studies involving real user data are rarely conducted outside of corporate research labs [186], due in part 
to proprietary and privacy-related concerns [196]. The lack of up-to-date research on this topic is also 
partly due to the ever-evolving nature of users’ information needs [197, 152] and the opaque interactions 
between users and autocomplete algorithms that influence the process of query selection [155], both of 
which require longitudinal study [198]. 
Evidence relating to selective exposure and engagement. Polarisation is on the rise in the US [184] and 
some (though not all) European countries [199]. Identifying the source of this trend is a difficult task, in 
light of the challenges involved in teasing apart the role of human agency and algorithmic curation. Do 
online environments really exacerbate polarisation or do they just reflect offline patterns of behaviour? 
Previous analyses have suggested that the evidence is inconclusive [200, 201]. 
A study using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) found that polarisation has 
increased the most among demographic groups least likely to use the Internet and social media [202]. In 
                                                 
38 Echo chambers may persist even if there is diversity of content, if non-aligned content is systematically denigrated [188]. 
Echo chambers may therefore be strengthened by the presence of oppositional viewpoints. 
39 https://moz.com/google-algorithm-change 
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a three-month study of 50,000 American online news consumers, the ideological distance between the 
news diets of a random pair of consumers was found to be small [203]. 
With respect to social media, several studies highlight the role of user choices and network structure as 
primary sources of polarisation. On Facebook, people tend to befriend people with similar politics and less 
than half of the content people are exposed to and engage with are from ideologically-different sources 
[186]. A 2015 study of retweet networks for 3.8 million Twitter users found that discussions on politically 
salient topics are often highly fragmented — occurring among users with the same ideological preferences 
— while discussions on other topics, like entertainment and sports, are more inclusive [204]. These results 
align with earlier studies of polarisation in blogs, where blogs with a similar ideological slant were more 
likely to link to each other than to blogs with the opposite slant [205]. 
Even when people are exposed to ideologically varied information on social media platforms [186, 204], 
the interactions resulting from such exposures are often vitriolic. For example, someone might post an 
article that is from a source coded as politically left-leaning, but add their own text harshly criticising it. It 
is important to note that most methods of measuring partisanship will miss this nuance. Moreover, 
exposure to ideologically-different information under such partisan criticism would result in increasing 
polarisation [206, 207] and would solidify existing echo chambers [188]. 
In controlled experiments, people generally do not choose information that conforms to their own views 
at the expense of information that contradicts held opinions. When presented with items that either 
confirm opinions held or are balanced, people are largely indifferent to the inclusion of opposing 
viewpoints. It is only when their own opinions are not represented at all, that they reject information [208]. 
By contrast, using real user data, Facebook researchers found that people are more likely to engage with 
ideologically consistent news sources, but concluded that this was due more to user choices (e.g. whom 
they friended) than Facebook’s algorithms [186]. When the data are broken down by partisanship, liberals 
were more likely to encounter cross-cutting content in the newsfeed than conservatives [186]. These 
results were broadly replicated in a recent analysis [209], which additionally found that the share of 
Republican respondents whose media diets were much more conservative than those of the rest of the 
sample increased between 2015 and 2016. 
This asymmetrical theme carries through other “big-data” analyses, with evidence for potential echo 
chambers of misinformation frequently emerging among particularly strong conservatives. For example, 
researchers reported evidence of substantial selective exposure to fake news, with Trump supporters 
consuming more news from untrustworthy websites than others [210]. The research team concluded that 
“echo chambers are deep (52 articles from untrustworthy conservative websites on average in this subset) 
but they are also narrow (the group in question represents only 20% of the public)” [210, p. 6]. Similarly, 
a recent large-scale study of Twitter users has found that sharing of misinformation was 
disproportionately concentrated among older Republicans [211]. This replicates a previous large-scale 
analysis of Twitter that also concluded that echo chambers exist or form as polarisation kicks in [204]. The 
same study also detected ideological asymmetry, with liberals being less likely to be caught in an echo 
chamber [204]. Nonetheless, non-political issues and events were found to be discussed without regard to 
partisanship [204]. 
Not all questions about echo chambers and filter bubbles have a clear answer. What is clear is that 
polarisation exists in society and that it exists online and is manifest in fragmented online spaces or highly 
selective media diets, that are justifiably called “echo chambers”. Although those echo chambers may be 
narrow and limited in size [210], members of those chambers have been found to be most likely to vote, 
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implying that “even if most Americans do not exist in online echo chambers, they are subject to the political 
influence of those who do” [209, p. 28]. 
What remains less clear is precisely how much of the blame for echo chambers can be attributed to 
algorithms or specific platforms. Human behaviour and algorithmic biases are entangled in a — frequently 
— reinforcing feedback loop that makes apportioning responsibility difficult. What is clear, however, is that 
algorithms do not militate against online polarisation—even though recent reports suggest that corrective 
technology exists but was rejected by Facebook [108]. 
How this affects our behaviour 
The power of search engines. The power of search engines to affect people’s perceptions has been 
demonstrated repeatedly in experiments. For example, Google search results have been shown to affect 
attitudes and beliefs about vaccinations [212]. Other experiments have shown that search ranking can 
impact attitudes about science controversies and that participants rated top-ranked pages as the most 
useful [213]. 
The results of such experiments are particularly pertinent and concerning in the political domain. In those 
studies, participants were presented with mock search engine results that were biased in favour of one 
politician at the expense of another. For example, it has been shown that (simulated) search engine 
rankings that favour a particular political candidate can shift voting preferences of undecided voters by 
20% or more [66]. Even when participants are given very detailed warnings about possible ranking biases, 
the effects of the bias were reduced (to 14%) but not eliminated [214]. The only time the effects of 
rankings were eliminated in these experiments, was when the results alternated between the candidates, 
essentially an equal time rule. 
Taking the US as an example, given that half of American presidential elections are decided by margins 
under 7.6% [66], the impact of potential search-engine biases should not be ignored. 
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Key scientific findings 
 
 Algorithms are an indispensable feature of the web that can 
be used or abused in relation to enhanced user satisfaction, 
engagement and awareness. 
 Curated newsfeeds and automated recommender systems are 
designed to maximise user attention by satisfying their 
presumed preferences, which can mean highlighting polarising, 
misleading, extremist or otherwise problematic content to 
maximise user engagement. 
 Newsfeed rankings, search engine ordering and recommender 
systems can causally influence our preferences and 
perceptions. 
 The evidence for filter bubbles (i.e. algorithmic segregation of 
users’ information content), is ambivalent, but there are 
legitimate serious concerns about echo chambers (i.e. formed 
through self-selection of content by users). 
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Chapter 6 
Misinformation & disinformation 
Specific characteristics: What is “post-truth”? 
How this affects our behaviour: Receptivity to misleading information 
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Chapter 6: Misinformation and disinformation 
“Post-truth” was nominated word of the year by Oxford dictionaries in 2016, to describe “circumstances 
in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal 
belief.”40 A year later, Collins dictionaries declared “fake news” as word of the year, to refer to “false, 
often sensational, information disseminated under the guise of news reporting.”41 These choices illustrate 
the massive current level of concern, in the public sphere as well as in political and academic circles, about 
misinformation. 
False information, political manipulation and online harassment are global public concerns. In the 
European Union, in every Member State, at least half of respondents in a large sample (N = 26, 576) say 
they come across fake news once a week or more [215]. In the US, 89% of adults (N = 6, 127) indicate 
that they come across made-up news intended to mislead the public at least sometimes [216]. In politics 
and policymaking, countless reports and recommendations have been issued about the threat to 
democracy arising from false information, although few have translated into policy. In the scientific 
literature, the increase in research attention has been equally striking. Whereas only 73 articles with “fake 
news” in the title had been published in all the years leading up to January 2017, since then 2,210 articles 
have appeared in the literature [217]. 
Specific characteristics: What is “post-truth”? 
Persistent concern about the widespread effects of misinformation are legitimately fue lled by 
a number of scientific results and present platform policies. These concerns are particularly 
serious if one considers the full spectrum of misinformation, from “fake news” to misleading 
statements by politicians, rather than just the fabrications emanating from a small number of 
“fake news” websites, which are consumed only by a small but arguably significant segment of 
the public [217, 211, 218, 219, 210]. 
Platform policies. Turning first to platform 
policies, there are at least two reasons for 
concern: First, the actual platform policies and 
second, the volatility of those policies. 
Concerning the former, until recently Facebook 
had an explicit policy against fact-checking 
political advertisements.42 Concerning the latter, 
at the time of this writing (July 2020), Facebook 
had just given customers the option to opt out 
of receiving political ads, at least in the United 
States.43 Facebook has also taken down posts 
and ads for President Trump’s re-election 
campaign because they violated the platform’s 
policy against “organized hate,” marking the 
                                                 
40 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 
41 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/woty 
42 https://time.com/5762234/facebook-political-ads-election/ 
43 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/technology/opt-out-political-ads-facebook.html 
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latest confrontation in an escalating battle over how tech companies handle controversial 
political content.44 
Facebook is not the only platform exercising decisions about political content, Twitter has also recently 
begun to mark some of Donald Trump’s tweets as false or misleading,45 and has prevented retweets 
without comments, thus curtailing the President’s ability to cause a social media cascade. 
The theme that cuts across these two sources of concern is that we live in tumultuous times in which 
platform policies can appear not only arbitrary or inappropriate in the eyes of many, but in which they can 
also change at a moment’s notice and without public conversation or accountability. This has not escaped 
key actors who are recognising the need for leadership and direction. For example, Facebook’s CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg expressed an interest to “partner more closely with governments not just based on what is 
written into law but proactively understand — what they would like to see us do” in an interview with the 
European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton.46 
Agenda setting power of disinformation. Even a small dose of fake news can set agendas through “its 
ability to ‘push’ or ‘drive’ the popularity of issues in the broader online media ecosystem” [220, p. 2043]. 
A recent study showed that although fake news did not dominate the American media landscape in 2014 
– 2016, fake news was intertwined with partisan media (e.g. Fox News) and influenced news agendas 
across a wide range of topics, including the economy, education, the environment, international relations, 
religion, taxes and unemployment [220]. Similarly, extreme-right outlets such as Breitbart have been shown 
to alter the broader agenda of the media [221]. 
Incentivising extremism. The segmentation and polarisation of the media [222] (both online and offline) 
and the emergence of partisan outlets have also created a reward structure for politicians to engage in 
strategic extremism [47]. The agenda-setting power of fake — and often extremist — material is therefore 
further amplified by politicians who, quite rationally, seek to maximise their electoral success. Although 
conventional wisdom holds that vote-maximising politicians should cater to the middle by chasing the 
“median voter” [223], extremism is rewarded when a politician gains more from energising their own 
supporters and gaining supporters on the fringe, than they lose by alienating median or opposing voters. 
This relative benefit of extremism can only occur when awareness of a politician’s message is higher 
among his or her supporters than it is among the opponent’s supporters. The existence of influential, highly 
partisan media provides this opportunity for pragmatic extremism. We further examine the mechanisms 
by which extremist content can become part of mainstream discourse in Chapter 7. 
Polarisation and strategic extremism may also be amplified by a striking feature of online disinformation 
in the past five years. Since the lead-up to the UK’s Brexit referendum in 2016, sophisticated actors have 
honed the ability to create misleading content that is likely to be shared virally by ordinary users; often 
they are not aware of its source (or falsity) [107]. This dissemination strategy exploits existing social 
factors, including trust, affinities and conformity, to maximize the uptake of misleading content. Thus, 
disinformation may appear from known, trusted sources within one’s social network, even though it was 
originally generated by unknown and often malicious third parties. 
This means that even on platforms where (non-sponsored) content can be shared only by existing 
connections, such as Facebook, third-party disinformation may appear because another user has decided 
                                                 
44 https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-removes-trump-campaign-posts-ads-for-violating-policy-11592504003 
45 https://techcrunch.com/2020/05/29/twitter-screens-trumps-minneapolis-threat-tweet-for-glorifying-violence/ 
46 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uZfi6WkIfgU&feature=youtu.be 
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to share it. This “participatory propaganda” will be explored further below. The perception that one is 
interacting only with known contacts can make users more susceptible to disinformation, precisely because 
it does not directly originate with a malicious actor but gives the impression of a friend’s endorsement. 
We now expand our focus to include the multitude of other forms of false or misleading information the 
public is exposed to. We begin by differentiating between different types of false or misleading 
information. This analysis focuses mainly on the supply-side of this information. It is followed by an 
examination of the demand side; that is, an analysis of the variables that render the public susceptible to 
the consumption of misinformation. 
Taxonomies of misleading information. Not all false information is equal. Several different 
classifications of false or misleading information have been proposed, invoking several different attributes 
or dimensions (Figure 4 provides an overview). 
 
Figure 4 - Types of false and misleading information. Adapted from [24]. 
One important dimension characterising false information is whether or not it was intended to mislead. 
One analysis distinguishes between three types of “information disorders” [224]: misinformation (false or 
misleading content created and initially presented without malicious intent), disinformation (false, 
fabricated or manipulated content shared with intent to mislead or cause harm) and mal-information 
(genuine information shared with intent to cause harm, such as hate speech and leaks of private 
information) [224]. Intentional generation of false content is financially lucrative: The Global 
Disinformation Index recently estimated that online ad spending on disinformation domains amounted to 
$235 million a year [225]. 
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Although intention can be challenging to discern, sometimes it is the only variable that 
differentiates fake news from satire. Most forms of satire should not be considered 
disinformation even if its content is technically false [226].  
There is, however, one critical qualification to 
the endorsement of satire. There is evidence 
that irony, “in-jokes” and satire have been 
weaponised by extreme-right actors [227]. It 
has been argued that “the far-right exploits 
young men’s rebellion and dislike of ‘political 
correctness’ to spread white supremacist 
thought, Islamophobia and misogyny through 
irony and knowledge of internet culture” [228, 
p. 11]. Under the umbrella of ironic ambiguity, 
many alt-right actions — such as the 
propagation of Nazi symbols, the use of racial 
epithets or spreading of racial slurs — 
effectively garner support for white 
supremacist ideologies.47 
This is of concern for a number of reasons: 
First, machine-learning algorithms are 
typically unable to differentiate irony from 
sincere information, which renders automatic 
detection of extremist messages more 
difficult. Second, the European Commission’s 
Code of Practice on Disinformation48 explicitly 
excludes “misleading advertising, reporting 
errors, satire and parody or clearly identified 
partisan news and commentary” (emphasis 
added). Thinly-veiled abuse of the right to 
expression is therefore difficult to identify or 
regulate. 
Another challenge to categorising false content 
according to intent is that the intentions of the 
content creator and those of the users who 
share the content may be different. For 
instance, content may be created by malicious 
actors intending to manipulate political beliefs; 
but shared by users who believe and are 
sincerely alarmed by the content, by users who 
are unsure what to think and hope to prompt 
discussion or commentary from others (e.g. 
because if it were true it would be interesting; 
                                                 
47 https://dailystormer.su/a-normies-guide-to-the-alt-right/ 
48 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation 
 
“If everybody always 
lies to you, the 
consequence is not that 
you believe the lies, but 
rather that nobody 
believes anything any 
longer. And a people 
that no longer can 
believe anything cannot 
make up its mind. It is 
deprived not only of its 
capacity to act but also 
of its capacity to think 
and to judge. And with 
such a people you can 
then do what you 
please.” 
 
— Hannah Arendt, German-
American philosopher and 
political theorist 
 
 
P
a
g
e 
6
0
 
[229]) or even by users whose principal goal is to fact-check or refute the content, but who thereby 
expose other users to it. In such cases, content that may begin as disinformation may morph into 
misinformation as the intentions of those who repackage it or share it change. A particularly pernicious 
form of this packaging of malicious intent in a seemingly innocuous format is the “just asking questions” 
strategy employed by conspiracy theorists [230]. This strategy creates legitimate space for a conspiracy 
narrative while maintaining some degree of respectability. It has been used by prominent American cable 
news provocateurs, for example when raising questions about the deaths of US troops in Niger [230]. 
Conversely, content created in a sincere effort at truth-telling, but which happens to be false or misleading 
when presented out of context, may be shared or promoted by malicious actors in a deliberate effort to 
mislead. This sort of strategy often occurs when political or economically-motivated actors cherry-pick 
legitimate scientific results to support their preferred position. Versions of this strategy have been widely 
used by industry groups for decades, such as when the tobacco industry sought to undermine the growing 
scientific consensus that smoking causes cancer [231, 232]. Various analyses have shown that the 
strategy can be effective even when it uses only legitimate scientific results [233]. 
Social media can make sharing legitimate content in misleading ways easier. During the COVID-19 
pandemic, both traditional pro-business media and some social media influencers have disproportionately 
shared apparently-legitimate research purporting to show that COVID-19 has a substantially lower 
infection fatality rate than the World Health Organization has estimated, whereas those with different 
policy preferences have disproportionately shared studies apparently showing the disease is more deadly. 
In such cases, it would be wrong to say that the underlying scientific articles are misinformation, much 
less disinformation or mal-information, even if their conclusions are in fact false or their reported data 
are outliers. And yet, some sharers of that content do intend to mislead or manipulate. 
Yet another class of false content that does not fall under the above categorisation are retracted 
or corrected articles that continue to propagate as if they were true even after they have been 
refuted or acknowledged as false by their authors. In the context of the COVID -19 pandemic, 
these articles have been called “information zombies” because they continue to spread on social 
media after they have been killed [234]. Prominent examples include a s tudy by a group of 
Indian scientists claiming an “uncanny” similarity in genetic material between COVID -19 and 
HIV, which was withdrawn two days after it was posted on January 31, 2020, but which was 
tweeted more than 20,000 times as of May 2020; or an Apr il 17 op-ed from the Wall Street 
Journal reporting results from a study of the prevalence of antibodies in a Santa Clara County 
population that were later substantially revised by the study authors, without any corresponding 
change to the op-ed—which in turn continued to be shared and promoted on Facebook for weeks 
after the revisions. In such cases, the content is not “misinformation” in the sense that it may 
well represent the best information available to the authors at the time; and yet as it continues 
to spread, it becomes misinformation or even disinformation.  
Other analyses have taken for granted an intent to mislead the public and focused on the 
techniques and goals of the manipulator. For example, one study [235] classified misinformation 
along two dimensions, one pertaining to style and primary audience (which ranges from an 
informal, conversational style directed toward people’s daily lives, to a formal, persuasive style 
aimed at institutions and systems) and one describing the underlying ontology of truth (which 
ranges from strong realism with the acceptance that truths exist and a respect for facts to 
strong constructivism where there is disbelief in the existence of external truths and a 
disrespect of facts). The latter dimension is of particular  interest, because it neatly captures 
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the evolution of misinformation during the last two decades. At one end, there are carefully 
curated deceptions whose purpose was to convince the public of a non -existent state of reality. 
Perhaps the most famous example involves claims surrounding the existence of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) in Iraq prior to the invasion of 2003. Although there is now much evidence [236, 237, 
238] that the US and UK governments engaged in deception to construct those claims, there is little 
evidence of outright fabrication by UK officials [238]). The US and UK governments therefore displayed 
an ontological commitment to a form of realism. That is, they accepted that there was a ground truth and 
they relied on empirical notations, such as “evidence” or “intelligence,” to contest the state of that ground 
truth in Iraq. The fact that Iraqi reality turned out to be different does not negate the fact that the WMD 
campaign contested a reality whose existence was acknowledged by all parties — governments, the public 
and U.N. weapons inspectors. Other examples of such carefully curated falsehoods involve climate change 
denial and other organised campaigns to convince the public of a state of affairs that is untrue but 
convenient for the campaigners. These curated campaigns can be highly successful; a poll from December 
2014 found that around 40% of the American public continued to believe that WMD were found in Iraq.49 
At the other end of the spectrum is a “shock and chaos” regime of falsehoods that seems to have given 
up on the notion of a shared reality and instead relies on an extreme form of constructivism in which 
“truth” is entirely in the eye of the beholder. This disinformation regime is characterised by indifference to 
the truth and a blizzard of erratic, often contradictory, messages. One striking example is the Russian 
government’s response to the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 in 2014 by a Russian-made Buk 
missile. Sputnik, RT (Russia Today) and other pro-Kremlin websites first denied it was a Russian missile. 
Then they said the missile was fired by Ukrainians. Then they said the pilot had deliberately crashed the 
airliner and the plane had been full of dead bodies before impact. Finally they said it was all part of a 
conspiracy against Russia [239]. In the Western world, the shock and chaos regime is illustrated by Donald 
Trump and his supporting infrastructure [240]. According to the Washington Post, Trump has made in 
excess of 20,000 false or misleading statements during his presidency to date (July 202050). One notable 
attribute of many of these false statements is that, unlike the more nuanced claims about WMDs based 
on government intelligence, they are readily and rapidly shown to be false. Indeed, some of Trump’s claims, 
for example that people went out in their boats to watch Hurricane Harvey,51 have an almost operatic 
quality and are not readily explainable by political expediency. This type of misinformation is not carefully 
curated but is showered onto the public as a blizzard of confusing and often contradictory statements. 
Incoherence and internal contradictions have also been shown to be rife with conspiracy theories relating 
to COVID-19 [241]. A RAND corporation report has referred to shock-and-chaos disinformation as the 
“firehose of falsehood” propaganda model [242]. 
This apparent shift over time in the predominant mode of misinformation, from tacit realism to extreme 
constructivism, has important consequences that must be understood for countermeasures to be 
successful. 
The changing ontology of truth and its public dimension. The changing underlying ontology of truth can be 
illustrated by examining the responses to challenges. When no WMDs were found in Iraq after the invasion 
of 2003, this gave rise to multiple inquiries on both sides of the Atlantic and the absence of WMDs 
                                                 
49 https://view2.fdu.edu/publicmind/2017/ 
50 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/13/president-trump-has-made-more-than-20000-false-or-
misleading-claims/ 
51 https://bit.ly/2A66Hc3 
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ultimately became acknowledged bipartisan reality in Washington. By contrast, in the current shock and 
chaos regime, challenges are not met with counter arguments, inquiries or even defences. Instead, Trump’s 
spokespersons, for example, have repeatedly sidestepped accountability by postulating an explicitly 
constructivist view of the world. 
These claims have quite explicitly repudiated the idea of external truths that exist independently of 
anyone’s opinion. Thus, Trump’s counselor Kellyanne Conway famously declared that she was in possession 
of “alternative facts.” Such deflections are not isolated occurrences but arguably form a pervasive pattern 
that has been labelled “ontological gerrymandering” [48]. Ontological gerrymandering has culminated in 
Donald Trump’s systematic invocation of labels such as “fake news” and “fake media” when describing 
news stories or organisations he dislikes. Arguably, any critical reporting of his actions are thus dismissed 
not by argument but by ontological gerrymandering [243]. 
Ontological gerrymandering is not confined to the US: When a British far-right personality’s claim that a 
recent car accident in London had been a terrorist incident was challenged, she dismissed the correction 
as “blatant state propaganda” and added: “I have no belief in fact. Fact is an antiquated expression. All 
reporting is biased and subjective. There is no such thing as fact any more. There is no truth, only the truth 
of the interpretation of truth that you see”.52 The ontological gerrymandering is not coincidence, but lies at 
the heart of populism and its “black vs. white” view of the world as a binary conflict between “the people” 
and its enemies [244]. Those enemies may be the “elites” or other out-groups such as immigrants (or 
both). Resulting from this binary view is the affirmation of “common sense” truths against “elite” lies. This 
fundamental premise of populism of an eternal conflict between “the people” and “the elites” creates a 
self-sealing epistemic landscape in which “critics can never offer facts that question, challenge, or 
complement populist assertions. Populism’s view of good people and bad elites is immune to factual 
corrections and nuances” [244, p. 26]. Instead, populists negate the possibility of truth-seeking as a shared 
goal of a society [244]. The disregard for facts exhibited by Trump and other populist politicians must 
therefore be understood as a necessary consequence, rather than an incidental by-product, of their 
ideology. Populist conceptions of truth and the ensuing ontological gerrymandering, are incompatible with 
liberal-democratic norms of truth-seeking. 
One putative consequence of shock-and-chaos disinformation and the associated gerrymandering of the 
ontology of truth is that people become sceptical of truth itself [245, 246, 49]. As political activist Garry 
Kasparov put it, “The methodology of [shock-and-chaos disinformation] isn’t to convince anyone exactly 
what the truth is, but to make people doubt that the truth exists, or that it can ever be known” [247]. Shock 
and chaos disinformation that undermines people’s belief in truth appears to be custom-designed for the 
online attention economy. 
Dissemination of false information. Two core attributes of the attention economy and human 
psychology combine to form the perfect conditions for the spread of false information. On the 
technological side, social media algorithms are designed to promote content that is most likely to attract 
user attention and engagement, and is most likely to be shared. As we showed in Chapter 5, algorithms 
are optimised with respect to those goals irrespective of whether the content benefits the user or the 
recipient of a share or whether it is true [46]. On the human side, there is strong evidence from around 
the world that audiences, on average, seek news that is predominantly negative [248] or awe inspiring 
[249]. This negativity bias may underlie the conventional lore among journalists that “if it bleeds, it leads.” 
It is also known that people are more likely to share or retweet messages featuring moral-emotional 
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language [250]. Moral-emotional language can thus increase the rate of spread of political messages, 
although this tends to be confined to communities of like-minded people and is less of an issue between 
such communities [250].  
Those known psychological attributes appear to be amplified further by digital media: The degree of moral 
outrage elicited by reports of immoral acts online has been found to be considerably greater than for 
encounters in person or in conventional media [46]. Whether by design or coincidence, false online content 
appears to exploit this specific conjunction of technological and psychological factors. In a content analysis 
of 150 fake and real news items, fake news titles were found to be substantially more negative in tone 
than real news titles [251]. 
The text of fake news was found to be substantially higher in displaying negative emotions, such as disgust 
and anger that are known to elicit outrage. Fake news texts were also lower in positive emotions, such as 
joy [251]. Another hot button that fake news can press is the human attraction to novelty and surprise. 
Anything that is new, different or unexpected is bound to catch a person’s eye. Indeed, neuroscientific 
studies suggest that stimulus novelty makes people more motivated to explore [252]. False stories have 
been found to be significantly more novel than true stories across various metrics [253]. There is evidence 
that people noticed this novelty, as indicated by the fact that false stories inspired greater surprise (and 
greater disgust) [253]. One interpretation of these findings is that falsehood’s edge in the competition for 
limited attention is that it feeds on an — otherwise highly adaptive — human bias toward novelty. 
How this affects our behaviour: Receptivity to misleading information 
Online disinformation has often been referred to as involving an “arms race”. As users become savvy to 
various forms of disinformation, those seeking to mislead innovate, figuring out new, effective ways to do 
so. By implication, innovative media formats play key roles in successful, ongoing disinformation. Some 
current and emerging forms of media that are playing this role involve memes, especially humorous ones, 
conspiracy videos as well as “deepfake” images and videos. 
Visual formats for misinformation dissemination may be particularly effective as they can be attention 
grabbing. In simulated social media environments, accompanying text with a photo increases sharing 
[254]. People have also been found to judge claims accompanied by photos more likely to be true [255]. 
Furthermore, the use of photographs and videos out of context is often an effective way to mislead [256]. 
Images, whether real or doctored, can also be very effective at eliciting emotional responses from viewers 
[257, 258]. Studies indicate that highly emotional content may “spread” more effectively on social media 
platforms [250]—although it is important to delve deeper into what it means for information to “spread.” 
Misinformation does not spread on its own. It is spread by people. A tweet by Donald Trump may reach 
millions of his followers, but it is the retweets, sometimes numbering in the thousands or more, that 
multiply the reach of the information. The architecture of social media thus permits the emergence of a 
misinformation ecosystem that has been referred to as participatory propaganda [259]. “While news is 
constructed by journalists, it seems that fake news is co-constructed by the audience, for its fakeness 
depends a lot on whether the audience perceives the fake as real. Without this complete process of 
deception, fake news remains a work of fiction. It is when audiences mistake it as real news that fake 
news is able to play with journalism’s legitimacy” [226, p. 148].53 
                                                 
53 See [260] for a further dissection of this relationship between originator and propagator of messages. 
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The involvement of an audience in the spreading of 
misinformation raises at least two important 
questions. First, what is the role of network 
architecture in disseminating information? Are 
some platforms more conducive to propagation of 
disinformation than others? Second, what is the 
underlying psychology of people’s participation in 
spreading disinformation? Why do people engage in 
participatory propaganda? We take up those two 
questions in turn. 
Network structure and dissemination of 
disinformation. Social networks share some 
fundamental structural characteristics. Most 
networks involve hubs (i.e. extremely well 
connected individuals) [261] and many have 
modular structures involving densely connected sub-groups [262]. In addition, the different connectivity 
features of online platforms can critically alter network structure [263]. One basic example is how the type 
of connections on a platform create either directed or undirected networks. Twitter or Instagram, for 
example, offer directed “follower” connections [264], which can be created so that information only travels 
in one direction. Facebook, on the other hand, provides undirected “friend” connections, which require 
reciprocity and symmetry (i.e. “friend” requests must be accepted and both see one another’s content). 
Directed networks. Directed networks have two independent measures for each individual; namely, the 
number of people an individual follows and the number of followers an individual has. These two measures 
can take on very different values as the former is ultimately bounded by cognitive capacities [265]. It is 
cognitively impossible to follow more than a certain number of sources without losing any benefit from 
the information. By contrast, the number of one’s followers is not bounded, as followers do not require 
attention [266]. In consequence, on such platforms, a few individuals can reach huge audiences [267, 268]. 
For example, Lady Gaga is a major influencer and has a Twitter follower base roughly the size of the 
German population. Influencers gain their reach in a collective self-organised way (as opposed to, e.g. 
journalists), by followers choosing someone to attach themselves to based on their preferences. This 
preferential-attachment process can be further amplified by platform recommendations [264]. The 
distribution of the counts of followers on Twitter is very broad [269]. This type of structure is well known 
to facilitate large/global/viral outbreaks of simple contagion processes [270]. For complex contagion 
processes, that is those that require social influence from multiple sources to spread [271], the role of 
these influential users becomes particularly critical. At first, they act as gatekeepers, but once they are 
convinced to share something they become tipping points that can trigger global cascades [272]. 
Notably, such cascades can even be triggered by less connected users. A recent example of this 
phenomenon occurred in March 2020, when a relatively obscure user on Twitter tweeted at a more 
connected user about the benefits of the pharmaceutical chloroquine for treating COVID-19; this second user 
then tweeted about the drug, which in turn caught the attention of Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla and a major 
Twitter influencer, who also began tweeting about the drug. Within days of Musk tweeting about it, influential 
Fox News anchor Tucker Carlson brought one of the links in this tweet chain onto his prime-time show.54 Later 
                                                 
54 https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/chloroquine-coronavirus-rigano-todaro-tucker-
carlson_n_5e74da41c5b6eab77946c3b3?ri18n=true&guccounter=1 
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that day, American President Donald Trump announced in a press conference that chloroquine and 
hydroxychloroquine, which is derived from it, were showing very promising results. The path from a relatively 
unknown user to a nationwide presidential press conference took three tweets, a television program and just 
under eight days [273]. 
Clearly, influencers on Twitter have great potential to spread misinformation and disinformation. From the 
point of view of malicious agents, they are ideal targets for persuasion. Even without being the source, 
once they are convinced of a piece of false information they can greatly accelerate its spread. To illustrate, 
influencers have been found to be responsible for 69% of the engagement on COVID-19 misinformation, 
while rarely being the source themselves [274]. 
Undirected networks. Undirected connections, by contrast, require reciprocity for a connection to 
materialize, which naturally limits the number of connections an individual has (e.g. Facebook limits users 
to no more than 5,000 friends and most users have far fewer [275]). In consequence, there are fewer 
highly connected users and influencers. However, many of these connections are personal, between users 
who have met in real life or share interests or ideologies [276]. Stronger social ties and greater trust may 
lead to more influence on peer behaviour [277] and thus propagandists can spread disinformation through 
these more personal links [278]. Such networks are particularly vulnerable to rumours that require social 
conviction to spread, like social movements, extreme opinions or conspiracy theories [279]. 
Disinformation campaigns have been exploiting this attribute of Facebook. Russian government-sponsored 
activity on Facebook over the past five years has tended to disseminate information via Facebook “Pages”, 
which users can choose to follow and which enable directed information transfer from a centralised source 
[280] (in that sense, Facebook Pages are structured more like Twitter than other Facebook products). The 
strategy is often to create affinity-based pages that attract members with certain interests or affiliations, 
such as political views or even love of pets and then push information out within the trusted network. 
But undirected connections also support the formation of networks that are segregated into multiple 
modules of like-minded individuals [276, 281]. In those networks, shared content stays more localised and 
ideologically aligned [186]. Such networks, like Facebook or WhatsApp, limit the reach of individuals, but 
can nonetheless create ideological communities that can have other drawbacks. For example, segregated 
groups in modular networks can also be a breeding ground for radicalisation and polarisation [282, 283]. 
One counter-intuitive aspect of undirected networks such as Facebook is that despite the limited number 
of connections from any given user, it exhibits the features of a “small world” network [284, 275, 285, 
286]. This means that the network has high clustering — i.e. it contains many tightly connected sub-
networks or “cliques” — and a short average path-length (number of links between people), which in 2016 
was measured to be just 4.5.55 Any user on Facebook, anywhere in the world, is thus only a small number 
of “degrees of separation” removed from any other user. In networks of this type, viral information can 
propagate very quickly within cliques and it can spread broadly within the larger network despite the 
relatively few connections between users. As a result, it is more difficult to intervene on such networks to 
promote fact-checking or content moderation, because there are no single users with grossly 
disproportionate influence, as on Twitter. This makes it even more important to understand why individuals 
share misinformation, thereby engaging in participatory propaganda. 
  
                                                 
55 https://medium.com/@duncanjwatts/how-small-is-the-world-really-736fa21808ba 
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Participatory propaganda. A particularly striking demonstration of participatory propaganda was 
provided in a study that presented participants with two side-by-side photographs of the inaugurations of 
Barack Obama in 2009 and Donald Trump in 2017 [287]. In the condition of interest here, the photographs 
were unlabelled and participants were asked to choose the photo that had more people in it. There is no 
doubt that far more people attended Obama’s inauguration than Trump’s.  
The study found that among non-voters and Clinton voters, only 3% and 2% of respondents, respectively, 
chose the incorrect picture (i.e., the picture from Trump’s inauguration with fewer people). Among Trump 
voters, this proportion was 15%. When the data were broken down further by level of education of 
respondents, the error rate rose to 26% among highly-educated Trump voters, compared to 1% for highly-
educated Clinton voters. For participants with low education, the gap between Trump (11%) and Clinton 
(2%) voters was considerably smaller [287]. Given that inauguration attendance had become a matter of 
controversy at the time the study was conducted, with Trump’s press secretary claiming that it was “the 
largest audience ever to witness an inauguration — period — both in person and around the globe,” the 
results identified an instance in which people’s partisan identity was more important than clear and 
unambiguous perceptual evidence [287]. Highly educated participants chose to participate in propaganda 
on behalf of their leader. 
This is no isolated occurrence within a laboratory experiment. An NBC poll conducted in April 2018 revealed 
that 76% of Republicans thought that President Trump tells the truth “all or most of the time.”56 By 
contrast, only 5% of Democrats held that view. Essentially the same pattern was obtained by a Quinnipiac 
University poll in November 2018.57 Clearly, partisanship is a major determinant of people’s views of 
truthfulness, what counts as facts and even people’s own perceptions of photographs. 
What, then, makes people susceptible to misinformation and shock-and-chaos propaganda? Why do people 
participate in spreading misinformation and why do they consider a politician honest who, by any fact-
checker’s account, is prone to making statements that are easily shown to be false? 
Prevalence of receptivity. Although much research attention has focused on Donald Trump, neither 
populism nor misinformation are limited to the United States. In Europe, populism and the ontology of 
truth it entails, have also made inroads, albeit to different extents in different countries. For example, a 
recent GLOBSEC survey of public attitudes towards democracy in 10 Central and Eastern European 
countries found that in half of the countries, a majority of respondents would choose an autocratic leader 
over liberal democracy.58 
A recent study probed the extent to which populist party supporters had or lacked political knowledge, and 
whether that knowledge was based on correct or incorrect information, in nine European democracies 
[288]. One uniform finding was that increased political information related to support for both populist 
and non-populist parties. In addition, higher levels of misinformation were associated with greater support 
for right-wing populist parties [288]. Being incorrectly informed, but believing oneself to be correctly 
informed, made it more likely for a voter to prefer right-wing populist parties over other alternatives [288]. 
This result meshes well with other findings that over-claiming of knowledge predicts anti-establishment 
voting [289]. 
                                                 
56 https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/poll-republicans-who-think-trump-untruthful-still-approve-him-
n870521 
57 https://bit.ly/2FoZhqd 
58 https://www.globsec.org/publications/voices-of-central-and-eastern-europe/ 
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Another recent study explored seven presumed determinants of a country’s susceptibility to 
misinformation online [290]. Table 1 shows the variables and their effects on the perceived prevalence of 
disinformation in 18 Western democracies. The effects in the last column were obtained by regressing 
self-reported encounters of disinformation, as reported by the Reuters Digital News Report 2018 [291], on 
indicators for each of the predictors.59 
The analysis in Table 1 identified three significant predictor variables: Countries with a greater trust in 
mainstream media reported reduced encounters with disinformation; whereas countries with greater 
social-media use and larger online advertising markets were more susceptible to misinformation [290]. A 
cluster analysis using all predictors identified three distinct clusters of countries. The first cluster consisted 
of Northern and Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) plus Canada, all countries characterized by a 
relatively high resilience to misinformation. The second cluster comprised Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; 
all countries with a polarised media system and historically late democratisation. The final cluster only 
included the United States, an outlier on many of the variables in Table 1 and the country most susceptible 
to disinformation [290]. 
Predictor variable Effect size a 
Populism 0.10  
Polarisation −0.30  
Trust in mainstream 
media 
−0.56  ∗∗∗ 
Shared mainstream 
media 
0.32  
Public broadcast media −0.16  
Social media use 0.62  ∗∗ 
Ad market size 0.41 ∗ 
 
Table 1 - Potential determinants of a country’s susceptibility to misinformation online 
 a Standardized coefficient and significance (∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001) for variables in the model reported 
by [290] predicting exposure to disinformation online. 
Although the data in Table 1 must be treated with caution because they are based on only 18 countries 
and on self-reported susceptibility to disinformation rather than more objective indicators, they provide a 
useful pointer to future research. At the very least, they establish the feasibility and necessity for cross-
cultural comparisons of the resilience to misinformation. 
One variable that has only recently attracted attention is language itself. Whereas most research on 
misinformation on social media has been conducted in English (i.e. involving English-speaking content), 
most social media activity in Europe takes place in languages other than English. A recent report that 
audited Facebook’s efforts regarding COVID-19 misinformation found within a sample of misinformation 
                                                 
59 The original report of the results [290] used a different format because several of the indicators were reverse coded for 
theoretical reasons [290]. In the present context this is unnecessary. 
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content in six languages, that while Facebook had provided warning labels for 71% of disinformation 
content in English and 86% in French, this fraction was considerably lower in Spanish (30%) and Italian 
(32%).60 Overall, over half (51%) of non-English misinformation content failed to be accompanied by a 
warning label. The striking differences between languages point to the need for a more consistent 
approach by social media platforms. 
Susceptibility to misinformation also varies within countries. Three variables in particular have attracted 
research attention: political beliefs, age and epistemological beliefs. 
Politically asymmetric susceptibility. There is a large body of research into the cognitive and 
psychological differences between liberals and conservatives. There is little doubt that some of those 
differences are quite striking; a recent review of those asymmetries was based on data from more than 
450,000 participants from a multitude of countries [292]. The study conducted a meta-analysis of surveys 
from 12 different countries (United States, England, New Zealand, Australia, Poland, Sweden, Germany, 
Scotland, Israel, Italy, Canada and South Africa) and found a relatively uniform set of psychological 
predictors of conservatism that transcended countries [293]. 
Given the depth of polarisation and cross-party animosity in many western societies, which can be stronger 
than affective polarisation based on race [294, 295], it would be peculiar indeed if there were no psychological 
differences between opposing partisans. Moreover, given the earlier analysis of the populist ontology of truth, 
it is unsurprising that recent research has repeatedly shown susceptibility to misinformation to be 
asymmetrically greater on the populist right and among strong conservatives than the left [211, 210, 218, 
219, 296]. 
Turning to controlled observation, one class of stimuli that has been used in a number of recent studies 
involved “bullshit;” that is, utterances designed to impress but generated without any concern for the truth 
[297]. In one study, stimuli were sentences that were randomly generated from a set of buzzwords (e.g. 
“consciousness is the growth of coherence, and of us”). When participants rated these statements for how 
profound they appeared, those ratings were found to be modestly but significantly associated with a proxy 
of libertarianism-conservatism, namely people’s endorsement of free-market economics [298]. Another 
study found that endorsement of pseudo-profound bullshit was associated with general conservatism and 
support for the Republican candidates for US president at the time [299]. No such association existed for 
mundane statements (e.g. “a wet person does not fear the rain”) [299]. 
This line of research was recently extended to statements about urban myths relating to potential hazards 
(e.g. “kale contains thallium, a toxic heavy metal, that the plant absorbs from soil”) that participants had 
to rate for their truth value [300]. Unlike bullshit, these statements have a clear discernible meaning. It 
was found that participants who were more conservative exhibited greater credulity for false information 
about hazards [300]. That is, conservatives were more likely to believe that kale contains thallium than 
liberals (there is no good evidence that it does).  
This correlation was absent for similar statements that underscored putative benefits (e.g.“eating carrots 
results in significantly improved vision”), which is consonant with a large body of research that has 
associated a greater negativity bias — i.e. a greater physiological response and allocation of more 
psychological resources to negative stimuli — with conservatism across numerous countries [301]. 
                                                 
60 https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/facebook_coronavirus_misinformation/ 
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The role of cognitive style and epistemic beliefs. It is becoming increasingly clear that not everyone 
is equally susceptible to misinformation. A number of individual-difference variables have been identified 
that either increase or decrease susceptibility to misinformation, fake news or conspiracy theorising. Table 
2 summarises those variables. 
The overall pattern in Table 2 is unsurprising. The fact that people who have a consistent desire to base 
their opinions on evidence are less susceptible to hold beliefs that are unsupported by evidence [305] is 
unsurprising. Of further interest is the nuanced role of political views. As shown in the previous section, 
strong conservatives and right-wing populists are overall more susceptible to being misinformed. Similarly, 
there is an overall correlation between the variables in the table and political views. Nonetheless, one 
study found only a limited number of interactions between epistemic variables (e.g. need for evidence) 
and political views, suggesting that cognitive style outweighed worldviews [305]. 
 
Increase susceptibility Decrease susceptibility 
Endorse delusion-like ideas (e.g. telepathy) [302] Actively open-minded 
thinking [302, 303] 
Dogmatism [302, 303] Analytic thinking [302, 304] 
Religious fundamentalism [302] Need for evidence [305] 
Strong distrust of the social and political system 
[306] a 
 
Low trust in media [219]  
View reality as a political construct [305]  
Age [211, 210, 218]  
 
Table 2 - Individual-differences variables that increase and decrease susceptibility to misinformation 
and fake news 
a [306] examined trust in fact checkers, not fake news consumption per se. 
The effects of age. A consistent finding in the literature is that older Americans are more likely to 
consume and share fake news [211, 210, 218]. This finding is particularly troubling in light of the fact that 
older Americans are more likely to vote than any other age group [307]. In Europe, the effects of age are 
far less clear because little research exists that has focused on this issue. In one study that examined the 
effectiveness of an intervention to reduce reliance on misinformation, pre-intervention baseline scores did 
not differ between younger and older adults in three countries (Germany, Greece and Poland) [308]. 
Although the role of age in belief and sharing of misinformation in Europe is presently unclear, given the 
prominence of age effects in other societies, possible reasons deserve to be explored. One possibility is 
that older people are less skilled with modern technology generally, having acquired those skills later in 
life because the technology became available only recently. On this view, the age effect should gradually 
diminish as people who acquired their online skills earlier in life are aging. Another possibility is that 
increasing susceptibility to misinformation with increasing age represents just another manifestation of a 
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general cognitive decline that is often observed later in life. In the context of misinformation, older people 
are known to forget corrections more than younger people [309]. An obvious implication of this view is 
that the age effect will persist over time because it is not tied to a specific cohort. A further possibility is 
that older people share fake news not because they are failing to recognise it as false, but they have other 
reasons for sharing (e.g. to amuse or provoke friends and family [229]). Older people are known to use 
technology mainly to connect with others rather than to acquire new information and this social use of 
technology is related to their psychological well-being [310]. A recent review of the effects of aging on 
processing of misinformation, concluded that “cognitive declines alone cannot explain older adults’ 
engagement with fake news. Interventions in a ‘post-truth world’ must also consider their shifting social 
goals and gaps in their digital literacy” [307, p. 14]. 
Countering misinformation: Fact-checking. Independent fact-checking organisations have become an 
integral part of democratic discourse in many countries. Quality media have embraced fact-checking and 
in 2008, the fact checker Politifact won the Pullitzer prize.61 Although there is some debate about the 
epistemological justification for fact-checking [311, 312, 313], a recent meta-analysis has confirmed its 
general effectiveness [314]. Specifically, across 30 experimental studies, fact-checking shifted beliefs in 
the expected direction in 28 cases. However, not unexpectedly, the effectiveness of fact-checking 
interacted with some of the variables considered above, such as pre-existing beliefs and partisanship. A 
recent large study of public perceptions of fact checkers in 6 European countries found greater acceptance 
of fact-checking in Northern Europe (Sweden, Germany) than elsewhere (Italy, Spain, France, Poland) [315]. 
The study also found that those with negative feelings towards the EU were less likely to embrace fact-
checkers, raising the possibility that those most vulnerable to disinformation are also the hardest to 
effectively reach by fact-checkers [315]. 
Moreover, however effective fact-checking may be in controlled experiments, in the real world it can only 
be effective to the extent that people are exposed to fact checks. There is evidence that fact-checked 
validated information does not travel as far or as wide as misinformation [253]. 
In a democracy, accountability of politicians is critical. Fact-checking is one necessary element of providing 
this accountability. However, fact-checking alone will not resolve the “post-truth” crisis. 
 
 
  
                                                 
61
https://www.politifact.com/article/2009/apr/20/politifact-wins-pulitzer/ 
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Key scientific findings 
 
 Two core attributes from the attention economy and human 
psychology create the perfect conditions for the spread of 
misinformation: algorithms that promote attractive, engaging 
content and people’s strong predisposition to orient towards 
negative news. 
 Fake news generally makes up a small fraction of the average 
person’s “media diet”, but some demographics are 
disproportionately susceptible. Strong conservatism, right-wing 
populism and advanced age are predictors of increased 
engagement with misleading content. The problem of 
misleading online content extends far beyond strict fake news 
and when misleading content is considered in its entirety, the 
problem is extensive and concerning. 
 The interpretation and status of misleading content often turns 
on subtle issues of intent and context that are difficult for third 
parties—especially algorithms—to ascertain, making it difficult 
to distinguish legitimate political speech from illegitimate 
content. 
 There are asymmetries in how false or misleading content and 
genuine content spread online, with misleading content 
arguably spreading faster and further than true information. 
Some of this asymmetry is driven by emotional content and 
differing levels of novelty. 
 Susceptibility to misinformation varies between people, with 
age and some cognitive attributes leading to greater 
vulnerability. 
 The spread of misinformation is shaped by the network 
structures of social media. Some network structures can give 
rise to significant distortions in perceived social signals that in 
turn can affect entrenchment of attitudes.  
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Chapter 7: Taking democracy online 
Early hopes that the web would automatically deliver democracy did not survive contact with reality. 
However, this failure need not be permanent. There is hope that democracy will reclaim online spaces and 
successful precedents are beginning to emerge at many levels of public engagement. 
Political engagement — online and offline — can be categorised depending on how directly it can influence 
political decision-makers and affect political decisions. 
At one end of the spectrum, private or public communications among citizens have indirect effects on 
political decisions by shaping the political public sphere in which decisions are taken. Those activities include 
seeking information online, participating in political debates, discussing solutions to societal challenges 
and commenting on policy-initiatives. When those discussions take place online, they often involve self-
governed community spaces (e.g. Reddit) that sit outside the sphere of influence of social media giants. A 
general attribute of those conversations is that they are not officially regulated, recognised or managed. 
When unregulated political conversations scale up in size, they can become social movements that make 
use of online platforms to shape and sometimes transform, public debate (e.g. Arab Spring, Occupy Wall 
Street, Black Lives Matter, Yellow Vests, Fridays for Future). These social movements typically also have a 
large offline presence. 
At the other end of the spectrum, direct public participation is officially recognised, managed and built into 
the political architecture, for example through acts of direct democracy (e.g. referenda) or deliberative 
democracy (e.g. deliberative assemblies). Although deliberative democracy has mainly been exercised 
offline, there have been recent attempts to design platforms that permit large-scale online deliberation. 
Between these extremes, we find other forms of citizen involvement in policymaking, such as signing 
online petitions, joining crowd-sourced lawsuits or contributing to consultations. Successful precedents at 
the intermediate level are also beginning to emerge. We explore recent developments along all these 
levels, from self-governed community spaces to online opportunities for deliberative democracy. 
Specific characteristics 
Self-governed community spaces. The web provides space for self-governed community fora that are 
not curated or controlled by the social media giants. For example, Reddit and outlets such as 4Chan (an 
anonymous site sympathetic to extreme-right content), cater to the interests and needs of a broad range 
of communities, including marginalised sections of society and niche communities. They can be utilised by 
different actors and serve a multitude of purposes, spanning a wide range of different design features [316]. 
Self-governed community spaces play a double-edged role in society. On the one hand, these spaces must 
be recognised as an opportunity for marginalised sections of society to build capacity for positive change. 
On the other hand, their potential to radicalise users must be critically examined as a potential threat 
to society. Both of these aspects can be illustrated by analysing Reddit. Reddit is a collection of fora 
(“subreddits”), most of which are user-run and moderated. There currently are around 138,000 active 
subreddits.62  
                                                 
62 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reddit 
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Reddit’s traffic consistently ranks among the top 10 US sites [317]. In the EU, Reddit ranked fifth among 
social media providers in 2018.63 Reddit has a historical commitment to freedom of speech and has 
allowed a large number of fringe communities to flourish. It also provides opportunities for engagement 
between celebrities (including politicians and scientists) and the general public, through a feature called 
AMA (“Ask Me Anything”), which is hosted by the subreddit r/IAmA.64 An AMA resembles an online press 
conference that is open to anyone, with questions and answers being upvoted or downvoted by the public. 
Notable participants in AMAs include Barack Obama, Bernie Sanders, Bill Gates and Donald Trump. A recent 
analysis of the experiences of 70 scientists who hosted an AMA revealed that most hosts considered it to 
be an enjoyable and productive experience [318]. 
However, other parts of Reddit may be more problematic. According to one study, Reddit’s “karma point 
system, aggregation of material across subreddits, ease of subreddit and user account creation, 
governance structure, and policies around offensive content serve to provide fertile ground for anti-
feminist and misogynistic activism” [319]. Reddit also supports a large community dedicated to conspiracy 
theories (at the r/conspiracy forum [317]). A retrospective analysis of users of the r/conspiracy forum 
found that prior to posting in conspiracy forums, users consistently exhibited anger more often than a 
control group of users who did not end up posting in the conspiracy forum [320]. 
Social movements online. Online social networks can be empowering platforms for individuals and 
minorities to reach unprecedented audiences for creating awareness and enable grassroots movements 
(e.g. "hashtag activism" #metoo, #BlackLivesMatter). For example, the #metoo hashtag, denoting an 
experience with sexual harassment, was used 19 million times on Twitter in the year leading up to October 
2018.65 For example, 52% of French Twitter users surveyed in 2019 mentioned #metoo as being the most 
striking hashtag symbolising a collective movement since 2015. It ranked second place only behind 
#JesuisCharlie.66 
Online activism thus promises easy participation — or at least the illusion thereof — from a safe place, 
via a simple “like” or share, although its actual impact in the real world is still being debated. On the one 
hand, there is research showing that online activism can facilitate future action to achieve social change 
[321]. Social affirmation through online interactions has been identified as a causal variable of how online 
activism can lead to offline collective behaviour [321]. On the other hand, it has been argued that online 
activism inhibits offline political participation — this is known as the “slacktivism” hypothesis and it is also 
not without empirical support [322]. A recent reconciliation of those divergent results [323] identified pre-
existing activism as a critical variable. That is, online activism increased future activism for other 
campaigns in individuals who were already active and had a sense of efficacy of their actions. For other 
individuals, no such benefit was observed [323]. This result identifies the crucial role of affirmation or 
positive feedback for people who engage in online activism, in order to enhance their sense of efficacy. 
Communication and the flow of information are especially critical for social movements due to their 
informal structure and large number of diverse participants. In addition, communication is critical because 
the goal of social movements is to attract widespread attention and support [324]. Providing easy and 
cheap ways to act politically lowers the barriers for participation [325]. Some prominent instances of 
                                                 
63 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/osm-final-report_en.pdf 
64 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R/IAmA 
65 https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/11/how-social-media-users-have-discussed-sexual-harassment-
since-metoo-went-viral/ 
66 https://www.statista.com/statistics/996368/most-memorable-hashtags-collective-movement-twitter-france/ 
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mobilisation, such as the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and the Occupy Wall Street movement beginning the 
same year, have very visibly formed via social media [326]. While their prominent reliance on Twitter has 
led to the creation of the term “Twitter revolutions” or “Hashtag activism”, other social media have played 
an important role as well (e.g. Facebook for the Women’s March on Washington67). 
Platform design has a major impact on the characteristics of a social movement’s user base, the available 
avenues for political behaviour, the necessary transaction costs of any activity and the formation of a 
collective identity [327].68 Different platform design choices can affect not only the amount of political 
activity, but also its characteristics. Preliminary findings indicate a significant amount of political activity 
on TikTok, which — potentially due to its more open design and “duet” function (a function that allows 
users to create new content featuring an initial video, with both videos appearing side by side, thus 
effectively permitting users to reply to video content with their own video) — creates more interaction 
across partisan lines [329]. 
A detailed analysis of the use of Twitter by three protest movements — Occupy Wall Street in the US, 
Indignados in Spain and Aganaktismenoi in Greece — revealed that Twitter was predominantly used for 
ongoing discussion among activists, media and the public and to sustain the movement, whereas original 
movement mobilisation had already occurred through other online platforms or offline [330]. Overall, social 
movements appear to be highly adaptive users of multiple platforms, demonstrating the high level of 
engagement that is possible through social media. 
However, mobilisation through social media does not necessarily follow a democratic, consensus-oriented 
or dialogue-enhancing path [331]. If these crucial ingredients for a constructive process are missing, large 
movements can then render themselves ineffective in real world politics [72]. Several obstacles to 
democratic processes arise from the cognitive consequences of platform architectures, in particular how 
they communicate the opinion of others to a user. 
Social signals from others are one of the most powerful determinants of attitudes and behaviours. The 
perception of a consensus opinion among others has been identified as a causal agent in shaping and 
changing of attitudes, including for politically-charged issues relating to stereotypes and discrimination. 
Receiving information about the predominant attitudes among one’s peer group—namely their views 
towards minority groups—tends to shift a person’s attitudes in the direction of the consensus [332, 333, 
334]. The effect is enhanced if the purported consensus involves members of one’s in-group, it can be 
long-lasting and is detectable outside the context of the initial manipulation [333]. A misperception or 
distortion of the social signal from others’ opinions can have far-reaching consequences. One form of 
distortion, known as “pluralistic ignorance”, arises when a minority opinion is given disproportionate 
prominence (e.g. in public debate or by the media), in which case the actual majority of people may think 
that their opinion is in the minority [335, 336]. 
 
                                                 
67 https://www.facebook.com/womensmarchonwash/  
68 This of course only applies so far as movements rely on such an identity, instead of existing in a much more loose, unstable, 
and ad hoc manner, such as the group Anonymous [328]. 
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Figure 5 - The perception bias in homophilic networks, where the colours correspond to some attribute - like political 
affiliation - the connections are more frequent between individuals sharing the same attribute and less if they are 
different. This causes individuals who belong to a minority (e.g. magenta) to overestimate their group’s size and for 
members of the (yellow) majority to underestimate their size or even overlook them (green minority) completely. 
In those circumstances, majority opinion may shift towards the minority position because its size is 
overestimated [337, 338]. The complementary distortion, known as “false consensus” applies when people 
overestimate the prevalence of their own opinion in their group or society at large (as they typically do, 
[339, 340]). The extent to which people over-estimate the prevalence of their opinion predicts their 
intention to engage in attitude-consonant behaviours: For example, the likelihood that someone might 
smoke marijuana increases with the extent to which the person over-estimates peer-support for the 
legalisation of drugs [341]. It follows that how platforms display the opinions of others to a user is a design 
decision with non-trivial implications. 
Most platforms display metrics of social reactions and cues (e.g. the number of “likes” and emoticons 
[342]), which could in principle quantify the degree of consensus of a public discussion. However, these 
signals are asymmetrically positive — there typically is no “dislike” button—and are biased toward narrow 
groups of highly active users (as they do not show passive behaviours/engagement) [343, 344]. Recent 
results indicate how such biased metrics can even influence people to share misinformation and ignore 
fact checks [345]. The limitations can have further effects, such as dramatically changing a user’s 
perception of group sizes (see Figure 5) and swaying collective decisions [346]. 
Another problem of existing social metrics is that they only represent a user’s immediate online 
neighbourhood and there is low visibility of the global state of the network [347, 281]. This distortion can 
create the illusion of broad support [348]. Although large social media platforms routinely aggregate 
information that would foster a realistic assessment of societal attitudes, they currently do not provide a 
well-calibrated impression of the degree of public consensus [349]. This can cause social movements to 
exist in parallel, keeping them too small to have real-world impact, while at the same time withholding the 
stimulus to expand further, since one already thinks to be in the majority (e.g.69). 
There is no compelling technological constraint that necessitates this distortion of social cues online. The 
interactive nature of social media could be harnessed to promote diverse democratic dialogue and foster 
collective intelligence. The positive examples in the past and the engaging character of social media, make 
them promising candidates for platforms of participation. In order to achieve this goal social media needs 
                                                 
69 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/05/08/bringbackourgirls-kony2012-and-the-
complete-divisive-history-of-hashtag-activism/ 
 
 
P
a
g
e 
7
7
 
to offer more meaningful, higher-dimensional cues that carry information about the broader state of the 
network rather than just the user’s direct neighbourhood. For example, it has been shown that alternative 
polling algorithms that systematically sample perceptions of the global prevalence of an opinion among 
neighbours can effectively mitigate distorted perceptions caused by the network structure [350]. Social 
media platforms could provide a transparent crowd-sourced voting system [351] or display informative 
metrics about the behaviour and reactions of others (e.g. including passive behaviour, like the total number 
of people who scrolled over a post), which might put into perspective social engagement numbers and 
could counter pluralistic ignorance and prevent false-consensus effects. 
Public participation in actions. Social media does not only permit coordination of social movements, 
it can also direct users to “official” websites dedicated to political participation. A study on the use and 
design features of a UK government petitions platform 
illustrates the growing importance of social media, as 
50% of traffic to the website came via Facebook (40%) 
and Twitter (10%) [352]. Once people reach a platform 
to express political action, platform design again 
plays a crucial role. 
This can be illustrated with the results of a natural 
experiment in which the design of a UK government 
petition platform underwent a seemingly minor 
modification; namely, the introduction of a “trending” 
feature on the website [352]. The study found that 
displaying information about the behaviour of others 
on the petition website had a significant influence on 
the political choices of users, that is, which petitions 
they chose to sign. This altered the distribution of 
signatures, which shifted from the less popular 
petitions to the popular (trending) ones [352]. This 
design choice might allow for more effective mobilisation efforts (for successful petitions that have 
popular appeal), but could also have an adverse impact on others. The study also suggests that the 
placement of information (within the list of trending petitions) might have impacted the decisions of the 
users [352]. The fact that people tend to remember the first few and the last few items on a long list — 
including menu items — is well established [353, 8]. 
Ease of access is a crucial determinant of participation also in areas that ordinarily have a very high 
threshold for political engagement. One example involves mass lawsuits, in which civil society groups 
recruit plaintiffs online. In recent years, the Court of Justice of the European Union had to decide a lawsuit 
that was brought by several thousand applicants (see, e.g. Sven A. von Storch and Others v. European 
Central Bank, Case T-492/12). The applicants were at least in part recruited online, through political 
platforms (in this case of a right-wing group) or social media. Applicants received information about the 
planned lawsuit, they could download, print and sign a form to appoint a mutual counsel and co-initiate 
the lawsuit. Legal costs were usually borne by the organisation behind the planned lawsuit to lower the 
threshold for participation.70 
                                                 
70 After the more than 5,000 plaintiffs lost the case and appeal, the CJEU ordered them to pay costs; Case T-492/12 DEP, 
ECLI:EU:T:2016:668 and Case C-64/14 P-DEP, ECLI:EU:C:2016:846). 
“When the world 
seems large and 
complex, we need 
to remember that 
great world 
ideals all begin  
in some home 
neighbourhood.” 
— Konrad Adenauer 
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As part of its better regulation agenda, the European Commission provides citizens with the opportunity 
to comment on draft legislation through public consultation before it adopts a legislative act. Views are 
invited on the scope, priorities and added-value of EU action for new initiatives, as well as evaluations of 
existing policies and laws. The consultations take place via tailored questionnaires, which have to be 
submitted electronically. The public consultations are open for a response period of 12 weeks. 
Prerequisites and procedures are relatively easy but perhaps not that direct for an ordinary citizen [354]. 
The requirement is registration with an EU account (former ECAS account). 
A tool devised by researchers at Cornell University, called RegulationRoom (/www.regulationroom.org/), 
sought to overcome those limitations by providing a moderated space for citizen engagement in rule making. 
The moderator provided information about a proposed rule and assisted commenters with substantiation 
of their views, encouraged them to consider opposing views and offer alternative solutions, while also 
maintaining civility [355]. RegulationRoom hosted several rulemaking discussions for the US Department 
of Transportation and the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. An analysis of one particular 
discussion, on a rule aimed at limiting the range of debt collection practices to protect consumers, revealed 
the crucial role of the human moderator [356]. The need for human moderation is a recurrent theme in the 
literature about online political deliberation. 
To date, most of these initiatives create non-binding results and are mostly experimental. Empirical 
research exists with regard to the effective design of crowd-sourcing platforms serving private actors 
[357]. It remains unclear, however, whether the insights in a commercial context hold in cases of public 
crowd-sourcing, with its goals of generating legitimacy, trust and acceptance, and ultimately promoting 
the public good. 
Soliciting comments on legislative or regulatory initiatives is only a partial step towards citizen 
involvement in governance. The most extensive form of involvement currently known involves “mini 
publics” [358] or “deliberative assemblies” constituted of ordinary citizens. 
Deliberative assemblies. Fears of global “democratic backsliding” are supported by the finding that in 
at least 45 democracies around the world, politicians and political parties have used computational 
propaganda tools by amassing fake followers or spreading manipulated media to garner voter support; 
and in 26 authoritarian states, government entities have used computational propaganda as a tool of 
information control to suppress public opinion and press freedom, discredit criticism and oppositional 
voices, and drown out political dissent [359]. 
This fear must be weighed against several striking counter-examples that provide a more positive outlook. 
These positive cases tend to involve deliberative forms of democracy. For example, The Republic of Ireland 
recently conducted referenda on two emotive issues — gay marriage and abortion — but the country has 
largely escaped demagoguery, populism and polarisation [360]. Integral to this success were two citizens’ 
assemblies, comprised of 99 randomly chosen voters who deliberated the issue one weekend every month 
for a year, which ultimately issued recommendations for the referenda.71  
The recommendations did not take a side on the binary decision required by the referendum, but noted 
core principles established during deliberation and the distribution of opinions within the assembly about 
each principle. Deliberation was moderated throughout and was informed by numerous experts and public 
                                                 
71 https://2016-2018.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-
the-Constitution.html 
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submissions [361]. The recommendations of the Irish Citizens’ Assemblies were widely disseminated and had 
discernible impact on the public [362]. 
There is growing evidence that deliberative bodies, when properly moderated and facilitated, can 
ameliorate polarisation and “post-truth” discourse [363]. The involvement of citizens in deliberation has 
been nominated as one important countermeasure to the corrosive effects of disinformation campaigns 
by malicious actors [364]. Several factors contribute to the success of offline deliberative fora. The 
presence of moderation and input from experts have been identified as critical attributes of successful 
assemblies. Moreover, assemblies provide protection against internet trolls, populist demagoguery and 
tabloid headlines — none of which find currency within moderated deliberative assemblies. 
There are, however, drawbacks to assemblies, the most obvious of which is cost in time and resources. 
Although the Republic of Ireland is currently conducting another assembly, on gender equality,72 there are 
limits to how many issues can be deliberated at the current pace and cost. Research and practice has 
therefore increasingly focused on moving deliberative fora online in order to broaden citizen involvement 
without sacrificing the advantages offered by moderated deliberative assemblies. We briefly review 
existing successful precedents. 
Online deliberation platforms: successful precedents. One of the most advanced and well-established 
platforms for deliberation and consultation exists in Taiwan, which uses a deliberation platform known as 
vTaiwan.73 vTaiwan is an officially recognised service of the Taiwanese Government [365] that enables 
citizens, government officials, representatives and other stakeholders to discuss legislative proposals and 
generate non-binding policy solutions. As of 2018, 26 initiatives have been discussed [366]. There are two 
noteworthy design features that contribute to its functionality [367]. First, users are unable to reply to 
comments, thus preventing vitriolic exchanges. Second, the platform forms groups of users based on their 
opinions by statistical techniques [366], which makes argumentative dividing lines as well as space for 
consensus visible [367]. Taiwan has used this tool, for instance, to generate a proposal for the regulation 
of online alcohol sales and the introduction of gig economy services (such as Uber) [366]. 
In a similar way, the City Council of Barcelona created an online platform to discuss local issues, such as 
its strategic city plan on current policy objectives and initiatives [368]. The Council set up Decidim 
Barcelona, a platform on which different proposals can be discussed in threaded comments. A study of 
the platform revealed that comments opposing the respective proposals were particularly successful in 
sparking discussions [368]. The authors of the study attribute this result to the design of the platform that 
allowed “both conversation threading and comment alignment” [368]. Decidim (http://decidim.org) is a 
digital infrastructure for participatory democracy, available as open source software.  
The software allows a wide range of configurations for use by different actors (from local city councils to 
universities, NGOs or national and supra national governments), including the blending of conventional in-
person democratic events with online deliberation. A recent White Paper describes the system in full.74 
Online deliberative procedures have also aided constitution-making. Most notable is the case of the post-
financial crisis Icelandic constitution, which was crowd-sourced on the basis of online public participation 
                                                 
72 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/gender-equality-citizen-s-assembly-moves-to-fulfil-1916-
proclamation-aims-1.4151805 
73 https://info.vtaiwan.tw/ 
74 Available at https://ictlogy.net/bibliography/reports/projects.php?idp=4017 
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[369]. Egypt also employed an online tool for public participation in the drafting process for the 2012 
constitution with more than 68,000 participants and more than 650,000 votes and comments [370]. 
The recent COVID-19 pandemic has forced several deliberative processes to move online. For example, 
the UK climate assembly was initially intended to be a physical event, but was moved online because of 
the pandemic.75 
Case studies on public deliberation platforms have also identified potential downsides. Among them are 
barriers to entry, such as accessibility issues, language and literacy requirements, cognitive demands and 
potentially necessary privacy limitations (particularly important vis-à-vis regimes that threaten to violate 
freedom-of-speech guarantees and police unwanted input) or the danger of capture. Therefore, 
deliberation platforms might provide unequal access and cement a certain power structure, all the while 
appearing to be open and inclusive. 
In a recent report, the OECD analysed and summarised nearly 300 deliberative precedents around the 
world and catalogued good practices for offline deliberation [371].  
The OECD identified the following principles for good deliberative practice: 
 Clear objective and linked to a defined public problem. 
 Deliberation must have influence on public decisions. Participants must be able to trust that 
their engagement informs subsequent action. 
 The process must be fully transparent. 
 Participation must be inclusive and encourage attendance by marginalised and 
underrepresented groups. 
 The assembly must be a representative microcosm of society (e.g. use random or random-
stratified selection). 
 Participants must have access to relevant information (e.g. reading materials, expert 
testimony). 
 Deliberation must involve skilled facilitation. 
 Sufficient time must be available. 
 The process must be run by people who are at arm’s length from the commissioning public 
authority. 
 Privacy of participants must be ensured to prevent lobbying or bribery. 
 Participants must be given the opportunity to evaluate the process 
 
These principles can be met by a number of different architectures, varying in size and purpose and 
duration. The OECD report recommended that deliberative fora be institutionalised to become an 
ongoing component of democratic governance. However, the report offers no guidance on how 
deliberation that complies with those principals can be taken online. Recent research has begun to 
identify the factors that make productive online deliberation possible. 
                                                 
75 https://www.involve.org.uk/resources/blog/project-update/how-we-moved-climate-assembly-uk-online 
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Ensuring productive deliberation online. Moving 
constructive deliberation online has to address two 
classes of obstacles: one relating to recruitment of 
participants and the other to providing an environment 
for discussion that is inclusive, rational-critical, reciprocal 
and respectful [372]. 
Although recruitment may sound like a simple issue, in 
fact it is not if the deliberative forum is supposed to be 
representative of the population [371], which rules out 
self-nomination and requires targeted — but suitably 
random and stratified — recruitment. Experience with 
online experiments in Finland has revealed very low 
return rates, ranging between 2 and 4% [372]. Although 
it is unclear how these recruitment rates would compare 
to institutional deliberations outside an experimental context, they raise the possible need for incentives 
or remuneration [372]. 
Concerning the format of deliberation, there is good evidence that if suitable conditions for face-to-face 
deliberation are replicated online — that is, the discussion is moderated or facilitated by a human, is 
synchronous (i.e., a real-time back-and-forth) and strict rules for civil discourse are provided — then the 
outcome tends not to differ from offline deliberation [373, 374]. That is, polarisation can be avoided and 
participants’ knowledge measurably increases through deliberation. 
Moreover, there may be at least two opportunities for improvement of deliberation online over its face-
to-face counterpart. The first concerns temporality—that is, whether discussion is synchronous or 
asynchronous. Synchronous deliberation is inevitable offline as people are discussing an issue face-to-
face in real time. If online deliberation is synchronous, it is therefore closest to an “ideal speech situation” 
resembling offline human communication. Synchronous deliberation is also more conducive to reciprocity. 
By contrast, asynchronous discussions, where people may take considerable time to respond to a point 
by another party, may allow more time for reflection. In an experimental comparison of the two modes, 
asynchronous online deliberation was found to enhance discussion quality compared to synchronous 
communication [375]. It is conceivable, therefore, that the opportunity for asynchronous communication 
afforded by online deliberation may give it an edge over its offline counterparts. However, the generality 
of this effect remains to be confirmed. 
A second potential advantage of online over offline deliberation lies in the potential anonymity it affords. 
Online anonymity has caused considerable controversy. On the positive side, the recognised benefits of 
online anonymity include the elimination of hierarchical markers (e.g. gender and ethnicity) that may 
create a more balanced playing field for discussion [376]. On the negative side, anonymity has been 
frequently linked with online incivility in all its manifestations including trolling [42]. However, anonymity 
is typically confounded with a number of other variables, such as visibility and eye contact. When these 
variables are experimentally disentangled, the role of anonymity is found to be minimal [32], with eye-
contact being the primary driver of online disinhibition and incivility. In an experimental examination of 
the effects of anonymity in the context of online deliberations, anonymity was found to have no effect 
[375]. Although this finding must await replication, it is reassuring that whether or not anonymity is 
permitted seems to be relatively unimportant. 
“Only the people 
can change and 
enrich things in 
the institutions 
and transmit 
them to future 
generations.” 
— Jean Monnet 
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How this affects our behaviour 
The dark side of community fora: hate and radicalisation. Radical and hateful content online is 
never far away and rarely out of reach. For example, in a German survey of more than 1,000 adolescents 
(age 14–19), 37% stated that they had encountered extremist content online, defined as content directed 
against the ideas and values of liberal democracy, for example by opposing the idea of the freedom and 
equality of all human beings [377]. 
As noted in Section 5.1, there has been much concern that recommender systems, in particular on 
YouTube, are guiding viewers towards increasingly radical content [68]. There is, however, another path 
towards radicalisation on mainstream social media platforms such as YouTube. A recent audit of 
radicalisation pathways on YouTube found that a large percentage of consumers of extreme “Alt-Right” 
content (e.g. defined as fringe views such as the creation of a white ethnostate) originally consumed less 
extreme content identified as belonging to the “Alt-lite” and “Intellectual DarkWeb” (IDW) [176]. The IDW 
is defined as an overtly respectable community that discusses controversial subjects such as race and IQ 
without necessarily endorsing extreme views, but which defines itself in opposition to mainstream 
intellectual discourse [176]. The Alt-lite community does not overtly embrace white supremacist ideology 
but is sympathetic to concepts associated with it, such as conspiracy theories about the “Great 
replacement.”76 The audit found that users in all three communities are more engaged with the content 
— as defined by the number of comments — than consumers of mainstream media [176]. Moreover, 
commenters systematically migrated from commenting on milder content to commenting on increasingly 
extreme content. Those comments are predominantly supportive of the content. The favourable stance 
of the community towards that content is also reflected in the high proportion of likes (median > 96%) as 
opposed to dislikes. 
The radicalisation pathway identified by researchers [176] highlights the need to understand the role of 
fora that can serve both as gateways into extremism and as conduits that channel extremist content into 
the mainstream. An illustrative example of this path from fringe to mainstream involves the “pizzagate” 
event of 2016, which culminated in an armed individual entering a pizza parlour in Washington, D.C. and 
firing shots inside in search of a (non-existent) basement in which an alleged paedophile ring was thought 
to be operating [378]. The event originated with a tweet in October 2016 that linked presidential candidate 
Hillary Clinton to a paedophilia ring (without any evidence), a rumour that was taken up on Reddit and 
far-right sites such as 4Chan. Within days, the hashtag #pizzagate appeared on Twitter and was actively 
retweeted by accounts based mainly in the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Vietnam [378]. The rumour had 
now been linked with a specific pizza parlour and discussion on a dedicated subreddit (r/pizzagate) began 
to reveal private information about people in the pizza parlour and stores nearby (which ultimately led to 
it being shut down). 
The bright side of online communities: Civil conversation by design. Online communities and 
movements are not only pathways to radicalisation, they also offer examples of productive civil 
conversation, knowledge building and advancement of progressive agendas. Importantly for the context 
of this report, a lot depends on the design aspect of such platforms. Wikipedia offers one example of how 
rules of collaborative editing can result in an impressive digital compendium of knowledge. Rules and 
design are equally important for successful civil conversation in online fora. One such example has 
originated on the Reddit forum ChangeMyView (r/changemyview).  
                                                 
76 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/politics/grand-replacement-explainer.html 
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This subreddit later became a standalone website ChangeAView and is now known as Ceasefire; 
https://ceasefire.net/. The idea behind the forum is that participants present their opinions and reasoning 
on various topics, invite others to persuade them to change their views [379] and finally acknowledge if 
someone’s arguments succeeded to persuade them. Topics of discussions range from climate change and 
gun control to religion and feminism (e.g. “Religion does more harm than good” or “Women already have 
equality”; https://www.reddit.com/r/changemyview/wiki/popular). 
Crucially, Ceasefire provides several ground rules that ensure civility and productivity of the conversation 
and moderation is used to enforce the rules when necessary. Rules include “Don’t be rude or hostile to 
another user”, “Clearly express and explain your thinking” or “Contributions should inspire or add value to 
discussion”, which are well defined with examples and counter-examples. Although these rules might 
appear self-evident, their presence and enforcement has non-trivial benefits. Recent modelling work using 
an agent-based approach has shown that polarised groups can identify optimal policy solutions with 
considerable skill, provided the agents are willing to talk and learn from each other [380]. By contrast, 
when even a small number of agents are impervious to evidence, these evidence-resistant minorities can 
prevent convergence on an optimal outcome [381]. Thus, disagreement or polarisation per se do not seem 
to present an insurmountable obstacle: what appears to be more important is how a conversation between 
political opponents is conducted. 
The importance of a clear set of rules and moderation has also been emphasised in research on online 
deliberation [372]. If users are left to their own devices, online conversation readily deteriorates. Empirical 
evidence confirms that polarisation increases between opposing groups when like-minded people are left 
to their own devices [374]. By contrast, when the same issue was discussed under guidance by deliberative 
norms and an active facilitator, polarisation between groups was reduced [374]. 
Although online deliberation has shown considerable promise, at least two issues remain to be resolved: 
First, not all citizens have high-quality web access. The impact of the “digital divide” is becoming 
increasingly clear and many voices now consider web access to be a basic human right.77 Second, there is 
no consensus on the distinction between online participation platforms and online deliberation platforms 
— the latter having been designed per se to be deliberative. In particular, there is no concrete agreement 
on what specific attributes a platform must have in order to be considered deliberative. 
  
                                                 
77 https://webfoundation.org/2014/12/recognise-the-internet-as-a-human-right-says-sir- tim-berners-lee-as-he-
launches-annual-web-index/ 
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Key scientific findings 
 
 Some self-governed online fora have been identified as 
contributing to radicalisation and toxic extremism. 
 Secluded online spaces can function as laboratories that 
develop extremist talking points that then find entry into the 
mainstream but they can also provide voices to marginalised 
and disadvantaged communities. 
 Consumers of extremist content on self-governed fora often 
begin with less extreme content and shift over time. 
 Current social media platform architectures provide social 
signals that can lead to misperceptions about relative group 
sizes. This has consequences for social movements who can 
believe that their ideas have broader or lesser penetration than 
they actually do. 
 Government-supported platforms have successfully permitted 
large-scale public consultation. 
 Existing research in online deliberative spaces suggests that 
online deliberation, when properly designed, may match the 
success of offline deliberative “mini publics” and citizens’ 
assemblies. 
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Chapter 8: What does this mean for policy? 
There is a widespread sense that liberal democracy is in crisis but the reasons why are unclear. This 
is in part due to the complex nature of democracy that is not one single concept but comprises the 
three fundamental principles of equality, representation and participation.78 
Consequently, the relationship between democracy and digital technologies is complex as their role 
and the importance attributed to them play out differently across these fundamental principles. There 
is no doubt that social media platforms spread polarising messages that can affect political 
behaviour offline but they also enable minority voices to be heard and can engage citizens in 
innovative ways in the political process. When it comes to policymaking, there is no one size fits all. 
This report provides a state-of-the-science review of how online technologies influence political 
behaviour and decision-making. The fact that technological advances can have such profound effects 
on our democracies by shaping our human behaviour may be seen by some as symptomatic of the 
general health of democratic societies. Others may see it as an opportunity to harness our 
understanding of human cognition and use this as a force for good. Regardless, it should be clearly 
understood that the many evidence-based suggestions and implications outlined in this chapter will 
only serve policymakers well if they are undertaken in conjunction with broader efforts to 
meaningfully engage with citizens to understand their different values and perspectives and re-
establish trust in political institutions. 
Within the EU, a range of regulatory and non-regulatory instruments or combinations of instruments 
can be used to reach policy objectives. Firstly, action at the EU level is governed by the proportionality 
principle, which means that action should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective. 
In short, the scope of the policy intervention needs to match the size and nature of the identified 
problem at the EU level. Secondly, the choice of policy instrument must take into account the 
experience obtained from the evaluation of the existing, relevant policies that are in place. 
As the European Commission considers the types of regulatory steps to take, algorithms and design 
choices are in the meantime controlling the online environment. Made by corporations in pursuit of 
financial profits, these algorithms have little transparency or public oversight [72]. In parallel, however, 
a number of existing legislative measures support EU citizens in the online world, these include: 
 Consumer protection rules which resulted in a large quantity of COVID-19 misinformation 
being removed from Facebook;79 
 EU e-Commerce Directive that establishes content removal liability clocks;80 
 The EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive that regulates amongst others, content on 
YouTube;81 
 The right to protect one’s reputation, e.g. from slanderous fake news/disinformation is 
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and implemented 
through defamation law;82 and  
 It is criminal law that can convict fraudulent creators of disinformation. 
                                                 
78 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT 
79 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2394/oj 
80 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX\%3A32000L0031 
81 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj 
82 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT 
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While respecting the legislative measures that are already in place and the key scientific findings in 
this report, what more could and should policymakers be doing? 
Delineating policy parameters 
Due to the integrated nature of the pressure points identified in this report, it is not meaningful to 
recommend individual policy actions. Instead, the three fundamental democratic principles of 
equality, representation and participation are used as a framework to shape the proposals 
formulated in this chapter. 
Equality 
  Managing misinformation and tackling disinformation; 
 Levelling the asymmetric landscape; 
 Safeguarding the guardians; 
Representation 
 Safeguarding electoral processes; 
 Safeguarding personalisation and customisation; 
Participation 
 Facilitating public deliberation; 
 The role of technology in the European Commission’s forthcoming Conference on the Future 
of Europe initiative; and 
 A final section “Enabling further policy reflections” is dedicated to the practical use of 
strategic foresight as a means of supporting complex policy reflections. 
Managing misinformation and tackling disinformation 
In line with what they consider proportionate, policymakers have at least four classes of interventions 
at their disposal. They can regulate content directly, they can mandate that platforms regulate their 
content to limit misinformation, they can mandate the redesign of platforms to develop architectures 
that are more conducive to the spread of high-quality information than misinformation or they can 
request the development of tools that can ultimately empower people to become more resistant to 
misinformation. We explore the four classes in turn. 
Regulating content. At the time of writing, the COVID-19 crisis has led to a vast expansion of 
government power in many countries, including some attempts to legislate against “disinformation” 
relating to the virus. Legislation is a powerful tool, however there is little evidence that on its own, it 
is as effective a tool against disinformation as the digital ecosystem requires. Conversely, there are 
legitimate concerns that overly broad legislative measures against disinformation will open the door 
to censorship. 
Moreover, regulatory frameworks designed to combat disinformation (wilfully misleading content 
produced by malicious actors) must contend with the fact that other social media users may believe 
or share the same content without malicious intent. The fluidity between different forms of false and 
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misleading content, as discussed in Section 6.1, often rests on intent and context, making it difficult 
for legislation and regulation to distinguish true disinformation from legitimate speech or unwitting 
sharing of false information. 
There are also practical difficulties associated with regulating content. A recent example of these 
difficulties involves a video that claimed that the COVID-19 pandemic was the result of a conspiracy. 
The video was based on disinformation and flawed reasoning [382] and was therefore removed by 
YouTube and other platforms. This did not stop the video from appearing elsewhere on the web, often 
under the banner of preserving “free speech” [383], which was then re-shared on Twitter, Facebook 
and other social media sites after the original content was removed from these larger platforms. 
Although regulation or legislation of content is fraught with risk, this does not mean that regulation 
cannot play a constructive role in other ways; for example, by mandating the reshaping of online 
architectures to ensure principles of fairness and transparency are adhered to. 
Mandating Content Regulation. Regulators could insist that platforms suppress misinformation 
and disinformation by their own means. For instance, legislation could require platforms to maintain 
research groups aimed at finding and eliminating new forms and sources of misinformation as they 
develop. Such groups should be especially responsive to the worry that, due to its arms-race 
character, misinformation is constantly evolving and thus requires flexible, evolving techniques to 
combat it. Regulators could also insist on the involvement of independent fact-checkers, which are 
known to be at least partially effective in countering misinformation [314]. Moreover, the 
performance of platforms in removing misinformation must be subject to constant public audit on 
human rights compliance with enforceable consequences. At the time of this writing, Facebook had 
just failed an external civil rights audit, which found that the platform had “not done enough to 
protect users from discrimination, falsehoods and incitement to violence.”83 
Major platforms such as Twitter and Facebook already have internal groups designed to detect and 
limit misinformation. Government involvement might take the form of requiring that the amount of 
misinformation on platforms remain below some threshold or that robust efforts are made to prevent 
pollution of the information space by non-authentic or non-human actors such as “bots” or “sock-
puppets”. 
There is some precedent for this approach. For instance, the German Network Enforcement Act (Act 
to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks of September 1, 2017) introduced reporting 
obligations for social networks with more than two million registered users in Germany about their 
management of complaints against certain kinds of unlawful content. Moreover, the law requires the 
platforms to set up effective and transparent procedures to address complaints against illegal 
content. These types of rules of course are based on other rules regulating content as the basis of 
these complaints (for instance, criminal laws prohibiting hate speech or slander). The effectiveness 
of these regulatory efforts depends on the design decisions platforms make when implementing 
regulatory obligations. A comparison of how Twitter and Facebook changed their management of 
user complaints in response to the legal requirements introduced by the NetzDG shows that 
                                                 
83 https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/weaponized-facebook-fails-protect-civil-rights-audit-says-
n1233143 
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“Facebook makes the process of submitting a NetzDG complaint unnecessarily cumbersome while 
simultaneously trying to redirect user attention away from the NetzDG reporting process” [384]. 
Enforcing targets for successful self-regulation could also address problems like the one identified 
above, concerning content that is removed but then re-introduced on other sites. In such cases, the 
users who are reposting or rehosting previously-removed content originally found that content on 
the social media sites that removed it, but no mechanism is in place to prevent reposting elsewhere.  
Technology exists to track photos and videos by creating a unique “hash” for an item, analogous to 
a unique DNA profile.84 
Once a visual item has been thus identified and catalogued, any other site can detect the offending 
item and prevent uploading. One possibility is to create incentives for social media companies to 
participate in this technology to combat disinformation. 
Additionally, proactive corrections could be automatically posted if a user has seen/engaged with 
mis/disinformation once it has been fact-checked; e.g. “You have shared XXX. It has been found that 
this was wrong, see here for more information.” 
Redesigning platforms. We already explored the power of choice architectures in Section 4. Design 
of online platforms is also important in the context of misinformation, sometimes in unexpected and 
unanticipated ways. A recent example relates to the misinformation-triggered “WhatsApp murders” 
in India (see earlier discussion in Chapter 1). By merely curtailing the number of times a message 
can be forwarded, a seemingly trivial change, WhatsApp may have contributed to the elimination of 
those lynch killings [13]. This approach, that blends platform design with knowledge of human 
cognition, has been labelled “technocognition” [246]. 
The idea behind technocognition is to redesign information architectures in a cognitively congenial 
way to assist in slowing the spread of disinformation. An example of a creative design intervention 
that embodies the technocognition spirit involved the Norwegian public broadcaster (NRK). Reader 
comments on news articles and blog posts are known to affect other readers’ impressions and 
behavioural intentions [349, 385, 386]. The mere tone of blog comments — that is, whether they are 
civil or uncivil — has been shown to affect people’s attitudes towards scientific issues they do not 
understand well [387]. In order to avoid those adverse consequences of commenting, the NRK trialled 
the requirement that readers must pass a brief comprehension quiz before posting comments.85 
This slight increase in “friction” is intended to raise the standard of discussion by eliminating trolls or 
people who have not read the content. The friction also allows for a cooling-off period, thus 
contributing to tempering the tone of the discussion. This approach appears attractive because it can 
be automated and does not constitute censorship. It must be noted, however, that the Chinese 
government is using extreme forms of friction to censor online information [388]. By contrast, this 
report advocates friction in small doses and with the explicit intent to avoid censorship. Another 
approach that avoids censorship is to focus policymakers’ efforts on empowering citizens to become 
more adept information consumers. 
                                                 
84 https://www.iwf.org.uk/our-services/hash-list 
85 http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/03/this-site-is-taking-the-edge-off-rant-mode-by-making-readers-pass-
a-quiz-before-commenting/ 
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Empowering citizens to reckon with disinformation. People acquire and practice numerous and 
diverse competences throughout their lives, from riding a bike or reading to adopting digital 
technologies. The competences to navigate the digital information ecology — which is at times 
manipulative and hostile — can be developed by considering the cues that are already available in 
the online environment but have remained largely untapped to date. One can classify those cues into 
endogenous and exogenous cues [98]. Table 3 lists examples of endogenous or exogenous cues. 
Table 3 - Examples of endogenous and exogenous cues of online content 
Endogenous cues refer to the content itself, like the qualitative aspects of a story (e.g. who are the 
protagonists; what is their relationship; what is the story’s plot). Modern search engines use natural 
language-processing tools that analyse content using endogenous cues. 
These cues have considerable promise. For example, it has recently been shown that a machine-
learning classifier can be trained to detect organised influence operations on social media and 
differentiate those operations from organic social discourse solely based on content of messages 
[389]. Nonetheless, content analyses continue to have substantial shortcomings: they cannot (yet) 
reliably distinguish between facts and opinions; they cannot detect irony, humour or sarcasm [390]; 
they also have difficulty differentiating between extremist content and counter-extremist messages 
[68]. Importantly, current endogenous cues of epistemic quality either require background knowledge 
of the issue in question or sophisticated machine learning techniques — this, in turn, increases the 
risks from a lack of transparency, information asymmetries between platforms and users, and abuse 
for censorship purposes. It must also be noted that disinformation is created in an adversarial 
environment and that development of automated detection algorithms is likely to stimulate an arms 
race to develop more sophisticated forms of disinformation.  
By contrast, exogenous cues do not tap into the content but the context of information. For a digital 
newspaper article, for instance, relevant, simple and intuitively easy to understand external cues 
include the sources being cited; when the article was first posted; how often it was posted and by 
whom; how often it was promoted (and, importantly, who paid for that); and how many people saw, 
shared and liked it. Slightly more complex cues could include, for instance, a sharing cascade for a 
social media post (see Figure 3a in [98]). Such a cascade reveals the informative history of the 
Endogenous cues Exogenous cues 
Actors Source/Publisher 
Statements Cited references 
Plot Language style 
Reported events Audience 
Relations between actors Social reactions 
Circumstances of events Sharing history 
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content before it reached the user, including metrics such as the depth and breadth of dissemination 
by others. Deep and narrow cascades (including repeated sharing) indicate extreme or niche topics 
and breadth indicates widely discussed issues. Other exogenous cues carry higher dimensional 
information beyond a user’s direct neighbourhood. For instance, social media platforms could provide 
a transparent crowd-sourced voting system or display informative metrics about less active 
behaviour and reactions of others. This could, for example, include informative disengaging 
behaviours, such as information about how many people only quickly scrolled through a post rather 
than spending time reading it. 
Once made available by the platforms, the cues outlined above could be used in behavioural 
interventions designed to make people more resilient to disinformation. Alternatively, social media 
operators could be mandated to offer the option to users to share their data with a secure research 
platform (this idea is further elaborated in Chapter 9) to establish a verifiable, common 
understanding of user behaviour. This is in line with the Eurobarometer findings on “Attitudes towards 
the impact of digitalisation on daily lives” that found that almost 60% of the representative EU 
population sample would be willing to share some of their personal information securely to improve 
public services. This in comparison to, e.g. the current 7-step Facebook process86 that includes waiting 
for data to be combined into a file that the user then has to personally forward to a researcher. 
Should the cue data be made more broadly available, the two main classes of behavioural 
interventions from which policymakers could draw conclusions are nudging and boosting (Table 4). 
Type Examples References 
Nudges: The choice architectures that 
alter people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way. 
Privacy-protecting default 
settings 
GDPR, Article 25 
Educative nudges: Reminders and 
subtle prompts to behaviour. 
Fact-check labels Facebook, 2020 
Twitter, 2020 
Accuracy nudges [393, 394] 
Prominent epistemic cues [98] 
Boosts: targeting cognitive and 
motivational competences.  
Boosts can target both cognition and/or 
the environment. 
Inoculation against 
disinformation 
[405, 404] 
Lateral reading [400] 
Simple rules for digital 
literacy 
[400, 401] 
Fast-and-frugal trees [408, 24] 
Self-nudging [24, 398] 
Center for Humane 
Technology, 2019 
Friction [406] 
WhatsApp, 2018  
Twitter, 2020 
Table 4 - Interventions to empower digital competences and design better online environments (based on 
[24, 98].)  
                                                 
86 https://www.facebook.com/help/1701730696756992?helpref=hc_global_nav 
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Nudging. Nudging interventions start from a “deficit model” of human cognition and behaviour, where 
both are seen as compromised by a range of hard-to-rectify cognitive biases and failures of self-
control. Therefore, it is assumed to be more promising to co-opt cognitive biases and failure than to 
aim to overcome them [391]. This is often achieved by making small changes in the digital choice 
architecture (the environment) in which decisions are being embedded. This often means that 
institutional and public choice architects determine what is in the best interest of citizens. (See 
discussion in Chapter 4.) 
A recent analysis of the current state of nudging online concluded that most websites included 
relatively invisible forms of nudges that were aimed at audience building [392], in addition to the 
more overt designs of choice architectures reviewed earlier in this report. 
Some nudging interventions involve “educative nudging”, such as the provision of disclosures, 
reminders and prompts. For instance, reminding people of the concept of accuracy made users more 
discerning in their subsequent sharing decisions of tweets (increase in the average quality of the 
news sources shared [393, 394]). Twitter recently introduced a facility that queries people whether 
they really want to retweet an article they had not read.87 
With regard to anti-Black racist online harassment on Twitter, being called out by a white male with 
a high number of followers (“Hey man, just remember that there are real people who are hurt when 
you harass them with that kind of language”) reduced the harassers’ use of slurs [395]. The problem 
with these kinds of interventions is that warnings, prompts and moral appeals can wear off or can have 
unintended and potentially problematic side-effects. For instance, attaching a warning to fake news 
stories has been found to increase perceived accuracy of headlines that were not accompanied by 
warnings — thus creating an “implied truth effect” for anything not accompanied by warnings [396]. 
Clearly displaying epistemic qualities, such as the number of cited references and clearly 
distinguishing between content types (e.g. news, advertisement and posts from friends), without 
making a judgement about their truthfulness could be a more promising avenue because it would 
not run the risk of creating an implied truth effect. 
Boosting. Boosting is a promising class of cognitive interventions from the psychological sciences 
[397]. Unlike nudging, boosting does not start with a deficit model of cognition and human behaviour 
but with a “growth” model, assuming that people’s competences, skills and self-control strategies 
can be systematically and lastingly fostered. The objective is to empower people to make better 
decisions for themselves and in accordance with their own goals and preferences; ultimately, the 
individuals decide if they acquire a competence and once acquired, if they exercise it. In Finland, 
information discernment is being taught in schools and the country has the highest media literacy 
index of 35 European countries,88 pointing to the possibility that boosting can be rolled out on a large 
scale. 
Boosting can be bridged with nudging when people learn to design their proximate environment in a 
way that works best for them. This process is known as “self-nudging” [398]. While nudging redesigns 
choice architectures to prompt a behavioural change, self-nudging empowers people to act as their 
                                                 
87 https://www.niemanlab.org/2020/06/twitter-wants-to-know-if-you-read-that-article-before-you-retweet-it/ 
88 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/how-finland-is-fighting-fake-news-in-the-classroom/ 
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own choice architects. For example, one can choose to move tempting but undesirable foods (e.g. 
potato chips) to places that are harder to reach and not always in sight. 
One competence worth boosting is people’s ability to make inferences about the reliability of 
information based on the social context from which it originates. The structure and details of the 
entire cascade of individuals who have previously shared an article on social media have been shown 
to serve as proxies for epistemic quality [399]. A boosting intervention could provide this information 
(see Figure 3a in [98]), that is, display the full history of a post, including the original source, the 
friends and public users who disseminated it and the timing of the process. The intervention would 
also provide some practice opportunity to learn how to recognise informative patterns.89 
Another competence that empowers people to evaluate the trustworthiness of information online is 
the ability to read laterally [400]. Lateral reading is a skill developed by professional fact-checkers 
that entails looking for information on sites other than the information source itself in order to 
evaluate its credibility (for example, “Who is behind this website?” and “What do others say about the 
quality of the evidence for its claims?”) rather than evaluating a website’s credibility solely by using 
the information provided there. This competence can be boosted with decision aids such as simple 
rules for digital literacy [401] or so-called “fast-and-frugal” decision trees [24]. Fast-and-frugal 
decision trees are simple protocols for the sequence of decisions that must be taken to reach a 
diagnostic conclusion. 
A competence of particular relevance when it comes to staving off disinformation rests on insights 
into what makes disinformation so alluring (for example, novelty and the element of surprise) and 
the ability to resist its pull. This competence can be boosted by “inoculation” techniques. Inoculation 
targets people’s ability to recognise misleading or manipulative strategies before they encounter 
them face-to-face or online. Metaphorically speaking, if disinformation is an infectious disease, 
spreading like a virus through a social network, then inoculation can immunise people against certain 
manipulative strategies and strains of false and misleading information (e.g. parasitic imitations of 
trustworthy sources and other sinister tactics [402, 403, 404]). Making people aware of such 
disinformation strategies or of their own personal vulnerabilities leaves them better able to identify 
and resist manipulation. For instance, having people take on the role of a malicious influencer in a 
computer game has been shown to improve their ability to spot and resist disinformation [405]. 
Boosting may also involve “friction”, similar to what can be introduced by technocognition. In the 
boosting context, friction might involve asking people to “please explain how you know that the 
headline is true or false” before they rate their sharing intent of a story [406]. This brief contemplative 
pause has been found to reduce sharing intent for false headlines but not for true headlines (even 
though the decrease in sharing intention was relatively small [406]). Adding this friction, however, 
was not as effective for repeated headlines [406] — possibly because prior exposure increases 
perceived accuracy of fake news [407]. 
The preceding review illustrates that there is a wide range of possible behavioural interventions: some 
interventions nudge people without the explicit intent to foster competences; others aim to explicitly 
boost users’ relevant competences; some are embedded in the digital choice architecture, others are 
external tools or mental routines. It is important to highlight that behavioural interventions can only 
                                                 
89 See: https://tracemap.info/home 
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be part of an orchestrated response to disinformation, complementing but not replacing robust 
regulations, platforms’ systematic curation of content or external fact-checking. 
Levelling the asymmetric landscape 
The attention economy is characterised by a profound asymmetry between the power of platforms 
and the limited power of users. Any behavioural intervention therefore runs the risk of being 
instrumentalised by the platforms to shift the burden of responsibility for the detection and spread 
of disinformation and other externalities of the attention economy such as privacy violations, from 
the platforms to the users. 
Europe’s 406 million Facebook users and their information diet. To illustrate the extent of the 
issue, in June 2020, increasingly uneasy with how Facebook was handling misinformation and hate 
speech, high profile multinational companies (among them Unilever and Coca Cola) committed to 
suspending their advertising on the platform. The response by Facebook was notable: the platform 
first rolled out new measures to flag problematic political posts and expand its policies around hate 
speech.90 A short time later, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced that he was unperturbed by 
the advertising boycott, suggesting that Unilever and Coca-Cola would be back on the platform “soon 
enough”. 91 
A healthy, collaborative relationship with the platforms across all segments of society should be 
encouraged; however, this must not detract from two relevant facts arising from this recent episode. 
First, decisions made by large corporations (e.g. Unilever) are having a direct impact upon the 
information diet of the 406 million active Facebook users across Europe. Second, although Facebook 
initially responded to the advertising boycott, it was unfazed by the actions of two major global 
corporations, Unilever and Coca-Cola, with a combined worth of US$123,000,000,000.92 At the time 
of writing, Facebook’s share price had grown by 24.6% in 2020.93 This raises crucial issues about 
corporate power, governance and democratic accountability. 
Self-regulation, co-regulation or regulation? A related problem is that many empowering 
behavioural interventions require changes to the online environment (for example, transparent 
sorting algorithms or clear layouts). This requires the cooperation of industry, especially because 
some of these measures might reduce engagement and are in conflict with the platforms’ 
commercial interests. 
For these reasons, effective regulation of the attention economy could require more than behavioural 
insights, interventions and incentives for self-regulation: it could require the formation of specialised, 
dedicated bodies—with EU oversight but empowered at Member State level—analogous to those 
regulating financial markets and other aspects of the traditional economy. This is particularly 
important as the attention economy grows and becomes ever more intertwined both with more 
                                                 
90 https://www.wsj.com/articles/unilever-to-halt-u-s-ads-on-facebook-and-twitter-for-rest-of-2020-
11593187230 
91 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-53262860 
92 See https://www.statista.com/statistics/326065/coca-cola-brand-value/ and 
https://brandfinance.com/news/press-releases/value-of-unilever-brand-portfolio-more-than-double- 
kraftheinz/ 
93 https://wallstreetexaminer.com/2020/08/top-tech-stocks-weather-the-storm/ 
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traditional sectors of the economy and with the fora where political discourse occurs. Such a body 
would need to have strong oversight power and the ability to subpoena otherwise proprietary data 
and algorithms from online companies participating in the attention economy. This sort of 
enforcement power would be analogous to the power that market regulators have to implement 
disclosure rules for publicly traded companies, which similarly involves ensuring the release of 
otherwise proprietary content in the public interest. 
Platforms are currently benefiting from the opacity of newsfeed algorithms because it permits 
unchallenged optimisation of advertising revenue, with no oversight, possibly at the expense of public 
understanding and democratic discourse. However, regulatory intervention could mandate other 
attributes to be included in newsfeeds, such as indicators of epistemic quality as well as information 
about the variables driving the algorithm and their weighting (for a review, see [98]). Users should 
be able to understand how an algorithm was used and to what effect. In some instances, this would 
include transparency about what data entered the decision-making system and how those data can 
be contested. However, without real explainability, users will remain powerless to digital technologies 
and the machine-based decisions that will have an immense impact on their lives [409]. Note that 
this is not mandating content and it does not constitute censorship: It simply mandates that the 
criteria for algorithms must include transparent epistemic attributes in addition to merely attracting 
users’ attention. 
Experimentation with and without consent. A related question is who develops, tests and then 
implements potential behavioural interventions? Behavioural innovations are likely to be developed 
both by independent academic research but also by the platforms’ research departments. To illustrate, 
experiments that platforms conduct without user consent can have substantial ramifications, for 
example when different emotions are induced by altering newsfeed content on Facebook and that 
intervention is shown to spread through the social network [410]. There currently is no public control 
over their design and execution (e.g. through the approval of external ethics committees). This lack of 
oversight stands in striking contrast to the strict ethical review boards that oversee research by 
academics and public research institutes. 
Without such oversight, internal experiments remain intransparent, are undertaken without explicit 
consent of subjects and, most importantly, target subsets of the population, exploiting information 
about demographics or personality. This can be detrimental to the democratic process in particular 
when these experiments influence election turnout, voting behaviour, the success of social 
mobilisation, the outrage against certain policies, the mood of constituents, vaccination behaviour 
and compliance with pandemic regulations, to name just a few potential effects. Policymakers should 
recognise that behavioural interventions are likely to exact only small effects — but even small 
effects can scale up over billions of users and have the potential to subvert democratic processes. 
During particularly crucial periods for democratic processes (e.g. during election periods), moratoria 
on such experiments might be necessary in order to avoid the manipulation of outcomes (e.g. voting 
behaviour). This would counter the risk of a targeted intervention by the platforms themselves, which 
otherwise could masquerade as seemingly neutral changes of design features. Of course, sufficient 
oversight would be necessary to even spot this kind of activity. 
To undo some of the asymmetry in the ability to conduct large-scale online experiments it seems 
desirable for independent agencies and the research community to have the opportunity to 
investigate promising interventions on the platforms. Without access to the platforms for independent 
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research, industry enjoys privileged knowledge of the effects of behavioural interventions and 
modifications of choice architectures without public accountability. 
Data privacy vs. availability. A more robust approach is needed to increase the transparency and 
access to data from the major social media and information sharing platforms. It is worth 
remembering that activities on social media contribute to our civilisation’s cultural heritage. We know 
about ancient civilisations because, in their excavations, archaeologists unearth pottery and pieces 
of glass, cultural artefacts that are treasured not because of their utilitarian value but because of 
what we can learn from them about the everyday lives of people. Our data on Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram or TikTok could be considered the contemporary equivalent of such cultural artefacts. 
Given the lack of access users have to data, this analogy could be stretched to the “cultural right of 
return.” When writing about the importance of cultural restitution, French experts Savoy and Sarr 
stated: “The removal of cultural property not only affects the generation from whom it is taken, it 
becomes inscribed throughout the long duration of societies, conditioning the flourishing of certain 
societies while simultaneously continuing to weaken others” [411]. Our societies should resist being 
denied our right of cultural return. 
Specifically, regulators may have to mandate the sharing of platform data with other entities. This 
would have to take into account the privacy implications of “big data” reviewed in this report; it would 
have to involve strict ethical procedures and supervision; and it would have to guard against abuse 
by political operatives. Significant efforts would be needed to use anonymous and anonymised data. 
Those data could be used by independent research organisations, NGOs and public bodies to audit 
algorithms and test for biases to uphold democracy in addition to safeguarding our cultural heritage. 
Additionally, platforms could be mandated to provide every user with an annual summary of when 
their data point was sold. To avoid receiving a meaningless document, criteria could be established 
to ensure it is both user-friendly and insightful. 
Steps to level the asymmetry. The Ranking Digital Rights (RDR) Corporate Accountability Index 
reflects over a decade of civil society and academic research into platform accountability. The 
recommendations below94 have been inspired by this Index. It is intended to help policymakers 
understand the information that needs to be disclosed in order to reduce the asymmetry between 
corporations and citizens as the policy environment evolves from self-regulation to regulatory 
interventions. 
Access to Key Policy Documents 
 Companies should publish the rules (otherwise known as terms of service or community 
guidelines) for what user-generated content and behaviour is/is not permitted. 
 Companies should publish the content rules for advertising (e.g. what kinds of products and 
services can/cannot be advertised, formatting, types of language used…). 
 Companies should publish the targeting rules for advertising (e.g. names, addresses, 
gender, ethnicity, personal interests…). 
                                                 
94 Adapted by the NGO New America: https://www.newamerica.org/ 
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 Companies should provide an inventory of sensitive inferences (e.g. personality) that are 
possible on the basis of user data for each individual. 
 Companies should notify users when the rules for user-generated content, advertising 
content or for ad targeting change so that they can make an informed decision about 
whether to continue using the platform. 
Rules and Processes for Enforcement 
 Companies should disclose the processes and technologies (including content moderation 
algorithms) used to identify content or accounts that violate the rules for user-generated 
content, advertising content and ad targeting. 
 Companies should notify users in understandable language when they make significant 
changes to these processes and technologies. 
Transparency Reporting 
 Companies should regularly publish transparency reports with data about the volume and 
nature of actions taken to restrict content that violates the rules for user-generated 
content, for advertising content and for ad targeting. 
 Transparency reports should be published at least twice per year. 
Content-shaping Algorithms 
 Companies should disclose whether they use algorithmic systems to curate, recommend 
and/or rank the content that users can access through their platforms. 
 Companies should explain how such algorithmic systems work, including what they 
optimise for and the variables they take into account. 
 Companies should enable users to decide whether to allow these algorithms to shape their 
online experience and to change the variables that influence them. 
 Companies must provide opportunity for independent audits and reverse engineering of 
algorithms to ensure that they are free of biases and support informed deliberation rather 
than extremism. 
Policymakers may want to consider extending these requirements to so-called data brokers or data 
merchants [412] before considering further measures such as mandating registration and licensing 
actors selling sensitive data. Key to the success of any policy intervention will be the ability for the 
relevant authorities at the EU and Member State levels to ensure enforcement. 
Safeguarding the guardians 
The growing movement of political fact-checking plays an important role in increasing democratic 
accountability and improving political discourse. Fact-checkers hold amongst others, governments 
and politicians to account through exposing false claims and exaggerated half-truths; this role is 
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increasingly considered a public service, benefiting both journalists and citizens. However, the task is 
time-consuming, intellectually demanding and laborious, requiring more advanced writing skills than 
ordinary journalism. There are also motivational issues associated with this work, which finds 
dedicated journalists and civil society actors fearing that their human efforts are simply training 
algorithms during the profession’s transition to automation. 
Another pillar of management of the online environment is content moderation. Moderation seeks to 
detect and eliminate unlawful or otherwise inappropriate content, such as hate speech, pornography 
or graphic violence. Undertaken by tens of thousands of mostly subcontracted personnel, moderators 
aim to meet daily quotas by evaluating a maximum amount of questionable content according to 
corporate appropriateness criteria. The diversity of content reflects the global nature of social 
media’s diverse user base. Consequently, there is a significant amount of illegal and objectionable 
content which moderation can prevent from appearing online.  
This results in moderation negatively affecting the mental health and well-being of the moderators;95 
this is often compounded by strict non-disclosure agreements that prevent moderators from talking 
about their work. 
In light of the important role that these occupations play in upholding democratic principles, 
policymakers may want to consider professional certification schemes that would guarantee minimal 
working conditions, clear explanations of inherent risks as well as the provision of psychological 
training and counselling. Through a certification scheme, independent audits could be used to monitor 
compliance and uphold standards. 
Safeguarding electoral processes 
Elections are a pinnacle of democratic political expression and engagement. Everything in this report 
therefore also applies to the political processes and conversations leading up to elections. Regulations 
and policies that safeguard political discourse online also contribute to safeguarding elections. There 
are, however, several distinct aspects of elections that deserve being singled out for the attention of 
policymakers. 
Cybersecurity. There is evidence of interference by foreign actors in several recent elections in the 
US and Europe [413, 414]. This interference raises issues of cybersecurity that are beyond the scope 
of this review and are the subject of a recent report by the JRC.96 
Political advertising. Political advertising during electoral periods is heavily regulated in the EU, for 
both the broadcasting and the press media sectors however; social media are largely not covered by 
these measures. 
Given the general absence of European or national-level rules, political advertising on online 
platforms is constrained only by the microtargeting options offered to political advertisers 
                                                 
95 https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/commercial-content-moderation/518796/;  
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/the-human-cost-of-online-content-moderation;  
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/737671615/from-nightmares-to-ptsd-the-toll-on-facebook-
moderators?t=1600813927984; https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-content-
moderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona 
96 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/put-cybersecurity-at-centre-of-society 
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established by the commercial platforms’ respective advertising policies. Table 5 summarises policies 
for some of the most popular platforms in the EU. 
Microtargeting of online political advertising has revolutionised political campaigns through the 
narrow segmentation of voters based on social media data coupled with sophisticated psychological 
profiling techniques using differentiated and customised political messages disseminated quickly and 
with precision. 
Despite the use of personal data for microtargeting being subject to the GDPR, and the inclusion of 
data protection principles and compliance requirements applicable to microtargeting in the 
September 2019 electoral package, there are legitimate concerns that the imbalances between 
online and offline rules potentially pose a threat to democratic processes. 
 Policymakers can consider taking a number of steps including: 
 Allowing only official candidate-bought and candidate-approved messages to reduce 
interference from third party actors; 
 Ban microtargeting for political ads. Political actors will be representing and held 
accountable by broad constituencies, consequently their messages should be seen by all; 
 To ensure accountability, all political ads should be made publicly available and centralised 
by an independent authority; and 
 All political ads should be subject to fact-checking. 
Political Misinformation. The spread of false information of political relevance in the period 
leading up to an election or other vote also deserves regulatory attention. Several jurisdictions have 
already taken on this special challenge in addition to general rules about the dissemination of false 
information (e.g. in laws against slander) and about the integrity of electoral processes. In particular, 
France adopted a law on the “fight against the manipulation of information” (Law 2018-1202) in 
December 2018. This law, inter alia, creates mechanisms to ward off attempts of foreign states to 
influence the outcome of votes through false information and to curb the spread of false mass 
communication during the three months before an election [415]. It also imposes reporting 
obligations on online platforms of a certain size concerning paid politically relevant content in the 
period before an election. 
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Table 5 - Social media platform policies on political advertising and political content 
Platform Overall policy Definitions Exemptions Source 
Facebook,  
Instagram 
“Advertisers can run ads about 
social issues, elections or 
politics, provided the advertiser 
complies with all applicable 
laws and the authorisation 
process required by Facebook. 
Where appropriate, Facebook 
may restrict issue, electoral or 
political ads.” 
Any advertiser running ads about social 
issues, elections or politics who is located in 
or targeting people in designated countries 
must complete the authorization process 
required by Facebook when the 
advertisement: 
 Is made by, on behalf of or about a 
candidate for public office, a political figure, 
a political party, a political action committee 
or advocates for the outcome of an election 
to public office; or 
 Is about any election, referendum or ballot 
initiative, including "get out the vote" or 
election information campaigns; or 
 Is about any social issue in any place where 
the ad is being run; or 
 Is regulated as political advertising.  
Advertisers running these ads must comply 
with all applicable laws and regulations, 
including but not limited to requirements 
involving: Disclaimer, disclosure and ad 
labeling; Blackout periods; Foreign 
interference; or Spending limits and 
reporting requirements. 
Advertisers who want to create or edit 
ads about social issues, elections or 
politics in a European Union country will 
need to go through the authorization 
process and place “Paid for by” 
disclaimers on ads. This includes any 
person creating, modifying, publishing or 
pausing ads that reference political 
figures, political parties or elections 
(including “get out the vote” campaigns). 
Advertisers will only be able to run ads in 
the country in which they are authorized. 
Then, ads will enter the Ad Library for 
seven years. 
 
https://www.facebook.com/ 
policies/ads/restricted_ 
content/political# 
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Platform Overall policy Definitions Exemptions Source 
Google,  
YouTube 
“We support responsible 
political advertising, and 
expect all political ads and 
destinations to comply with 
local legal requirements, 
including campaign and 
election laws and mandated 
election “silence periods,” for 
any geographic areas they 
target.” 
Political content includes ads for political 
organizations, political parties, political 
issue advocacy or fundraising, and 
individual candidates and politicians. In the 
EU, election ads include ads that feature: 
 a political party, a current elected 
officeholder, or candidate for the EU 
Parliament. 
 a political party, a current officeholder, or 
candidate for an elected national office 
within an EU member state. Examples 
include members of a national parliament 
and presidents that are directly elected; 
 a referendum question up for vote, a 
referendum campaign group, or a call to 
vote related to a national referendum or a 
state or provincial referendum on 
sovereignty. 
Note that election ads do not include ads 
for products or services, including 
promotional political merchandise like t-
shirts, or ads run by news organizations 
to promote their coverage of 
referendums, political parties, 
candidates, or current elected 
officeholders. 
 
https://support.google.com/ 
adspolicy/answer/6014595 
?hl=en 
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Platform Overall policy Definitions Exemptions Source 
Microsoft “To offer a safe and positive 
online experience for users, we 
cannot accept ads that contain 
or relate to certain content.” 
This includes, but is not limited to, the 
content covered in the policies listed below. 
We reserve the right to reject or remove 
any ad, at our sole discretion and at any 
time. 
Advertising for the following content, 
products and services is either disallowed 
or subject to specific participation policies. 
 Areas of questionable legality 
 Dating 
 Defamatory, slanderous, libelous or 
threatening content 
 Hate speech 
 Peer-to-peer file sharing 
 Political and religious content 
 Sensitive advertising 
 Suffering and violence 
 Tax collection 
 Unregulated user-generated content 
In France, ads containing content related 
to debate of general interest linked to an 
electoral campaign are not allowed. 
 
https://about.ads.microsoft. 
com/en-us/resources/ 
policies/disallowed-content-
policies 
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Platform Overall policy Definitions Exemptions Source 
Twitter Twitter globally prohibits the 
promotion of political content. 
“We have made this decision 
based on our belief that 
political message reach should 
be earned, not bought.” 
Political content is content that references a 
candidate, political party, elected or 
appointed government official, election, 
referendum, ballot measure, legislation, 
regulation, directive, or judicial outcome. 
Ads that contain references to political 
content, including appeals for votes, 
solicitations of financial support, and 
advocacy for or against any of the above-
listed types of political content are 
prohibited under this policy. 
Twitter also does not allow ads of any type 
by candidates, political parties, or elected or 
appointed government officials. 
News publishers who meet certain 
criteria may run ads that reference 
political content, candidates, political 
parties, or elected or appointed 
government officials, but may not 
include advocacy for or against those 
topics. 
 
https://business.twitter. 
com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-
content-policies/political-
content.html 
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Safeguarding personalisation and customisation 
Renegotiating privacy and personalisation. One potential solution to the privacy paradox is 
data-protection-by-design: the integration of proactive protections into the design, development 
and application of data systems and technologies [416]. Article 25 of the GDPR requires a 
reasonable level of protection as the default; thus, the burden of making rational decisions that 
are costly and require effort in the moment, but are beneficial in the long-run would be lifted from 
users. In addition, policymakers could consider regulation that directly addresses psychological 
targeting, for example, by restricting its use in specific contexts such as political campaigning and 
establishing clear standards for algorithmic fairness that prevent discrimination. 
A potential difficulty with regulation and public standards in this arena is that sensitive attributes 
can be masked within online systems with clever renaming or by replacing an attribute with a proxy 
variable. For example, algorithms may infer “ethnic affinity” instead of “race” [417] or “upcoming 
important changes in the life of a woman” instead of “pregnant”. Such euphemisms or use of proxy 
variables can enable discriminatory practices, such as the microtargeting of job or housing ads with 
respect to race and gender [105]. Such inferences, even when they may comply with the letter of 
the law, pose risks of harm [34], making it possible to manipulate user behaviour based on their most 
sensitive information. 
One countermeasure involves personal data cooperatives. These cooperatives aim to democratise 
the decision process of the use of sensitive data [418]. Cooperatives aggregate personal data and 
provide access to other platforms and services on the terms decided by the members of the 
cooperative, serving as a way for individuals to build a common good without the need to depend 
on private companies or state agencies. An example of this is MIDATA in Switzerland, a cooperative 
that aggregates health data donated by its members to enable technological uses that can have a 
positive effect on their health without compromising privacy. 
An alternative, technological approach would be to limit the power of the inferences made by 
online platforms and social networking services. Going beyond the individual’s control over data, 
this approach would constrain the inferences that can legally be made. 
Redesigning privacy. The challenges for the design of effective privacy protection revolve around 
several issues. Generally, data protection policies are based upon notice-and-choice rules 
mandating a certain level of disclosure. One of the main limitations of these rules (and perhaps a 
partial cause of the privacy paradox) is the users’ limited capacity to read and process the details 
of the privacy policies [127]. 
Users also often cannot readily understand which kind of data they transmit, to whom and for how 
long. Consequently, notice-and-choice rules fail to incorporate the externalities of an individual’s 
data disclosure, such as its relevance for predicting the behaviour of other users through 
algorithms using big data. Given its significance, the authors suggest that these externalities could 
be incorporated into future policies. 
Another possible intervention could be to automate decisions about privacy settings, for instance 
by designing a tool that takes into account the individual user’s privacy preferences (based on 
observation or one-time in-depth elicitation). Once those have been entered, the tool could 
automatically apply them to all new sites. 
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Other interventions aim at raising awareness by visualising the meta-data that is shared [131], for 
example through a smart phone app that shows a photo that the new app would have access to 
when asking for permissions during its installation process [419]. 
Policy interventions could consider mandating the use of such tools during the notice-and-choice 
process or when eliciting privacy-relevant information. In Europe, consumer protection law imposes 
similar responsibilities on firms, when it requires them to make general terms and conditions (the 
“fine print”) salient in order to include it in the contract, which for example is the case in Germany.97 
Facilitating public deliberation 
User interfaces have the potential to promote reasoned discussion. One successful model is the 
Reddit ChangeMyView community (see Section 7.2), which has been found to promote high quality 
discussion [379]. The platform provides an explicit expectation that users will state reasons for 
their beliefs. In addition, content is moderated to ensure posts are of high quality and engage 
properly with other users. Studies of this community have yielded useful insights [379]. For 
example, longer posts on ChangeMyView tended to be more persuasive as users can be more 
explicit about their reasoning [379]. 
By implication, sites like Twitter that put strong constraints on length may prevent users from 
engaging in good debate by design. In addition, emotional language was found to be less 
successful in online argumentation [379]. This stands in contrast to research showing that negative 
emotional content is likely to be retweeted [420, 421]. It follows that algorithms that promote 
calmer content over highly emotionally laden content may help users engage in improved discourse. 
Platform design for public consultation. Small changes to platforms can make a big difference 
[352]. This creates a challenge for policymakers and designers who are responsible for public 
participation sites. It is very difficult to define the normative goal of platform design: what should 
a petition site look like? Civil servants should note that the most effective way they can implement 
optimal deliberative platforms is through a public procurement process. 
As there is no neutral platform design, it is important to recognise the substantive influence of 
design choices and prevent undue influence, such as outright user manipulation. Also, it is not well 
understood yet, how this effect varies across platforms, with their different approaches to filtering 
and displaying social information [422]. Due to these insights, it might be advised, at least for 
government platforms, to conduct empirical studies before making final choices about platform 
design and to be aware of the effects on behaviour when changing them. 
Regardless of a platform’s design, learnings from behavioural decision science can help lower the 
threshold to public participation and increase the quality of interactions. When engaging with the 
public online, in addition to providing clear explanations of the topic in question, tools can be 
provided to empower participants as they engage in the deliberative process. Framing the process 
is a crucial part of any engagement and support applications can be designed to assist with e.g.: 
i) explaining why decision-making is difficult; ii) how to establish common understanding through 
the use of relevant information; and iii) how to reach a decision when there are diverse points of 
                                                 
97 § 305.2 of the German Civil Code 
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view. Moderation is obviously key to the success of such a deliberative process, however this can 
be greatly supported by optional apps that provide background information and illustrative 
examples in multimedia formats for 
reading, listening and watching. 
Since platform design is never neutral, 
public actors should make their underlying 
choices salient and subject to public 
debate. Recognising directed network 
platforms like Twitter and their resulting 
broadcasting character is important. For 
example, very popular accounts (i.e. with a 
high number of followers) could be 
identified as broadcasters and could be 
incentivised to apply journalistic standards 
to their content. 
This will not curb their reach, but might 
make malicious actors easier to spot and 
good-faith influencers more careful before 
sharing content (“freedom of speech is not 
freedom of reach”98). 
But in the spirit of empowerment, such 
network structures also allow individuals 
or minorities to get their voices heard, if 
they pick up enough social support. 
Limiting the number of possible 
connections might work against this 
positive achievement of social media. 
However, the platforms simply promoting 
already popular accounts to increase 
engagement on their site and by that amplifying rich-get-richer dynamics does not follow a 
democratic but a commercial goal and could be regulated. Similarly, self-affirming groups may play 
into the targeting business model of the platforms, as they allow groups with very specific interests 
to gather in a self-organised way, which can then be addressed with specific advertisement (e.g. a 
local toddler’s group can be targeted with baby clothes). Recommendation algorithms that promote 
and amplify homophily further should be viewed in the light of these incentives and the potential 
dangers of radicalisation and perception biases they are posing. 
A transparent, but randomized diversification of content that goes beyond the direct neighbourhood 
in the network could potentially open up the discourse and prevent actors from posting extreme 
content, as the chance exists that it gets carried to the outside. However, such methods can backfire, 
when opposing content is repulsive to the other side of a polarized discussion and could even 
increase polarisation [187]. Alternative sampling/polling methods that consider not the directly 
                                                 
98 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/nov/22/sacha-baron-cohen-facebook-propaganda 
“From the very 
beginning, I made clear 
that people need to be 
at the very centre of all 
our policies. My wish is 
therefore that all 
Europeans will actively 
contribute to the 
Conference on the 
Future of Europe and 
play a leading role in 
setting the European 
Union’s priorities. It is 
only together that we 
can build our Union of 
tomorrow.” 
— Ursula von der Leyen, 
President of the European 
Commission 
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opposing side of the network, but e.g. the extended neighbourhood beyond direct connections, can 
mitigate perception biases and potentially false consensus effects [423]. This could easily be 
achieved by the social cues that are transmitted along the network connections. If they were to carry 
higher dimensional information to draw a more realistic picture of the state of the network, they 
could, in principle, foster the democratic potential of large communication platforms to reach 
consensus or lead an informed debate. However, they need to be designed carefully and need to be 
hard to game by malicious actors. 
Overall, such measures would neither curb freedom of speech, nor directly regulate the platforms’ 
business model, but would have the potential to transfer responsibility for transparency to 
influential individuals and open up modular structures and, by that, set boundaries within which the 
current ecosystem and the emerging social networks can evolve further. 
All of these implications should be considered by democratic institutions looking to strengthen their 
democracies when embarking upon meaningful citizen engagement. This includes the European 
institutions as they prepare for the forthcoming Conference on the Future of Europe. 
Enabling deeper policy reflections: Strategic foresight 
Previous sections in Chapter 8 have identified policy options addressing specific issues based upon 
the status quo. However, policymakers face systemic challenges that require addressing multiple 
issues simultaneously. Moreover, they may have alternative visions of the web where, for example, 
global platforms no longer dominate the market but a multitude of alternatives exist that compete 
on quality and consumer protection features. This is where strategic foresight can help. 
In light of the knowledge that has been garnered from this report, with a specific focus on the 
understanding gained about the stability of some basic behavioural principles, the authors invite 
readers to take the plunge and dive into the four possible futures co-created with key stakeholders 
which are as follows (see annex of this report for the in-depth scenarios): 
Scenario 1: The “Struggle for information supremacy” scenario assumes that the future European 
information space will be marked by high degrees of conflict and economic concentration. 
Scenario 2: In the “Resilient disorder” scenario, the EU has fostered a competitive, dynamic and 
decentralised information space with strong international interdependence, but is facing continuous 
threats from sophisticated disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. 
Scenario 3: The “Global cutting edge” scenario foresees a world in which societal and geopolitical 
conflict have been reduced significantly, while high degrees of competition and innovation have led 
to the emergence of a dynamic, global information space. 
Scenario 4: The “Harmonic divergence” scenario assumes a world in which strong regulatory 
differences and economic protectionism between national and regional actors have resulted in a 
fractured global information space. 
The scenarios have been prepared to give policymakers a tool to visualise the possible implications 
of their decisions. This can help them understand today the robustness of frameworks and how 
trade-offs can be made to improve policies for tomorrow.  
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These scenarios can be used by: 
i) specialists in a single policy area to gain a broader systemic perspective;  
ii) policymakers representing different policy areas whose collective efforts are needed 
to regulate technology and democracy; and  
iii) by all policymakers as a way of engaging in meaningful stakeholder dialogue “So you 
consider Scenario 2 to be implausible, please tell me why?” 
There are various ways to use scenarios. Four are described here. The first and most obvious is for 
an individual reader to read them carefully and to apply their own imagination and knowledge to 
assess the scenarios critically. The synoptic table (in annex) has been designed to facilitate this kind 
of work. While this exercise will challenge that person’s thinking and will undoubtedly contribute to 
enrich it, the individual nature of the exercise makes it difficult to overcome personal biases and 
entrenched opinions. It also requires a willingness to spend enough time studying the scenarios to 
get the most out of them. 
A second way to use the scenarios is to do the same as above, but in a group. Ideally, a small (5-6 
people) and as diverse as possible group of interested people would have to read the scenarios 
critically before meeting to discuss the meaning and possible consequences of the scenarios. Again, 
the synoptic table (in annex) can be helpful to support the analytical discussion. The confrontation 
of diverse perspectives in this case allows for the development of richer and more robust reflections. 
A third way, which is very relevant for policymakers, is to take a policy (or issue, e.g. a ban on 
microtargeting for political advertising), define clearly its objective and success criteria, and assess 
how the criteria would fare in each scenario. This is best done in a group. This is an applied approach 
and works well but tends to look at the situation from the perspective of just one stakeholder. This 
is a form of ex ante impact assessment. 
A fourth way is to explore scenarios using role-playing techniques. This tends to be the richest 
approach in terms of understanding how the scenarios can influence the implementation of a policy 
but it requires a little extra preparation beyond scenario development (which in this case already 
exist; see annex). One tool to help do this efficiently is the Scenario Exploration System (SES),99 a 
platform that engages participants in future-oriented systemic thinking developed by the JRC. The 
SES makes participants take action to reach their long-term objectives in contrasting scenario-
related contexts while interacting with other stakeholders creating a realistic journey towards the 
future to simulate possible responses relevant for the issue of interest to the participants. This 
engagement platform helps people imagine what the scenarios of interest could mean for 
themselves and others and can be used for strategic development as well as anticipatory 
preparedness.  
                                                 
99  https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/foresight/tool/scenario-exploration-system-ses_en 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1946756719890524  
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Future research agenda 
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Chapter 9: Future research agenda 
To enable evidence-based policies that will shape Europe’s future online information space, it is 
imperative that researchers have access to data from social media platforms. Current research relies 
upon data collected either painstakingly under uncontrolled conditions on the existing platforms,100 
or upon highly simplified experimental paradigms in the laboratory or online. None of these options 
are a sustainable solution to satisfy the urgent need to establish a full and transparent 
understanding of online behaviour, the importance of which has been outlined throughout this report. 
Of all current and future human behaviours, political behaviours online are perhaps the most 
important ones for our collective future, but a full scientific understanding of these behaviours has 
been hampered by a mix of platform reticence and lack of regulatory clarity. To support the design 
and test of behavioural measures — they can be boosts, nudges, technocognition tools or any other 
measure — it is crucial to be able to carry out this research autonomously from the decision-making 
of existing platforms.101 To illustrate, there is evidence that attempts to build measures by the 
research community can be thwarted by platforms terminating access to the required data.102 
In response and serving multiple purposes, the EU could create a new online infrastructure for 
collaborative research and knowledge co-production between the public and scientists. The 
infrastructure would be a continuously evolving social-media environment that is designed by the 
public for the public in cooperation with researchers. This endeavour could generate new evidence 
in the service of creating an online space that fosters resilience towards the problems outlined in 
this report as well as anticipating future issues. 
This is important as democracy is not static and should not be considered a system that can be 
perfected and then simply maintained and defended against threats. Democracy has always evolved 
and now needs to evolve further. The proposed infrastructure would enable the behavioural and 
scientific understanding of the “democratization of democracy” [424]. 
Participants would function as “citizen scientists” who — unlike current social media users — are 
fully informed about all aspects of the research, engaging with, employing and evaluating different 
tools on a consenting and consensual basis. Their behavioural data would then be used to identify 
the tool’s efficiency, downsides, target groups and levers for improvement. Importantly, user privacy 
and transparency would be matched to the best legal and ethical standards of data protection, non-
manipulative study design and fair compensation. 
This infrastructure could also be a distributor of tools (like an “app-store” of digital assistants). Such 
a hub would also provide a real-time overview of the behavioural science and the success of 
interventions (akin to current approaches to collect behavioural science knowledge for COVID-19 
responses: e.g. https://www.scibeh.org/), enabling fast responses in times of crises. A “knowledge for 
policy” interface would be developed, allowing big data results to become immediately available to 
policymakers, enabling them to make informed decisions despite the fast pace of change online. 
                                                 
100 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Science_One 
101 https://citizensandtech.org/2020/01/industry-independent-research/ 
102 e.g. https://tracemap.info 
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As a means of illustrating how the platform could be used, researchers and citizens could jointly 
pursue a research agenda dedicated to developing an understanding of the influence of technology 
on democracy. 
An individual’s ability to navigate potential traps in the online world is indispensable in the 21st 
century. Many of the core competences of what constitutes digital literacy have been and will 
increasingly be taught and practiced in schools, universities and institutions of life-long learning. 
Formal education, however, is slow and effortful. By contrast, the online world evolves at lightning 
speed. Consequently, institutionalised education in digital literacy needs to be complemented by 
research that designs, tests and implements behavioural measures (boosting tools) and smart 
online design (technocognition) that address ever-new emerging challenges and just-in-time 
interventions, delivered when users are most motivated to employ them or where platform redesign 
can be most effective. 
To illustrate, “deepfakes” leverage powerful techniques from machine learning and artificial 
intelligence (e.g. [425]) to manipulate or produce fake visual and audio content — e.g. quite literally 
putting words into the mouths of politicians — with a high potential to deceive. Deepfakes are likely 
to dwarf the manipulative potential of fake news. The sudden emergence of such technological 
innovations requires a concerted research strategy with the objectives to anticipate such 
technological developments, analyse the challenges they pose and then to design, test, implement 
and evaluate boosting measures to empower citizens within a cognitively optimised design. 
If the EU were to take leadership in this area, the future research agenda could be designed around 
three key principles: 
 Building resilience through redundancy — users are highly heterogeneous (age, level of formal 
education, language ability, numeracy and risk literacy, level of motivation and self-control) — 
and no one-size-fits all behavioural measures exist. In response, a continuously growing 
toolbox of boosting measures would be developed to “fit” the specific cognitive and 
motivational needs of heterogeneous groups of users rather than those of a generic citizen. 
Redundancy by design means that such boosting interventions would be interlocked with other 
behavioural, techno-cognitive and regulatory measures, so that users’ resilience is 
strengthened and their protection is retained if one of more measures fail. 
 Safeguarding information autonomy — relative to the highly complex information ecology of 
the online world, users’ bounded cognitive resources appear outmatched. Yet, a boundedly 
rational cognitive system [426] need neither be acting irrationally nor inefficiently and decision 
strategies can perform surprisingly well [427, 428]. Boosting measures are designed to respect 
the limits of realistic cognitive systems; in the fast-paced, complex digital environment, users 
will be empowered to take back some control by becoming citizen choice architects in the digital 
world [398]. 
 Competitive and efficiency testing — behavioural measures will be tested in the field with 
other behavioural measures and techno-cognitive interventions to gain a clear understanding 
of relative efficiency, including unanticipated side effects. 
Implementation of these principles would be based upon the extensive theoretical and empirical 
body of research on bounded rationality in the behavioural sciences; analysis of expert decision-
making in online environments; comparative analysis of how the cognitive system responds to 
offline and online technological design; simulations of structural changes to digital choice 
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architectures to identify those that best support users’ cognitive effort; and democratising boosting 
design by crowd-sourcing the creative process. 
This may sound like a lofty vision yet, a powerful — and far more expensive — precedent for such 
a scientific infrastructure exists: CERN. At CERN, scientists work to uncover what the universe is made 
of and how it works. CERN’s Member States are European (with the exception of Israel). Echoing 
CERN’s goal, the mission of the proposed research structure for online behaviour would be to 
uncover the working of the digital universe and to safeguard the foundation of democratic and 
autonomous decision-making. 
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Annex 
The European information space in 2035 
Scenario 1: Struggle for information supremacy 
Scenario 2: Resilient disorder 
Scenario 3: Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4: Harmonic divergence 
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A strategic foresight study of the European information space 
in 2035 
Four scenarios for the European information space in 2035 
This report has presented the available science on the behavioural impact of online technologies on political 
decision-making. While many of the dynamics that have been discussed are generic and will therefore 
remain relevant even in light of future technological advances, the question of how our information 
environment will look in a few years time remains very much open. The extreme speed of development of 
the internet over the last two decades, as well as the acute challenges we currently encounter around issues 
such as disinformation and algorithmic content curation make it difficult to escape our overwhelming focus on 
the present. Given that the speed of innovation is not expected to subside for the foreseeable future, it is 
paramount for society and policymakers to anticipate the possible impacts of these developments on the 
European information space. 
For this reason, the JRC has collaborated with a broad group of stakeholders to engage in a strategic 
foresight exercise to create possible futures for the “European information space”. For the purpose of this 
exercise, the JRC defined this space as: 
“All factors and entities that directly or indirectly contribute to the creation, dissemination and 
processing of information on the individual, group and societal level, including the translation of such 
information into political action.” 
Based on this definition, the stakeholders contributed to the construction of four possible scenarios describing 
what this environment could look like in the future. Balancing the need for imagining a sufficiently long time-
horizon with the high degree of unpredictability of the digital environment, a fifteen-year horizon was chosen 
as an appropriate timeframe. 
While it is impossible to predict the future, strategic foresight and explorative thinking can help us to uncover 
evolving trends and dynamics that may have a significant impact on the world we will eventually inhabit. For 
our digital information environment, such anticipation is all the more crucial, since we currently find 
ourselves at a number of significant crossroads. The way we will address issues such as digital privacy, 
hateful and discriminatory online behaviour, illegal content or online polarisation and radicalisation as a 
society will shape our future online experience and as proven in this report will result in offline consequences. 
With substantial legislation already applying to the online world and several regulatory initiatives currently 
taking shape at the European level, policymakers and legislators more than ever, need to look forward to 
identify how frameworks and policies can be made future-resilient. 
Methodology. To best serve the needs of policymakers while respecting the time and resource constraints 
of this project, the JRC team applied the tried and tested foresight methodology of scenario building. Scenarios 
are stories illustrating possible futures or some aspects of possible futures. They are not predictions. In 
policymaking, scenarios help in policy design and analysis by providing realistic possible sets of future 
conditions. To be effective, scenarios must be: 
 Plausible - they must remain within the realm of what might conceivably happen; 
 Consistent - they should respect a coherent logic and not contain any inconsistency that would 
undermine their credibility; and 
 Meaningfully insightful 
Importantly, the coherence within scenarios does not mean that the developments described in them are 
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mutually exclusive, nor are they weighted in terms of being more or less probable. In reality, individual trends 
from each of the scenarios might materialise in one or other form and the future will likely resemble a mixture 
of all four, rather than a “pure” representation of only one of four scenarios. Ultimately, scenarios should be 
useful. 
A key strength of foresight scenarios is that they are qualitative. This gives them a potential richness of 
coverage that is not bound by the limitations of quantitative methods. They can easily explore relationships 
and trends for which either little or no numerical data are available or important dimensions that are 
impossible to quantify such as values, emotions, shocks and discontinuities, motivations or behaviours. 
Scenario building also generates knowledge that can be applied in the formal decision-making process, helping 
policymakers to anticipate the context in which they have to act. They can also stimulate creativity and detach 
decision-makers from the priority mostly given to present and short- term problems. As such, scenario building 
can be a crucial method to foster longer-term leadership. 
However, for scenarios to be used effectively, the participants in scenario building must be convinced of the 
soundness, relevance and value of the process. This is essential, as the foundations, on which scenarios are 
built, the structures that they use and the reasoning they employ, must stand up to critical examination. Only 
then is there a chance that they will contribute to decisions and actions. This is why extreme care must be 
taken in the setup of the group of participants in any good scenario-building workshop. The participants must 
cover a range of diverse relevant backgrounds, each able to provide useful insights for the topic of interest in 
the scenario-building process. They must also be able to bring both an inside and an outside view of the topic 
or system at stake. Direct participation of relevant decision-makers is also essential as it implies that they 
truly understand and co-own both process and the resulting scenarios, making it more likely that the insights 
generated by the scenarios will be used in their decision-making. 
In the present case, despite the fact that the scenario building workshop took place in early March 2020, at 
the start of the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the participants associated with this foresight 
exercise represented the following stakeholders: digital technologies industry, non-profit organisations in the 
domain of digital rights, anti-disinformation organisations, think tanks, media and communications specialists, 
academics as well as EU policymakers (DG CNECT, DG COMM, DG HOME and DG JUST). We extend our grateful 
thanks to everyone who so actively contributed. 
What we actually did in practice? The scenario-building process for the European information space was 
carried out in an intense 1-day participatory workshop. 
As most participants in the study did not know each other, a first session focussed on getting to know each 
other and creating a cohesive group. The participants were then presented with the JRC definition of the 
European information space and had some time to ask questions and become familiar with the concept. After 
that, participants were split into groups and asked to identify all the drivers of change that would affect the 
European information space over the next 15 years that they could think of. 
The JRC team used the STEEP (Society, Technology, Environment, Economy, Policy) framework to help the 
participants in this exercise. All the identified drivers of change were then collected, discussed, clarified and posted 
in full view of everyone. The participants were then asked to look at the complete list and voted on which drivers of change 
would have the most influence on the future evolution of the European information space. 
This yielded 11 drivers of change that received two votes or more. Participants were then asked to look at 
these drivers and to vote again, this time to identify those for which there was the most uncertainty regarding 
the way they would evolve in the future. 
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Figure 6 - Identified drivers of change. 
This process delivered a clear answer to which two drivers of change the group considered most important to 
drive the European information space towards the future while remaining the most uncertain regarding their 
future evolution: conflicts/cyber-attacks and changing economic paradigm. These two so-called "key 
uncertainties" were used as axes to build the logical space within which the scenarios were created. 
Figure 7 - Scenario logic. 
In the afternoon, following clarifications about the axes and the scenario quadrants, the participants were 
split into four groups and engaged in a World Café‚ process to start developing the substance of the scenarios. 
The result of this work follows. 
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Scenario 1: Struggle for information supremacy 
The “Struggle for information supremacy” scenario assumes that the future European information space will 
be marked by high degrees of conflict and economic concentration. 
Regulatory environment. Following intense economic protectionism and regulatory divergence, the internet 
has become geographically fragmented, with each region or state either having created their own digital- 
architecture champion or keeping a tight regulatory grip on a national sub-section of an international giant. 
Big companies with lots of technical capacity and oligopolistic market power are dominating all layers of the 
information architecture, ranging from the provision of broadband to the algorithmic curation and creation of 
content on social-media platforms. Information has become a deeply weaponised means of control, with 
national governments, political movements, businesses and foreign actors all struggling to steer the narrative 
on their own terms. A mostly disengaged public is circumventing the predatory nature of the European 
information space by focussing on apolitical, entertainment-oriented means of socialising online, losing touch 
with many social injustices in the process. The EU is struggling to keep at least some degree of coherence in 
the European information space, as Member States have introduced a patchwork of national legal frameworks. 
Societal impact. Society is marked by deep distrust of what is seen in the information space. Public 
broadcasters, publicly subsidised media and a small number of partisan outlets are seen as the only 
somewhat reliable sources of information, while citizens greatly distrust “outsider” information from unknown 
sources. This has led to the emergence of a number of strongly exclusionary digital services that provide 
sharing and discussion spaces for small numbers of users with cryptographically verified profiles. Since these 
are however relying mostly on paid subscription plans, most citizens still use bigger, less protected platforms. 
Due to the intentional lack of protection from corporate predatory practices, only individuals who are either 
highly tech-savvy or are closely connected to the corporate/public/security nexus have access to privacy and 
anonymity supporting technologies. The intensity of the political and commercial competition online leads to 
a disillusioning effect in large parts of the population where there is a clear trend of using technology primarily 
in an escapist way: in a society where reporting on the “real” world is not to be trusted, citizens have largely 
withdrawn from the political sphere and socialise in game-like virtual spaces. This trend is facilitated by a 
wide uptake of virtual and augmented reality tools, allowing for immersive experiences with a close circle of 
peers. 
Political impact. Despite these tendencies towards apathy, the conflictual, polarised nature of the 
information space also results in a rise of ambient nationalism in the parts of the population who still partly 
trust state-sponsored information online. In Europe, this trend is particularly strong in countries where 
societies are traditionally more homogenic and closed or where populist governments have managed to 
cement their power through increased control of the media and judiciary. Governments respond to the danger 
of losing legitimacy vis-à-vis a disengaged public by introducing public deliberation platforms. However, these 
services often suffer from a lack of sophistication, as their primary development focus in a disinformation-
rich environment is to detect and remove malicious meddling activities. Strict authentication conditions that 
frequently involve the processing of biometric data create a severe access barrier that only few citizens are 
willing to cross. Big social media platforms are filling this void by implementing their own polling and 
deliberation features that see higher participation rates due to their embeddedness, resulting in one of the 
most important means of accessing information from citizens. Although not representative and used only by 
some sections of society, the introduction of these polling features gives digital corporations large agenda-
setting power that increases their capacity to influence the political process disproportionately. In opposition 
to such superficial and manipulative means of organising societal discussion, some groups still use 
information technology in an emancipatory way to challenge the status quo, using highly protected alternative 
deliberation platforms aiming at fair and transparent consensus building. Counter-culture movements also 
try, with varying degrees of success, to sneak political protest and debate into the virtual socialising and 
gaming worlds of their apolitical peers. However, activist and partisan groups ultimately fail to mobilise bigger 
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groups of people for societal causes. Encouraged by floods of inflammatory content, some radical splinter 
groups of both political and religious nature have fostered isolationist online communities that give rise to a 
surge in “stochastic terrorism”, meaning lone wolf violent attacks based on an ideology that largely functions 
without clear leaders and organisational structures. 
With regard to political advertising, the large-scale harvesting of citizens’ data from their connected devices 
has led to widespread hyperpolarised advertising based on psychological traits. Both the creation and 
dissemination of content have become increasingly automated: communication experts feed base parameters 
of a political narrative or commercial campaign into an automated system that translates the input into blog 
articles, entertainment videos or political campaign pieces. In the most extreme cases, the output content is 
additionally fine-tuned to the user that accesses the content. As only a limited number of proficient users has 
the desire to anonymise their activities on the web, filtering and targeting technologies determine the majority 
of content that is seen by most individuals in society. Technological and societal trends such as personalisation 
and inward-looking retreat are also reflected in the growing importance of virtual assistants. These 
automated, extremely personalised systems are an integral part of life of most citizens, organising and 
displaying most of their news content, entertainment and personal organisation alike. Since only the biggest 
digital corporations develop and deploy such systems, the market choice is limited and the companies 
therefore hold a great degree of power over one of the most important means of information access. 
Although it is illegal in most jurisdictions to deploy “automated personas” that cloak themselves as humans, 
such chatbots are active in vast numbers on all digital platforms with discursive or economic relevance. 
Extensively trained on vast datasets of human behaviour and drawing on automated text- and audio-visual 
creation algorithms, the software can simultaneously manage thousands of accounts that each have a 
coherent, life-like persona. Despite pouring great amounts of resources into their detection and removal 
capacities, digital giants mostly fail to curb this activity; only some citizens still use internet platforms as 
forums of discussion, while the vast majority is retreating. The highly negative reputation of automated 
personas has also stalled any effort by legitimate political candidates and parties to deploy chatbot versions 
of themselves to give voters an opportunity to interact more deeply with their political ideas. 
Technological impact. Because governments favour protectionism and autarchy, there is very little product 
and software compatibility between the services of different digital giants and there is no interoperability 
between different social media services. The internet has experienced a fragmentation of international 
conversation as users are clustered along with their geographical location across a variety of regional and 
national social media. Identity verification technologies have become crucial for maintaining at least some 
basic level of trustworthiness on deliberative and social media services, but they frequently come at the cost 
of encroaching on user privacy. Relying frequently on biometric data and facial recognition, both governmental 
and corporate digital identities are based on central data storage rather than decentralised authentication 
solutions. 
Economic impact. Large, powerful companies heavily dominate the economy of the European information 
space. As the legal framework regulating issues such as illegal content has become increasingly difficult for 
international platforms to adhere to, some European alternatives have emerged and, in some cases, have 
become dominant in the European market. In the cases where large international providers remained 
dominant for a given service, the divergent legal frameworks across the globe result in starkly different user 
experiences depending on where the service is accessed. While the harnessing of vast amounts of citizens’ 
data does result in a continuous development and improvement of the various national and regional digital 
services, the lack of direct competition results in a general lack of disruptive innovation. Where innovation 
does happen, it is mostly focussed on deterrence and defence against disinformation and cyberattacks. This 
is not least because of a mutually beneficial interconnectedness between on the one hand the digital 
champions and governments that builds on lax legal frameworks and on the other hand cooperation of the 
private sector for state surveillance and censorship purposes. Another consequence of this closed economy 
 
 
P
a
g
e 
1
1
9
 
with a highly weaponised information space, is the development of a vibrant cryptocurrency market, 
developed to avoid tax regimes and create subliminal subsidy mechanisms. 
Despite the heavy dominance of the bigger commercial platforms, there are still some isolated instances of 
alternative services: relying on alternative, highly securitised and cryptographically protected platforms, some 
dedicated deliberation services serve as important discussion venues for the politically engaged. As a result 
of economic concentration and the state’s defence orientation, media plurality has decreased, with a number 
of big publishers owning most of the European media landscape. Small and medium sized news organisations, 
as well as private blogs and commentary are struggling in the face of strict online distribution regimes: it is 
still possible to host one’s created (lawful) content on a website, but the possibility to disseminate it via open 
standards or to share its URL freely on social media has become subject to tight regulation. In accordance 
with the respective national or regional sets of rules, the access to recommender systems such as newsfeeds 
on digital platforms depends on a mixture of automated indicators and evaluations of nationally authorised 
fact-checkers that favours strongly the actors with greater resources. With regards to news content, media 
organisations struggle with the high levels of forgery and disinformation and therefore focus mainly on 
promoting as much as possible a shared understanding of reality. In many cases, this comes at the expense 
of deeper coverage and investigative journalism. Because geographical location is seen as one of the primary 
indicators of trustworthiness for a news organisation in a given territory, the rise of high-quality automated 
translation only had a marginal impact on the European and international media and even large publishers 
are drawing their audiences almost exclusively from the national level. 
The role of the European Union. Policy, both at the European and national levels, is heavily focussed on 
security and economic protectionism. State entities further their security agenda through close ties with large 
companies and are thus unwilling and unable to limit corporate surveillance and enforce strong human rights 
compliance regulation for emerging technologies. National militaries and secret services have become an 
integral actor in the information space, working both towards neutralising foreign influence operations and 
conducting their own psychological warfare operations. The efforts towards increasing digital and media 
literacy are stalled in order to make citizens more susceptible to the authorities’ own narratives. Data that is 
generated or collected by authorities is rarely made available in a non-discriminatory way and is instead 
passed only to a few select companies that align closely with the state. In turn, these commercial actors gain 
even more semi-autonomous power, resulting in lower quality software products. 
The role of the European Union in shaping policies regarding the creation, dissemination and processing of 
information is severely limited as Member States have increasingly resorted to national measures to protect 
and control their respective information spaces. As a consequence, cyber-espionage exists across some 
Member State borders, undermining trust in further integration of the European project. Where common rules 
are agreed, they are only accepted if they include far-reaching implementation discretion. Such fragmentation 
is also visible in regulatory authorities: most Member States maintain one or more public entities to enforce 
obligations such as algorithm audits on digital services, but their orientation, legal bases and degree of 
investigative capacity vary widely. Coordination at EU level is thus reduced to the smallest common 
denominator. The EU is trying hard to counter external disinformation but due to fragmented national 
initiatives and low degrees of trust, these efforts are frequently undermined from within. 
The balkanised, non-centralised structure of the information space leads to a multitude of localised data 
centres and server centres, which due to economies of scale harnessed by the big corporations have moderate 
degrees of energy efficiency. The environment is, due to visible effects of degradation, a topic that media and 
political communication frequently covers, but information battles usually substitute serious discourse and 
policy action. 
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Scenario 2: Resilient disorder 
In the “Resilient disorder” scenario, the EU has fostered a competitive, dynamic and decentralised information 
space with strong international interdependence, but is facing continuous threats from sophisticated 
disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. 
Regulatory environment. Private companies and civil society initiatives increasingly lead the response to 
uncertainties, as the degree of regulatory intervention has decreased. While hyper-partisan groups frequently 
undermine the consensus that polarisation and disinformation are problems that should be tackled by 
everyone, a general level of resilience towards the adversities of the online information environment has 
emerged. 
Societal impact. With an increased focus on individualism, societies in Europe have become fragmented 
among various political and economic cleavages, which public policy generally does little to address. As a 
result of the high degrees of conflictual information, online tribalism has increased and is often visible in the 
clustering of communities along services whose content moderation and blocking policies members agree with 
the most. 
Such grouping leads to somewhat heavier societal polarisation as echo-chamber effects between the 
different social media providers increase. As a result, these tribal means of accessing information also 
increase the general level of trust in the accuracy of online content that users receive through such channels 
as it conforms with their ontology of truth. Most services have developed robust moderation policies. This 
increases trust but does not generally reduce susceptibility to disinformation, although such tendencies are 
observable in some hyper-partisan communities. As tribal communities between or within different providers 
can still federate and access each other’s content, politically engaged citizens and movements frequently 
compete to dominate the societal discussion. This can lead to emotional sensationalism and competition for 
the best argument. 
Political impact. Despite many citizens actively participating in such online discussions, the building of 
bottom-up resilience capacity to disinformation has by far not rendered everyone politically active: many 
users opt instead to see as little political content as possible and focus on apolitical socialising and 
interactions. This move away from social media as a venue of political discourse is also facilitated by the 
introduction of both national and pan-European political deliberation platforms. Because these public services 
offer central means of societal discussions, large parts of society are beginning to expect their political peers 
to settle their differences there. However, the outcome of consensus-driven deliberative platforms is not 
unequivocally trusted: despite strict cybersecurity and strong user authentication, incidents of on-platform 
discussions that were significantly skewed by domestic and foreign intervention have occurred several times 
and both the open-source community and private contractors have yet to find a way to effectively shield their 
deliberation projects. Another means of maintaining a shared understanding of reality are collaborative 
projects to counter disinformation: along with the greater diversity of services and their interoperable APIs 
(Application Programming Interface), a number of professional as well as non-profit services are able to be 
active across a multitude of platforms to provide fact-checking or moderation services. While these do not 
fully offset the tribal nature of the served communities, their collective intelligence approach to mitigate 
disinformation has gained them trust and respect across most of society. This has a negative effect upon the 
creation of EU-wide collective narratives. As information becomes increasingly individualised, Member States 
offer different national narratives. Consequently, fact-checkers that correct an inclusive narrative, may be 
perceived as foreign intruders by some countries while others, whose own narratives are more closely aligned 
with the EU, would welcome such efforts. This would likely lead to increased political polarisation with inclusive 
EU rebuttals being met with anti-EU rhetoric campaigns. 
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Technological impact. Due to the enforcement of open standards and profile portability, digital services in 
the European information space have become increasingly decentralised. As competition on quality features 
such as privacy protection, communication features or content moderation standards is high, the pace of 
innovation is moderately fast and leads to continuous industry-wide development. Being confronted with a 
multitude of partisan, state-led and corporate disinformation operations, innovation is however commonly 
pivoting mostly towards improving security and trustworthiness. Common points of improvement include 
account verification or the accurate detection of forged content. 
Providers of social media services however frequently diverge on their approach to curation and targeting 
technologies. While some open source platforms and social enterprises have built platforms that combine 
community maintenance with technological approaches to actively mitigate issues such as information 
overload or radicalisation, other niche providers have conversely pivoted towards the opposite: they want to 
keep their members perpetually outraged and politically engaged. In this process, the value orientation of the 
service chosen by a user gradually undermines cross-societal political ideologies. While this value orientation 
is in some instances closely aligned with universal human rights, other services— including most of the bigger 
ones—invoke and respect such norms only insofar as they serve their commercial interests. In addition, bigger 
platforms in the market can, despite official commitments to data protection, still leverage significant data 
harvesting from the activity and inferences on their user bases, marketing the use of behavioural targeting 
as a trade-off for increased security. There is also a high degree of topical divergence of platforms. While 
there is a multitude of services available for different purposes (e.g. for maintaining business contacts or 
exchanging ideas on niche hobbies), users generally lock the content they post on such dedicated platforms 
from being displayed on services serving another context. 
Authenticated digital identities supported by decentralised technology (such as distributed ledgers) are a key 
feature for maintaining trust in the online environment. Anonymous and pseudonymous platforms and fora 
still exist but are, due to the insecurity induced by psychological warfare operations, usually only used by 
tight-knit communities that seek isolation. As most services therefore rely on granting access only to 
authenticated personas, the data attached to these profiles is extremely comprehensive and personal. In turn, 
the cybersecurity of these profiles is of paramount importance. There is a booming market for software that 
manages data access in accordance with citizens’ preferences. Such access management is also common 
practice when it comes to systems facilitating and organising information for users, for instance virtual 
assistants. While in many of these services the data of authenticated profiles does not leave its storage and 
processing is happening on-device, some of the bigger commercial offers still seize the opportunity to gather 
troves of personal data from the use of their assistants. 
Decentralised technology is also commonly used to provide transparency about the origin of a piece of content 
but given the flood of information available and the common re-mixture of cultural production, the impact on 
trustworthiness remains limited. Endeavours to solve the challenge of disinformation technically also run into 
an impasse because of an ongoing arms race with technology designed to create and disseminate 
disinformation. The proliferation of deepfake audio-visual content, automatically generated false news 
articles and sophisticated campaigns involving automated accounts is only slightly mitigated by initiatives 
such as industry-standards on timestamping and digital watermarking of original digital material. 
Highly sophisticated automated personas are active across all instances of digital media. While governments 
had some initial success at curbing their spread by enforcing legislation requiring stricter authentication 
policies throughout the market, the growing sophistication of malicious chatbot systems ultimately rendered 
none of the federated social networks fully secure. Social media services of all sizes collaborate with 
volunteers in the open source community to develop common high standards of detection and removal 
systems. However, the arms race is overall still weighing in favour of foreign governments, domestic actors 
and, in some cases, private corporations who are deploying their inauthentic armies for political or economic 
gain. Debates in online spaces that rely on unauthenticated profiles thus become increasingly disfavoured by 
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the public, who either move towards services that rely fully on governmental electronic authentication or cease 
to use social media for interactions with anyone other than their closest relatives and peers. 
Economic impact. In principle, the introduction of profile portability and interoperability standards has made 
the economy of the European information space more competitive. Political advertising, as a consequence 
would take place on digital platforms via an interoperable, open standard (i.e. the same ad appearing on 
Facebook, Twitter and others), with options for microtargeting being limited by the amount of data that users 
allow to be accessed for advertising purposes (most platforms having quite granular controls). Microtargeting 
would still frequently happen on the bigger, “free” platforms. Nevertheless, such ads would be blocked by 
default by some providers who see it as a competitive advantage for their users not to receive political 
advertising. It follows that weakly enforced regulation based upon payment transparency of the ads is 
frequently overstepped by disinformation actors. Although the technical standard for political ads would be 
the same globally, national and regional laws would impose obligations on service providers to block or flag 
certain types of political advertising 
However, the conflictual nature of the information environment has, despite the widespread availability of 
alternatives, led to a situation where most users rely on the services of a few select companies that are seen 
as the most protective and technologically advanced. Although far less monopolistic than in previous times, 
bigger digital platforms and services still scoop up the most significant share of revenue — not least because 
their advertising-based model grants free access to the service — whereas more secure alternative providers 
mostly function based on a subscription model. Competition is also skewed by an increasing reliance on public-
private partnerships, initiated by public authorities in the hope that government sponsored authentication and 
filtering technologies will boost their societies’ digital resilience. 
When it comes to news media, the market features some remaining big, widely respected publishers and a 
growing multitude of small media, hyper-partisan outlets and blogs. Given the high level of disinformation 
and the diversification of news sources along granular political axes, maintaining a shared understanding of 
truth remains a fundamental challenge for the media landscape. Since the EU’s open internet and economy 
model does not discriminate against external media, the media diet of European citizens has internationalised 
to a certain degree thanks to enhanced automated translation. This gives many users unprecedented access 
to content that was not created in their mother tongue. On the upside, this facilitates a better understanding 
of global events but on the downside also makes state-led disinformation campaigns of foreign actors much 
easier. Finally, the economy of the European information space frequently faces dangers to the integrity of its 
supply chains: geopolitical tensions around the attribution of influence campaigns sometimes escalate into 
foreign actors shutting off the supply of critical raw materials for hardware production or threatening to seize 
servers of companies that store the data of many Europeans. This has led to the creation of digital embassies 
at the national level, while the EU has put in place backup infrastructure for the entire European information 
space. 
The role of the European Union. Despite facing significant degrees of internal and geopolitical 
manipulation attempts, the EU’s commitment to a free and open internet is widely acknowledged but there 
are also frequent calls from citizens and Member States for tougher regulatory action on online content. EU 
policy has, however, focussed on providing higher degrees of transparency and data protection, for instance 
by requiring algorithm audits by competent regulatory authorities. While relying mainly on the private and civil 
society sector to decide how to address disinformation (e.g. by technological means or collective intelligence), 
the EU also concentrates on identifying and sanctioning malicious actors through enhanced attribution and 
imposition of sanctions regarding cyberattacks and influence operations. The Member States mostly follow 
this line but some countries have nevertheless introduced stricter liability and safety rules in their jurisdiction. 
In turn, market access in these territories is unviable for many smaller providers and the digital single market is 
therefore partly distorted. Such incoherence in turn undermines the capacity for coordination among the 
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various national regulators at European level, making regulatory compliance with European standards depend 
largely on a company’s legal residence. 
The open economy of the European information space allows economies of scale for the storage of data, 
curbing energy costs. Despite climate change unfolding with tangible consequences, it remains a contentious 
issue that is still frequently subject to massive dis- and misinformation. However, many civil society led 
initiatives frequently collaborate on debunking and education campaigns and some of the more progressive 
providers of social media services have introduced strict filtering or rigorous community-led moderation to 
keep misinformation in check.  
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Scenario 3: Global cutting edge 
The “Global cutting edge” scenario foresees a world in which societal and geopolitical conflict have been 
reduced significantly, while high degrees of competition and innovation have led to the emergence of a 
dynamic, global information space. 
Regulatory environment. Through strong anti-trust and interoperability frameworks, the EU has 
significantly contributed to the diversification of the online information economy and has cemented its role 
as an international innovator of technological and privacy standards. In an environment of intense economic, 
technological and collaborative dynamism, citizens and companies leverage the true potential of collective 
intelligence. However, issues such as tribalism, productivity-centred culture and a retreat from the ideal of 
collective goods can also make this environment mentally challenging for many European citizens. 
Societal impact. A broadly peaceful world and a general spirit of collaboration and openness have fostered 
a climate of trust in networked societies. Information found online is mostly accurate and reliable and is 
provided by a vibrant mix of public broadcasters, small and large independent media and collective 
intelligence networks. Private individuals also frequently engage in the sharing and discussion of information 
in a generally collaborative manner. Enabled by auto-translation, in a low conflictual world, participation in 
political discussions is far-reaching, as governments have embraced deliberative online platforms both at the 
national and supranational levels that allow for nuanced, large-scale debate in a non-polarised manner. While 
political content is still widely shared on other social media, societal polarisation has decreased because of 
these participatory policy dialogues. Interoperable services with diverging curation policies have contributed 
to a situation where users have a wide degree of control over what they see online, which on the one hand 
reduces polarisation, but on the other hand also limits wider discussions on societal values as communities 
largely resort to their own moral standards. Groupthink is also a widespread phenomenon in some user clusters 
which, in cases where it remains unaddressed, results in less valuable output. 
Political impact. Supported by decentralised technology, authenticated profiles that uniquely identify 
citizens are widely available, either for online participation in political matters or trust-based civil or economic 
cooperation. Since popular contributions tied to one’s verified persona have become an important source of 
societal status, many citizens actively try to be as productive and popular as possible—sometimes with the 
adverse effect that less motivated community members are looked down upon. However, anonymous profiles 
or profiles that are untied to an authenticator remain the norm for most services and most citizens actively 
keep both systems separate thanks to high levels of digital literacy. Authenticated personas also support a 
thriving deliberative platforms scene, including both private or non-profit services that cater to the needs of 
specific communities and public websites that facilitate larger societal discussions. These (mostly open 
source) services can federate with other digital infrastructures and are thus frequently embedded into social 
media newsfeeds and digital newspapers. 
Participation is broad and the bridging of otherwise less connected communities significantly increases the 
quality of the discourse. Benefitting from a dynamic information economy with low degrees of tax avoidance, 
inequalities in society are mitigated by redistributive social policies. There are escapist tendencies in some 
parts of society that engage with political content only as far as necessary and otherwise use the information 
space to socialise and share non-political experiences such as games. For many citizens, adhering to this trend 
is actually a method of coping: because of society’s emphasis on productivity, dynamism and collaboration, 
those unable or unwilling to submit to this paradigm often feel excluded and less valued, leading to a small but 
significant spike in mental health problems. 
One way of organising the abundance of information and the coordination of large networks of collaborating 
workers and volunteers is through dedicated automated systems. Such software can include summary and text 
mining algorithms or highly developed artificial moderator personas. The latter are complex models trained to 
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display human traits such as compassion, authority and empathy in order to fulfil their task of coordinating 
both small and vast numbers of people in their common work. Automated moderators are almost always 
clearly labelled due to legal requirements and are often open sourced. Despite these transparency measures 
and the significant efficiency gains, many citizens struggle to adjust to the reality of automated systems 
directing much of their work. Consequently, issues of emotional well-being and human autonomy are gaining 
increasing traction in societal debates. Additionally, “bot wars” are becoming more common, referring to a 
situation where users deploy adversarial automated systems to sway moderators into their direction. In some 
cases political entities and activist movements also use digital automated personas as official representations 
of themselves. At the disposal of citizens, these unregulated systems can increase depth of thought 
interaction with political material but are seen as manipulative by some observers and questions over their 
legitimacy slowly arise. 
Technological impact. Technology has become increasingly focussed on sharing and collaboration: crowd 
funding, participatory networks and validation technologies contribute to the information space’s trust and 
openness. Decentralisation has become a guiding technological principle: from protocol interoperability of 
digital services to mesh networks and secure multi-party computing, data storage and processing in a central 
manner has mostly become outdated. Digital services have developed highly granular choice interfaces that 
allow users to choose their desired level of personalisation, both with regard to advertising and to the curation 
of content in newsfeeds and similar products. To help citizens cope with information overload, curation remains 
key. Apart from the recommender systems of social and collaborative platforms, the packaging and presentation 
of information is frequently managed by personalised virtual assistants. Since these systems only access, not 
copy, personal data from a given source and process the information fully on-device, privacy is mostly 
preserved. Thanks to the availability of open source products, citizens also have transparent insight into such 
crucial software. Generally, the legal and technological shift towards privacy protection has made unwarranted 
data collection difficult. As a result, the dominance of online behavioural advertising has decreased and 
contextual advertising is flourishing on media websites, supported by sophisticated automated systems that 
match content with advertisement. 
Nevertheless, there is also a market for secretive tracking technology that links users’ (anonymous) profiles 
to their real life, verified identity e.g. anonymous activity in a political forum can be linked to verified identity. 
These tools are used by both economic and political actors to improve their campaign narratives and targeting 
but an ongoing arms race with mostly privacy-oriented social services renders this a difficult and expensive 
undertaking. New means of accessing the information space, such as virtual and augmented reality (VR and 
AR), have spread far and wide and offer new means of entertainment and collaboration. While social, non-
political games have proliferated and are used by large parts of society, VR and AR have also contributed to 
emancipatory and participatory usage. These can for instance include attending a realistic, online campaign 
rally or “in-person” coordination of activist activities. 
There are a number of indirect effects on the environment and climate crisis. Firstly, the collaborative and 
non-conflictual manner of the global information space leads to faster development and spread of promising 
adaptation technologies. While the energy demands of a digitised society are high and threaten to leave a 
large carbon footprint, economies of scale that are harnessed by globally operating computing and cloud 
services have a mitigating effect. 
Economic impact. Economically, the global information space is a dynamic mix of many competing digital 
services. Strong interoperability requirements have led to a diversification of platforms, giving citizens the 
choice among a large range of providers whose products compete on issues such as privacy protection, quality 
of service, design, curation, etc. This competition results in fast-paced innovation, as best practices are 
frequently adopted by other market players and disruptive improvements are key to retain users in the long 
term. Business models of digital services vary but rely mostly on contextual advertising, subscriptions, micro-
payments or donations. In contrast, behavioural microtargeting has largely disappeared as a result of the 
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continuous development of encryption standards co-developed by the private and civil society sectors, as well 
as hyper-granular consent and privacy options applied by most digital services. 
The emergent, collaborative platform economy provides for a wide range of jobs and roles, making the 
distinction between remunerated labour and voluntary work increasingly fluid. The news media industry has 
experienced an impressive revival but looks very different when compared to earlier days of the internet. 
While a few — mostly high quality — trans-regional, big newspapers are still going strong, the prevalence of 
online group spheres and increasing professionalism outside of traditional media has also fostered a 
proliferation of small news sites, professional blogs and citizen journalism that steadily increase their share 
of revenue and influence. Due to the effect of automated translation, the vast majority of web and news 
content has become available in a multitude of languages. Initially, this resulted in a direct competition of 
many previously national media on the global scene, which in some cases led to the disappearance of these 
outlets. In the meantime, however, this loss of bigger, multi-issue news organisations has been compensated 
by a vast increase in highly specialised, small scale media that cover almost every aspect of human existence, 
regardless of whether the global audience interested in such content consists of 500 or five million persons. 
Regardless of size and market power, all outlets for the journalistic profession have benefitted from the 
impact of more privacy protected digital services as the decrease of on-platform behavioural advertising led to 
a revaluation of advertising on quality media. 
The role of the European Union. Policy is focussed on enforcement of data protection, competition and 
interoperability legislation, leaving most issues in the information space to be solved by private and civil 
society innovation. Independent regulators with strong monitoring powers play a key role in this regard, also 
auditing algorithmic systems for compliance with legal frameworks such as labour or anti-discrimination law. 
Such enforcement is tightly coordinated at the European level to prevent a fragmentation of the digital single 
market, however the participation in global fora is also gaining increasing importance due to growing 
recognition that international coordination is crucial in a borderless information space. Intellectual property 
legislation has developed advanced “fair use” clauses to facilitate sharing and open access and a proliferation 
of open licenses has contributed to a general drop in piracy.  
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Scenario 4: Harmonic divergence 
The “Harmonic divergence” scenario assumes a world in which strong regulatory differences and economic 
protectionism between national and regional actors have resulted in a fractured global information space. 
Regulatory environment. The general low level of international and societal conflict has prevented a 
crowded and predatory information environment for citizens. The EU has steadily expanded its role in setting 
— sometimes lauded, sometimes criticised — regional standards for digital services, ranging from data 
protection to illegal content. Emphasising the need for the online environment to conform with European 
values, this trajectory is in line with a general focus on common policies. Following a slow but steady long-
term pace of innovation and policymaking, the stability of the European information space relies on the 
favourable conditions of reduced polarisation and foreign interference. This breeds vulnerability should such 
conflicts re-emerge. 
Societal impact. Society in the European information space has become more inward looking. Facilitated by 
an ongoing policy focus on shared values, redistributive policies and social equality, the “European model” 
actively participates in international cooperation while simultaneously promoting and protecting its own values 
and standards. There is a tendency towards more regionalised content, based on a reliance on big platforms 
that are either based directly in Europe or that have implemented heavily localised versions of their services. 
Trust in information found online is generally high but the awareness of filtering technologies and 
geographically dispersed services gives some citizens an increasing feeling of not getting the full picture. While 
many subscribe to digital services that are dominant in other parts of the world to get additional information 
from foreign sources — in some cases even via virtual private networks (VPNs) — most people rely primarily 
on the dominant European and national digital platforms. Due to the low level of societal conflict and 
egalitarian policies, politics does not dominate most citizens’ online experiences. The main uses of both 
traditional hardware as well as new means of access such as virtual reality remain mostly apolitical. However, 
both national governments and the EU have had some success in engaging citizens via dedicated deliberative 
polling websites. Although often contracted out to external providers who only give low degrees of 
transparency into the workings of moderation and information processing, these services mostly manage to 
secure the trust of those citizens passionate enough to use them. Through negotiations with bigger social 
media platforms to make them embed polling links into their digital architectures, public authorities manage 
to gradually increase participation of citizens. This however comes at the cost of further cementing the 
position of these platforms in the market. In addition to governmental deliberative websites, some platforms 
administered by civil society and non-profit enterprises also exist but are rarely used by most internet users. 
When it comes to the sharing of information and collaboration in collective intelligence processes, citizens 
and businesses benefit and actively make use of the European information space’s internal coherence. This 
for instance includes the consolidation of intellectual property regimes to public oversight over platform 
algorithms. However, the leveraging power of big digital players persists and the diverging trajectory of the 
EU’s digital economy makes cooperation with the rest of the world more difficult. As a result, the dynamism 
of collective intelligence is not as high as it could be and the EU stands at the verge of losing out vis-à-vis 
economies that took a more open path to innovation. 
Political impact. In the absence of geopolitical and domestic conflict, malicious bot-networks and automated 
personas do not hold a large presence in the European information space. Far-reaching EU legislation on 
labelling and operating apply to automated persona systems coordinating or otherwise affecting the work, 
social lives and political decisions of citizens. While these standards do increase the trust placed in software 
agents increasingly contributing to economic sectors, the lack of transparency in their inner workings (e.g. 
because it is proprietary software) frequently raises legitimate fears of dark patterns and threats to human 
autonomy. Politicians, political parties and international organisations have developed automated personas in 
order to give citizens the opportunity for a “personal” interaction. Although for many citizens this has sparked 
greater attachment to politics, the deployment of such placeholder chatbots — in particular those of the most 
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publicly known actors — is also confronted with increasingly difficult challenges like cybersecurity and 
reputation management. 
Technological impact. As larger platforms dominate the market and continue to benefit from significant 
network effects, innovation in digital services is steady but rarely makes big leaps. Technologies related to 
the creation and dissemination of content are constrained by strict sets of rules. For instance, the algorithmic 
curation of content needs to balance the blocking of illegal content with carrying obligations for political 
speech. Where automated systems for content creation, alteration and dissemination are deployed, 
transparent labelling obligations apply. While this approach has facilitated the emergence of a more protected 
European information space, the insurmountable imperfections in filtering technologies and their underlying 
legally mandated moderation policies are frequently subject of heated debates on the rights to freedom of 
expression and access to information. Trust in this model of internet governance has also declined in light of 
some documented abuse cases in which the implementation of the curation guidelines led in some Member 
States to discrimination against opposition candidates and social movements. 
Tracking and corporate surveillance have intensified and product advertisements are heavily personalised. 
Political advertising is also making use of such targeting options. However, due to EU internal legislation on 
transparency requirements and data protection, such targeting is generally not very sophisticated. 
Authentication technologies such as cryptographically verified identities have proliferated and are mainly 
issued by national governments. While the tying of inferences from user behaviour on a given service to such 
an identity is in principle subject to strict consent obligations, big digital corporations are partially successful 
in circumventing legal constraints due to loopholes and a general lack of competition. The cybersecurity of 
most online services is however strong,and therefore authenticated identities are rarely used to gain service 
access. 
Economic impact. There is far-reaching economic concentration in the digital single market, with a select few 
platforms reaping the main economic benefits from providing means of information creation and 
dissemination. Strict regulatory frameworks on data protection, local storage, content moderation and illegal 
content have contributed to a partial withdrawal of international platforms from the European information 
space, giving initially innovative European services an edge that resulted in a limited number of European 
digital giants. Without profile portability or interoperability requirements, big players can benefit from strong 
networks, making it hard for smaller competitors to enter and stay in the market. The lack of direct 
competition results in low innovation with most information services focussing their development on 
incremental improvements. As start-ups and smaller services get acquired quickly at international and 
European level, the level of dynamism in the European information space economy is limited. Regarding media 
organisations, there is a clear trend towards internationalisation due to the widespread uptake of automated 
multilingualism. Supported by measures such as mandatory revenue sharing from digital distribution channels 
and in some cases even via public funding, Europe’s media landscape has consolidated and its quality outlets 
are able to compete at international level. As the funding and business models facilitated by public policy 
mainly benefit larger players, small and medium sized media are often at an impasse when it comes to long- 
term stability. They nevertheless play a vital role in the European information space often due to their thematic 
specialisation. 
The role of the European Union. Politically, the EU has achieved further integration on digital matters as 
Member States have collectively pushed for stronger digital sovereignty. Following a utilitarian mode of 
policymaking, most interventions into the European information space are guided by an emphasis on collective 
goods and European values. Access to data held by public authorities is usually granted mostly for projects 
with a clear social or economic benefit in mind and digital services are required to share parts of their 
company data for purposes such as academic research and public projects. While heavy-handed legal 
frameworks on data protection, intellectual property, intermediary liability and content moderation have 
sparked some degree of international tension, they have also helped to create an integrated and well-
 
 
P
a
g
e 
1
2
9
 
functioning European digital single market. In turn, policy has shifted from reigning in large platforms’ market 
dominance towards strong oversight and moderation rules. Having largely overcome initial problems of 
attracting skilled staff, a network of European digital service regulators with a single board at European level 
now tightly monitors the status of implementation of EU rules. Internal borders for intellectual property have 
mostly been abolished, facilitating sharing and collaboration in Europe. Far-reaching legal obligations to 
counter terrorist content, disinformation or social discrimination on digital intermediaries have resulted in the 
European information space becoming increasingly separate from the global information community. Some 
instances of Member State governments using European legal frameworks such as counter terrorism to force 
removal and de-prioritisation of political content that they define as extremist have also raised many concerns 
among civil society. 
Regarding the environmental impact of digitalisation, the EU has imposed resolute standards for the energy 
consumption of ICT services. Bringing carbon border adjustments into the online sphere, these standards have 
in some cases resulted in heavy fines imposed against foreign digital services. However, the insistence on 
geolocation of servers and the reluctance to foster more decentralised methods of data storage does 
ultimately still result in comparably high energy costs of the European information space. 
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Table 6 - The future of European information space 2035 at a glance 
 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
Scenario axes Conflictual World / Closed 
& concentrated economy 
Conflictual World /  
Open & interdependent economy 
Collaborative World / Open & 
interdependent economy 
Collaborative World / Closed & 
concentrated economy 
Trust in online 
information 
Information online, as well as 
news reporting on the “real” 
world, is trusted very little. 
Public broadcasters, publicly 
subsidised media and a small 
number of partisan outlets are 
seen as the only somewhat 
reliable sources of 
information. “Outsider” 
information from unknown 
sources is rarely trusted. 
Societal resilience facilitates some 
degrees of trust in the accuracy of 
digital content, but the struggle to 
maintain a shared understanding of 
reality persists in both social and news 
media. 
Popular online contributions tied 
to one’s verified persona are an 
important source of societal 
status. 
Emphasis on productivity, 
dynamism and collaboration, 
those unable or unwilling to 
submit to this paradigm often 
feel excluded and less valued. 
Trust in information found online is 
generally high but the awareness of 
filtering technologies and geographically 
dispersed services gives some citizens an 
increasing feeling of not getting the full 
picture.  
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 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
Political 
engagement 
and 
participation 
Generally low engagement, 
high degree of escapism with 
few exceptions 
Rise of ambient populism and 
nationalism. 
Counter-culture movements 
try, with varying degrees of 
success, to sneak political 
protest and debate into the 
virtual socialising and gaming 
worlds of apolitical peers. 
Public political deliberation 
platforms have poor 
sophistication and are scarcely 
used by citizens, not least 
because of their biometric 
access requirements. 
 
Moderate level of political 
engagement and political news 
sharing. 
Move away from political discussions 
on social media towards dedicated 
platforms. Many users choose not to 
see political content at all. 
Political deliberation platforms are 
used but have been subject to 
meddling and cyberattacks, resulting 
in lower degrees of trust in their 
outcomes. 
Participation in political 
discussions is far-reaching as 
governments have embraced 
deliberative online platforms 
that allow for nuanced, large-
scale debate in a non-polarised 
manner. 
Political content is widely shared 
on social media, societal 
polarisation has decreased as a 
result of facilitated participatory 
policy dialogues.  
Escapist tendencies in parts of 
society engaged with political 
content only as far as it is 
necessary and otherwise use 
the information space to 
socialise and share non-political 
experiences.  
Politicians, political parties and 
international organisations have developed 
automated personas in order to give 
citizens the opportunity for a “personal” 
interaction. Although for many citizens this 
has sparked greater attachment to politics, 
the deployment of such placeholder 
chatbots – in particular those of the most 
publicly known actors – is also confronted 
with increasingly difficult challenges like 
cybersecurity and reputation management. 
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 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
Collaboration 
and sharing 
High degrees of escapism lead 
to focus on common online 
social experiences. 
Hostile information 
environment severely limits 
economic productivity. 
Focus on individualism, fragmentation 
among various political and economic 
cleavages.  
Online tribalism has increased and is 
often visible in the clustering of 
communities along services whose 
content moderation and blocking 
policies they agree with the most. 
Private individuals frequently 
engage in the sharing and 
discussion of information in a 
generally collaborative manner. 
Social, non-political games have 
proliferated and are used by 
large parts of society, VR and AR 
have also contributed to 
emancipatory, participatory use 
cases. 
When it comes to the sharing of 
information and collaboration in collective 
intelligence processes, citizens and 
businesses benefit and actively make use 
of the European information space’s 
internal coherence. 
Internal borders for intellectual property 
have mostly been abolished, facilitating 
sharing and collaboration in Europe. 
Pace and focus 
of innovation 
Little product and software 
compatibility between the 
services of different digital 
giants, no interoperability and 
portability between different 
social media services. 
Lack of direct competition 
results in a general lack of 
disruptive innovation. 
As competition on quality features is 
high, the pace of innovation is 
moderately fast and leads to 
continuous industry-wide 
development. 
Innovation is commonly pivoting 
mostly towards improving security, 
surveillance and trustworthiness. 
Decentralisation is a guiding 
technological principle: From 
protocol interoperability of 
digital services to mesh 
networks and secure multi-party 
computing, data storage and 
processing in a central manner 
has mostly become outdated.  
Market for secretive tracking 
technology that matches 
citizens’ various profiles with 
each other, in particular with 
their verified identity. 
Technologies related to the creation and 
dissemination of content are constrained 
by strict sets of rules. 
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 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
Content 
curation and 
targeting 
Creation and dissemination of 
content have become 
increasingly automated. 
Widespread use of automated 
systems which translate 
human input into blog articles, 
entertainment videos or 
political campaign pieces. 
Little to no anonymity, high 
degrees of filtering and 
targeting thus determine the 
majority of content that is 
seen by most individuals in 
society. 
On bigger platforms, behavioural 
targeting is a trade-off for increased 
security. 
There is a booming market for 
software that manages data access in 
accordance with citizens’ preferences. 
Some open source platforms and 
social enterprises combine community 
maintenance with technological 
approaches to actively mitigate issues 
such as information overload or 
radicalisation. Other providers have 
pivoted towards the opposite in order 
to keep their members perpetually 
outraged and politically engaged. 
Highly granular choice 
interfaces that allow users to 
choose their desired level of 
personalisation, both in regard 
to advertising and the curation 
of content in newsfeeds and 
similar products.  
Interoperable services with 
diverging curation policies have 
contributed to a situation where 
users have a wide degree of 
control over what they see 
online. 
New means of accessing the 
information space, such as 
virtual and augmented reality, 
have spread far and wide in 
society and offer new means of 
entertainment and 
collaboration. 
Algorithmic curation of content needs to 
balance the blocking of illegal content with 
carrying obligations for political speech. 
Where automated systems for content 
creation, alteration and dissemination are 
deployed, transparent labelling obligations 
apply. 
Tracking and corporate surveillance have 
intensified and product advertisements are 
heavily personalised. 
Political advertising is also making use of 
such targeting options, but due to EU 
internal legislation on transparency 
requirements and data protection, is 
generally more limited regarding targeting 
sophistication. 
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 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
Authentication Identity verification 
technologies are crucial for 
maintaining a basic level of 
trustworthiness on 
deliberative and social media 
services, relying frequently on 
biometric data and facial 
recognition. 
Verified digital identities, supported by 
decentralised technology (e.g. 
distributed ledgers), are a key feature 
for maintaining trust in the online 
environment.  
The data attached to these profiles is 
extremely comprehensive and 
personal. 
Decentralised technology is commonly 
used to give transparency about the 
origin of a piece of content (with 
limited effect). Initiatives such as 
industry-standards on timestamping 
and digital watermarking of original 
digital material has limited effect. 
Supported by decentralised 
technology, centralised, 
“verified” identities that 
uniquely identify citizens are 
widely available, either for 
online participation in political 
matters or trust-based civil or 
economic cooperation. 
Anonymous profiles remain the 
norm for most services and are 
kept untied from verified 
identities. 
Authentication technologies such as 
cryptographically verified identities have 
proliferated and are mainly issued by 
national governments. While the tying of 
inferences from user behaviour on a given 
service to such an identity is in principle 
subject to strict consent obligations, big 
digital corporations are partially successful 
in circumventing such legal constraints 
through remaining loopholes and a general 
lack of less invasive competition. 
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 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
Disinformation 
and 
information 
operations 
Sophisticated automatic 
generation tools are being 
used for highly granular, 
targeted political advertising 
campaigns. 
Foreign and domestic forces 
interfere with online 
deliberation processes on 
dedicated platforms. 
Efforts towards increasing 
digital and media literacy are 
stalled in order to make 
citizens more susceptible to 
the public authorities’ own 
narratives. 
Online communities are competing - 
trying to control the narrative. 
Proliferation of deepfake audio-visual 
content, automatically generated 
false news articles and sophisticated 
campaigns involving automated 
account 
Foreign and domestic forces are 
interfering with online deliberation 
processes on dedicated platforms. 
Disinformation exists but this is 
not a broad societal issue. 
Absence of information operations, but 
increasing tensions over centrally 
mandated information curation legislation. 
Some Member States are accused of using 
EU acquis to censor political opponents. 
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 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
Digital 
platforms 
market 
Heavily dominated by large, 
powerful companies.  
Some European alternatives 
have emerged and, in some 
cases, have become dominant 
in the European market. 
Fragmentation of international 
conversation, users are 
clustered along with their 
geographical location across a 
variety of regional and 
national social media. 
Limited number of secure 
sharing and discussion spaces 
for small numbers of users. 
Reliance on paid subscription 
plans. 
Competitive, mostly decentralised 
information space with strong 
international interdependence. 
Majority of users rely upon the 
services of a few select companies 
that are seen as the most protective 
and technologically advanced. 
Some Member States have introduced 
national liability and safety rules in 
their jurisdiction, partially distorting 
the digital single market. 
More secure alternative providers 
mostly function based on a 
subscription model. 
High degree of topical divergence of 
platforms, users generally lock the 
content they post on such dedicated 
platforms from being displayed on 
services serving another context. 
Dynamic mix of a multitude of 
competing digital services.  
Strong interoperability 
requirements have led to a 
diversification of platforms, 
giving citizens the choice 
between a variety of providers 
whose products compete on 
privacy protection, quality of 
service, design, curation etc. 
Fast-paced innovation. 
Disruptive improvements are 
key to retain users in the long 
term. 
Business models of digital 
services vary but rely mostly on 
contextual advertising, 
subscriptions or donations.  
Far reaching economic concentration in the 
digital single market. Select few platforms 
reap the main economic benefits from 
providing means of information creation 
and dissemination. 
Strict regulatory frameworks on data 
protection, local storage, content 
moderation and illegal content have 
contributed to a partial withdrawal of 
international platforms. 
Without profile portability or 
interoperability requirements, big players 
benefit from strong network benefits.  
Start-ups and smaller services are 
acquired quickly on international and 
European levels but level of dynamism in 
the European information space economy 
is limited. 
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 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
News media 
market 
Media has become less 
investigative, focussing mainly 
on promoting as much as 
possible a shared 
understanding of reality. 
News-media market features some 
big, widely respected publishers and a 
growing multitude of small media, 
hyper-partisan outlets and blogs. 
Revival of news media, some 
few – mostly high quality – 
transregional, big newspapers 
are still going strong. 
Prevalence of online group 
spheres and increasing 
professionalism outside of 
traditional media foster a 
proliferation of small news sites, 
professional blogs and citizen 
journalism increase share of 
revenue and influence. 
Decrease in on-platform 
behavioural advertising leads to 
a revaluation of advertising on 
quality media. 
Europe’s media landscape has 
consolidated and its quality outlets are 
able to compete on an international level. 
Small and medium sized media are often 
at an impasse when it comes to long-term 
stability, but play a vital role in the 
European information space. 
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 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
Regulation and 
control 
Focussed on security and 
economic protectionism. 
EU is struggling to keep some 
degree of coherence in the 
European information space. 
Member States have 
introduced a patchwork of 
national legal frameworks. 
The EU is trying to counter 
external disinformation. Due to 
fragmented national initiatives 
and low degrees of trust, these 
efforts are frequently 
undermined from within. 
Data generated or collected by 
public authorities is rarely 
made available in a non-
discriminatory way and is 
instead passed only to 
selected companies that align 
closely with the state. 
Enforcement of open standards and 
profile portability have resulted in 
digital services in the European 
information space becoming 
increasingly decentralised. 
Focussed on enforcement of 
data protection, competition and 
interoperability legislation, 
leaving most issues in the 
information space to be solved 
by private and civil society 
innovation - independent 
regulators play a key role. 
Intellectual property legislation 
has developed advanced “fair 
use” clauses to facilitate sharing 
and open access, and a 
proliferation of open licenses 
has contributed to a general 
drop in piracy. 
Strong regulatory enforcement 
is tightly coordinated at the 
European level to prevent a 
fragmentation of the digital 
single market. 
Participation in global fora has 
gained increasing importance as 
recognition that international 
coordination is crucial in a 
borderless information space. 
High EU integration on digital matters. 
Shift from reigning in of large platforms’ 
market dominance towards strong 
oversight and moderation rules 
Some instances of Member State 
governments using European legal 
frameworks such as counter terrorism to 
force removal and de-prioritisation of 
political content that they define as 
extremist raise concerns among civil 
society. 
Legal obligations to counter issues such as 
terrorist content and disinformation on 
digital intermediaries have resulted in the 
European information space becoming 
increasingly separate from the global 
information community.  
Internal borders for intellectual property 
have mostly been abolished, facilitating 
sharing and collaboration in Europe. 
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 Scenario 1 
Struggle for information 
supremacy 
Scenario 2 
Resilient disorder 
 
Scenario 3 
Global cutting edge 
Scenario 4 
Harmonic divergence 
Transparency 
and public 
oversight 
State entities further their 
security agenda through close 
ties with large companies and 
are thus unwilling and unable 
to limit corporate surveillance 
and enforce strong human 
rights compliance regulation 
for emerging technologies. 
Mandatory algorithm audits by 
competent regulatory authorities. Big 
challenges to coordination on 
European level as Member States 
have passed a patchwork of national 
laws with different legal obligations 
for intermediaries. 
Independent regulators with 
strong monitoring powers play a 
key role in enforcing legislation, 
auditing algorithmic systems for 
compliance with legal 
frameworks.  
Increasing participation in 
international fora as the 
information space is truly 
global. 
A network of European digital services 
regulators with a single board at European 
level now tightly monitors the status of 
implementation of EU rules. 
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List of abbreviations and definitions 
 
Algorithm: An unambiguous procedure to solve a problem or a class of problems. It is typically 
composed of a set of instructions or rules that take some input data and return outputs. 
Algorithmic content curation: Auto- mated selection of what content should be displayed to users, 
what should be hidden, and how it should be presented. 
Algorithmic decision-making: The pro- cessing of input data to produce a score or a choice that is 
used to support decisions such as prioritisation, classification, association, and filtering. 
Attention economy: Human attention limits what we can perceive in stimulating environments and 
what we can do. Attention has become a commodity online with platforms vying for user engagement. 
(Also sometimes called the “dopamine economy” because of the presumed addictive properties of 
social media.) 
Avatars: An icon, graphic or other image by which a person represents herself online. 
Bots: A software program that can execute commands, reply to messages or perform routine tasks, 
thus mimicking human communication either automatically or with minimal human intervention. 
Social media bots may retweet certain posts to gather attention. 
Choice Architectures: Refers to the practice of influencing choice by organising the context in which 
people make decisions. 
Cognition: The mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, 
experience, and the senses. 
Dark patterns: Design choices that benefit an online service by coercing, steering or deceiving users 
into making unintended and potentially harmful decisions. 
Digital fingerprint: A distinct, data-driven identifier comprising tiny bits of personal data. 
Disinformation: False, fabricated or manipulated content shared with intent to mislead or cause 
harm. 
Echo chamber: An environment in which a person encounters only beliefs or opinions that coincide 
with her own, so that existing views are reinforced and alternative ideas are not considered. 
Epistemic quality: The quality of information as valid components of knowledge. 
European Information Space (used in the foresight process): All factors and entities that 
directly or indirectly contribute to the creation, dissemination and processing of information on the 
individual, group and societal level, including the translation of such information into political action.  
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Explainability: The possibility to explain the function of artificial intelligence technology so that their 
solutions are being under- stood by humans. 
Fake news: A form of manufactured news consisting of deliberate disinformation or hoaxes that 
seeks to mimic the format of real news. 
Filter bubble: A situation in which an Internet user encounters only information and opinions that 
conform to and reinforce her own beliefs, caused by algorithms that personalise information diets. 
Fundamental rights: The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union guarantees 
personal, civic, political, economic, and social rights and freedoms to individuals in the EU. 
Instrumental-variable analysis: A sta- tistical technique that permits identification of causality in 
the associations between ob- served variables. 
Internet: A global computer network con- sisting of interconnected nodes using stan- dardised 
communication protocols. 
Machine learning: When computers dis- cover how they can improve performance from provided 
data, without being explicitly programmed to do so. 
Mal-information: Genuine information shared with intent to cause harm, such as hate speech and 
leaks of private information. 
Microtargeting: Customised marketing messages delivered to a niche audience shar- ing relevant 
interests, based on personal data provided by users or inferred from their on- line behaviour. 
Misinformation: false or misleading con- tent created and initially presented without malicious 
intent. 
Online moderation: Methods used to sort contributions that are irrelevant, obscene, illegal or 
insulting with regards to useful or informative online contributions. 
Profiling: Any form of automated personal data processing that uses personal data to evaluate 
certain personal aspects relating to a natural person. 
Search Engine Optimization (SEO): The process of growing the quality and quantity of website 
traffic by increasing the visibility of a website or a web page to users of search engines. 
Sock-puppet: A fake persona used to dis- cuss or place comments online. Usually created to 
manipulate or deceive for political ends. 
Social media: Websites and applications that enable users to create and share content or to 
participate in social networking. 
Strategic foresight: A way of exploiting our inherent storytelling abilities to create a manageable 
and memorable number of plausible stories of the future. 
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User authentication: A security process that encompasses the human-to-computer interactions 
that require the user to log in. 
Web: The World Wide Web, commonly known as the Web, is an information system where documents 
and other resources are identified by web addresses (URLs), which may be interlinked by hypertext, 
and are accessible over the Internet. 
Worldview: The collection of attitudes, values, stories and expectations about the world around us, 
which inform our thoughts and attitudes and provide a schema for how the world should be 
structured.  
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address of the centre 
nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. 
Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see 
https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en). 
EU law and related documents 
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1952 in all the official language versions, go to EUR-Lex at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu 
Open data from the EU 
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en) provides access to datasets from the EU. Data can be downloaded and 
reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. 
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